Executive Overview — What We’re Dealing With

This specimen has persisted long enough to matter. Human experts classified it as Malware, and the telemetry confirms a capable, evasive Trojan with real impact potential.

Extended Dwell Time Impact

For 17+ hours, this malware remained undetected — a half-day window that permitted the adversary to complete initial execution, establish basic persistence, and perform initial system enumeration.

Global Detection Posture — Who Caught It, Who Missed It

VirusTotal engines: 73. Detected as malicious: 55. Missed: 18. Coverage: 75.3%.

Why it matters: if any endpoint relies solely on a missed engine, this malware can operate with zero alerts. Prevention‑first controls close that gap regardless of signature lag.

Behavioral Storyline — How the Malware Operates

Dominant system-level operations (40.19% of behavior) suggest this malware performs deep system reconnaissance, privilege escalation, or core OS manipulation. It’s actively probing system defenses and attempting to gain administrative control.

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

• T1027 – obfuscated with SmartAssembly
• T1129 – link function at runtime on Windows
• T1082 – Checks available memory
• T1071 – Binary file triggered YARA rule
• T1106 – Guard pages use detected – possible anti-debugging.
• T1129 – The process attempted to dynamically load a malicious function
• T1057 – The process has tried to detect the debugger probing the use of page guards.
• T1129 – The process tried to load dynamically one or more functions.
• T1045 – Manalize Local SandBox Packer Harvesting
• T1129 – link function at runtime on Windows
• T1057 – The process attempted to detect a running debugger using common APIs
• T1027 – obfuscated with SmartAssembly
• T1106 – .NET source code references suspicious native API functions
• T1497 – Allocates memory with a write watch (potentially for evading sandboxes)
• T1562.001 – Creates guard pages, often used to prevent reverse engineering and debugging
• T1140 – .NET source code contains calls to encryption/decryption functions
• T1082 – Queries the volume information (name, serial number etc) of a device
• T1082 – Queries the cryptographic machine GUID
• T1560 – .NET source code contains calls to encryption/decryption functions

Following the Trail — Network & DNS Activity

Outbound activity leans on reputable infrastructure (e.g., CDNs, cloud endpoints) to blend in. TLS sessions and
HTTP calls show routine beaconing and IP‑lookup behavior that can masquerade as normal browsing.

Hunting tip: alert on unknown binaries initiating TLS to IP‑lookup services or unusual CDN endpoints — especially early in execution.