Executive Overview — What We’re Dealing With

This specimen has persisted long enough to matter. Human experts classified it as Malware, and the telemetry confirms a capable, evasive Trojan with real impact potential.

Extended Dwell Time Impact

For 17+ hours, this malware remained undetected — a half-day window that permitted the adversary to complete initial execution, establish basic persistence, and perform initial system enumeration.

Global Detection Posture — Who Caught It, Who Missed It

VirusTotal engines: 73. Detected as malicious: 58. Missed: 15. Coverage: 79.5%.

Why it matters: if any endpoint relies solely on a missed engine, this malware can operate with zero alerts. Prevention‑first controls close that gap regardless of signature lag.

Behavioral Storyline — How the Malware Operates

Significant process manipulation (75.18% of behavior) suggests code injection, process hollowing, or privilege escalation techniques. The malware is actively compromising running processes to hide its activities.

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

• T1140 – decode data using Base64 in .NET
• T1620 – invoke .NET assembly method
• T1129 – link function at runtime on Windows
• T1083 – get common file path
• T1083 – check if file exists
• T1027 – encrypt data using AES via .NET
• T1564 – A process created a hidden window
• T1202 – Uses Windows utilities for basic functionality
• T1036 – A file was accessed within the Public folder.
• T1548 – A file was accessed within the Public folder.
• T1027 – The binary likely contains encrypted or compressed data
• T1564.003 – A process created a hidden window
• T1027.002 – The binary likely contains encrypted or compressed data
• T1082 – Checks available memory
• T1082 – Access the NetLogon registry key, potentially used for discovery or tampering
• T1012 – Access the NetLogon registry key, potentially used for discovery or tampering
• T1071 – Resolves a suspicious Top Level Domain (TLD)
• T1071 – At least one IP Address, Domain, or File Name was found in a crypto call
• T1071 – HTTP traffic contains suspicious features which may be indicative of malware related traffic
• T1071 – Reads from the memory of another process
• T1071 – Reads data out of its own binary image
• T1071 – Binary file triggered YARA rule
• T1071 – A process attempted to delay the analysis task by a long amount of time.
• T1106 – Guard pages use detected – possible anti-debugging.
• T1059 – Executed a command line with /C or /R argument to terminate command shell on completion which can be used to hide execution
• T1129 – The process attempted to dynamically load a malicious function
• T1140 – Detected an attempt to pull out some data from the binary image
• T1129 – The process tried to load dynamically one or more functions.
• T1057 – The process has tried to detect the debugger probing the use of page guards.
• T1083 – get common file path
• T1140 – decode data using Base64 in .NET
• T1129 – link function at runtime on Windows
• T1083 – check if file exists
• T1027 – encrypt data using AES via .NET
• T1057 – The process attempted to detect a running debugger using common APIs
• T1071 – The process behaves as a known keylogger (iSpy)

Following the Trail — Network & DNS Activity

Outbound activity leans on reputable infrastructure (e.g., CDNs, cloud endpoints) to blend in. TLS sessions and
HTTP calls show routine beaconing and IP‑lookup behavior that can masquerade as normal browsing.

Hunting tip: alert on unknown binaries initiating TLS to IP‑lookup services or unusual CDN endpoints — especially early in execution.