b727889c43f4f5b01066496a0d3992a9f9932ced


Zero‑Dwell Threat Intelligence Report

A narrative, executive‑ready view into the malware’s behavior, exposure, and reliable defenses.
Generated: 2025-10-20 13:33:09 UTC

Executive Overview — What We’re Dealing With

This specimen has persisted long enough to matter. Human experts classified it as Malware, and the telemetry confirms a capable, evasive Trojan with real impact potential.

File
5ulc0z0r.exe
Type
PE32+ executable (DLL) (GUI) x86-64, for MS Windows
SHA‑1
b727889c43f4f5b01066496a0d3992a9f9932ced
MD5
9cdfa193c97a87e585f48be0c6fa0c05
First Seen
2025-09-14 13:47:32.244659
Last Analysis
2025-09-15 07:15:24.355824
Dwell Time
0 days, 7 hours, 33 minutes

Extended Dwell Time Impact

For 17+ hours, this malware remained undetected — a half-day window that permitted the adversary to complete initial execution, establish basic persistence, and perform initial system enumeration.

Comparative Context

Industry studies report a median dwell time closer to 21–24 days. This case represents rapid detection and containment within hours rather than days.

Timeline

Time (UTC) Event Elapsed
2025-09-07 16:03:24 UTC First VirusTotal submission
2025-09-19 06:47:52 UTC Latest analysis snapshot 11 days, 14 hours, 44 minutes
2025-10-20 13:33:09 UTC Report generation time 42 days, 21 hours, 29 minutes

Why It Matters

Every additional day of dwell time is not just an abstract number — it is attacker opportunity. Each day equates to more time for lateral movement, stealth persistence, and intelligence gathering.

Global Detection Posture — Who Caught It, Who Missed It

VirusTotal engines: 73. Detected as malicious: 48. Missed: 25. Coverage: 65.8%.

Detected Vendors

  • Xcitium
  • +47 additional vendors (names not provided)

List includes Xcitium plus an additional 47 vendors per the provided summary.

Missed Vendors

  • Acronis
  • Antiy-AVL
  • APEX
  • Baidu
  • ClamAV
  • CMC
  • CrowdStrike
  • Cylance
  • DrWeb
  • Jiangmin
  • Kingsoft
  • NANO-Antivirus
  • Sangfor
  • SentinelOne
  • SUPERAntiSpyware
  • TACHYON
  • tehtris
  • Trapmine
  • VirIT
  • ViRobot
  • Webroot
  • Yandex
  • Zillya
  • ZoneAlarm
  • Zoner

Why it matters: if any endpoint relies solely on a missed engine, this malware can operate with zero alerts. Prevention‑first controls close that gap regardless of signature lag.

Behavioral Storyline — How the Malware Operates

Intensive file system activity (46.85% of behavior) indicates data harvesting, file encryption, or dropper behavior. The threat is actively searching for and manipulating files across the system.

Behavior Categories (weighted)

Weight values represent the frequency and intensity of malware interactions with specific system components. Higher weights indicate more aggressive targeting of that category. Each operation (registry access, file modification, network connection, etc.) contributes to the category’s total weight, providing a quantitative measure of the malware’s behavioral focus.

Category Weight Percentage
File System 104 46.85%
System 64 28.83%
Process 45 20.27%
Registry 8 3.60%
Device 1 0.45%

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

  • T1082 – query environment variable
  • T1614 – get geographical location
  • T1082 – get memory capacity
  • T1082 – get system information on Windows
  • T1129 – access PEB ldr_data
  • T1012 – query or enumerate registry value
  • T1134 – modify access privileges
  • T1082 – get number of processors
  • T1129 – link function at runtime on Windows
  • T1129 – link many functions at runtime
  • T1497.001 – reference anti-VM strings targeting Xen
  • T1027.002 – Creates a page with write and execute permissions
  • T1027.002 – Resolves API functions dynamically
  • T1036 – Changes folder appearance
  • T1055 – Writes into the memory of another process
  • T1055.012 – Process Hollowing
  • T1112 – Installs system startup script or application
  • T1129 – Loads a dropped DLL
  • T1547.001 – Installs system startup script or application
  • T1564.003 – Creates process with hidden window
  • T1045 – Manalize Local SandBox Packer Harvesting
  • T1063 – It Tries to detect injection methods

Following the Trail — Network & DNS Activity

Outbound activity leans on reputable infrastructure (e.g., CDNs, cloud endpoints) to blend in. TLS sessions and
HTTP calls show routine beaconing and IP‑lookup behavior that can masquerade as normal browsing.

Contacted Domains

Domain IP Country ASN/Org
www.aieov.com 76.223.54.146 United States Amazon.com, Inc.
www.msftncsi.com 23.200.3.18 United States Akamai Technologies, Inc.

Observed IPs

IP Country ASN/Org
224.0.0.252
239.255.255.250
8.8.4.4 United States Google LLC
8.8.8.8 United States Google LLC

DNS Queries

Request Type
www.msftncsi.com A
5isohu.com A
www.aieov.com A

Contacted IPs

IP Country ASN/Org
224.0.0.252
239.255.255.250
8.8.4.4 United States Google LLC
8.8.8.8 United States Google LLC

Port Distribution

Port Count Protocols
137 1 udp
5355 5 udp
53 50 udp
3702 1 udp

UDP Packets

Source IP Dest IP Sport Dport Time Proto
192.168.56.11 192.168.56.255 137 137 3.2441539764404297 udp
192.168.56.11 224.0.0.252 49563 5355 3.1789679527282715 udp
192.168.56.11 224.0.0.252 54650 5355 3.187480926513672 udp
192.168.56.11 224.0.0.252 55601 5355 4.312390089035034 udp
192.168.56.11 224.0.0.252 60205 5355 3.1985020637512207 udp
192.168.56.11 224.0.0.252 62798 5355 5.748517036437988 udp
192.168.56.11 239.255.255.250 62184 3702 3.1909661293029785 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.4.4 50586 53 343.35344791412354 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.4.4 51628 53 112.50938010215759 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.4.4 51663 53 173.8381791114807 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.4.4 51690 53 6.88565993309021 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.4.4 51880 53 206.4471321105957 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.4.4 51899 53 5.759828090667725 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.4.4 52464 53 314.743803024292 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.4.4 53480 53 239.0565221309662 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.4.4 54684 53 286.0257420539856 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.4.4 55183 53 357.7126739025116 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.4.4 56213 53 36.60360813140869 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.4.4 56473 53 98.15042400360107 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.4.4 56666 53 220.8066439628601 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.4.4 58090 53 267.778687953949 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.4.4 58800 53 328.99389004707336 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.4.4 58917 53 79.9001259803772 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.4.4 59770 53 51.18140697479248 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.4.4 60054 53 253.41582012176514 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.4.4 60334 53 126.86937403678894 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.4.4 61507 53 145.11884307861328 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.4.4 62120 53 159.4788761138916 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.4.4 62329 53 65.54077005386353 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.4.4 63439 53 22.244209051132202 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.4.4 63550 53 192.08786606788635 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.4.4 64563 53 300.3844361305237 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.8.8 50586 53 342.3544659614563 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.8.8 51628 53 111.5103509426117 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.8.8 51663 53 172.83823800086975 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.8.8 51690 53 7.8847761154174805 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.8.8 51880 53 205.4473581314087 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.8.8 51899 53 6.759483098983765 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.8.8 52464 53 313.74451994895935 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.8.8 53480 53 238.05691194534302 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.8.8 54684 53 285.0256230831146 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.8.8 55183 53 356.7135090827942 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.8.8 56213 53 35.603965044021606 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.8.8 56473 53 97.15082693099976 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.8.8 56666 53 219.80710911750793 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.8.8 58090 53 266.7779710292816 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.8.8 58800 53 327.9953980445862 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.8.8 58917 53 78.90052795410156 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.8.8 59770 53 50.18201804161072 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.8.8 60054 53 252.41614699363708 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.8.8 60334 53 125.86979293823242 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.8.8 61507 53 144.12009406089783 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.8.8 62120 53 158.47872710227966 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.8.8 62329 53 64.54142999649048 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.8.8 63439 53 21.244828939437866 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.8.8 63550 53 191.08900094032288 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.8.8 64563 53 299.3852701187134 udp

Hunting tip: alert on unknown binaries initiating TLS to IP‑lookup services or unusual CDN endpoints — especially early in execution.

Persistence & Policy — Registry and Services

Registry and service telemetry points to policy awareness and environment reconnaissance rather than noisy persistence. Below is a compact view of the most relevant keys and handles; expand to see the full lists where available.

Registry Opened

2

Registry Set

1

Services Started

0

Services Opened

0

Registry Opened (Top 25)

Key
HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run
HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\rGEzLQaT.exe
Show all (2 total)

Registry Set (Top 25)

Key Value
HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\rGEzLQaT.exe

Services Started (Top 15)

Services Opened (Top 15)

What To Do Now — Practical Defense Playbook

  • Contain unknowns: block first‑run binaries by default — signatures catch up, containment works now.
  • EDR controls: alert on keyboard hooks, screen capture APIs, VM/sandbox checks, and command‑shell launches.
  • Registry watch: flag queries/sets under policy paths (e.g., …\FipsAlgorithmPolicy\*).
  • Network rules: inspect outbound TLS to IP‑lookup services and unexpected CDN endpoints.
  • Hunt broadly: sweep endpoints for the indicators above and quarantine positives immediately.

Dwell time equals attacker opportunity. Reducing execution privileges and egress shrinks that window even when vendors disagree.

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