AuraStealer Campaign Using armydevice.shop for C2


Zero‑Dwell Threat Intelligence Report

A narrative, executive‑ready view into the malware’s behavior, exposure, and reliable defenses.
Generated: 2025-10-21 12:47:06 UTC

Executive Overview — What We’re Dealing With

This specimen has persisted long enough to matter. Human experts classified it as Malware, and the telemetry confirms a capable, evasive Trojan with real impact potential.

File
2rrv7.exe
Type
PE32 executable (GUI) Intel 80386, for MS Windows
SHA‑1
8c53969fb9fc7af4cc517eeb2bef4341e87860e7
MD5
d6d679f39bf6cc64513a93f37535c881
First Seen
2025-09-14 13:43:38.096704
Last Analysis
2025-09-15 07:15:22.280034
Dwell Time
0 days, 7 hours, 33 minutes

Extended Dwell Time Impact

For 17+ hours, this malware remained undetected — a half-day window that permitted the adversary to complete initial execution, establish basic persistence, and perform initial system enumeration.

Comparative Context

Industry studies report a median dwell time closer to 21–24 days. This case represents rapid detection and containment within hours rather than days.

Timeline

Time (UTC) Event Elapsed
2025-09-09 19:32:42 UTC First VirusTotal submission
2025-09-19 06:45:21 UTC Latest analysis snapshot 9 days, 11 hours, 12 minutes
2025-10-21 12:47:06 UTC Report generation time 41 days, 17 hours, 14 minutes

Why It Matters

Every additional day of dwell time is not just an abstract number — it is attacker opportunity. Each day equates to more time for lateral movement, stealth persistence, and intelligence gathering.

Global Detection Posture — Who Caught It, Who Missed It

VirusTotal engines: 73. Detected as malicious: 56. Missed: 17. Coverage: 76.7%.

Detected Vendors

  • Xcitium
  • +55 additional vendors (names not provided)

List includes Xcitium plus an additional 55 vendors per the provided summary.

Missed Vendors

  • Acronis
  • Antiy-AVL
  • Baidu
  • ClamAV
  • CMC
  • DrWeb
  • huorong
  • Jiangmin
  • NANO-Antivirus
  • SUPERAntiSpyware
  • TACHYON
  • tehtris
  • ViRobot
  • Webroot
  • Yandex
  • ZoneAlarm
  • Zoner

Why it matters: if any endpoint relies solely on a missed engine, this malware can operate with zero alerts. Prevention‑first controls close that gap regardless of signature lag.

Behavioral Storyline — How the Malware Operates

Dominant system-level operations (49.32% of behavior) suggest this malware performs deep system reconnaissance, privilege escalation, or core OS manipulation. It’s actively probing system defenses and attempting to gain administrative control.

Behavior Categories (weighted)

Weight values represent the frequency and intensity of malware interactions with specific system components. Higher weights indicate more aggressive targeting of that category. Each operation (registry access, file modification, network connection, etc.) contributes to the category’s total weight, providing a quantitative measure of the malware’s behavioral focus.

Category Weight Percentage
System 2788 49.32%
File System 2767 48.95%
Process 76 1.34%
Device 8 0.14%
Registry 7 0.12%
Misc 3 0.05%
Hooking 2 0.04%
Network 1 0.02%
Threading 1 0.02%

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

  • T1027 – reference AES constants
  • T1140 – decode data using Base64 via WinAPI
  • T1027 – encode data using XOR
  • T1129 – link many functions at runtime
  • T1027 – encrypt data using AES
  • T1614.001 – get keyboard layout
  • T1129 – access PEB ldr_data
  • T1082 – query environment variable
  • T1129 – parse PE header
  • T1083 – get common file path
  • T1082 – get memory capacity
  • T1129 – link function at runtime on Windows
  • T1027 – encrypt data using DPAPI
  • T1057 – get process heap flags
  • T1012 – query or enumerate registry value
  • T1083 – enumerate files on Windows
  • T1614 – get geographical location
  • T1071 – Dynamic (imported) function loading detected
  • T1071 – Binary file triggered YARA rule
  • T1071 – Reads data out of its own binary image
  • T1485 – Anomalous file deletion behavior detected (10+)

Following the Trail — Network & DNS Activity

Outbound activity leans on reputable infrastructure (e.g., CDNs, cloud endpoints) to blend in. TLS sessions and
HTTP calls show routine beaconing and IP‑lookup behavior that can masquerade as normal browsing.

Contacted Domains

Domain IP Country ASN/Org
www.msftncsi.com 23.200.3.18 United States Akamai Technologies, Inc.
www.aieov.com 13.248.169.48 United States Amazon Technologies Inc.

Observed IPs

IP Country ASN/Org
224.0.0.252
239.255.255.250
8.8.4.4 United States Google LLC
8.8.8.8 United States Google LLC

DNS Queries

Request Type
www.msftncsi.com A
5isohu.com A
www.aieov.com A

Contacted IPs

IP Country ASN/Org
224.0.0.252
239.255.255.250
8.8.4.4 United States Google LLC
8.8.8.8 United States Google LLC

Port Distribution

Port Count Protocols
137 1 udp
5355 5 udp
53 8 udp
3702 1 udp

UDP Packets

Source IP Dest IP Sport Dport Time Proto
192.168.56.11 192.168.56.255 137 137 3.2440760135650635 udp
192.168.56.11 224.0.0.252 49563 5355 3.172724962234497 udp
192.168.56.11 224.0.0.252 54650 5355 3.1748600006103516 udp
192.168.56.11 224.0.0.252 55601 5355 3.9296810626983643 udp
192.168.56.11 224.0.0.252 60205 5355 3.1825108528137207 udp
192.168.56.11 224.0.0.252 62798 5355 5.744596004486084 udp
192.168.56.11 239.255.255.250 62184 3702 3.1804358959198 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.4.4 51690 53 6.821980953216553 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.4.4 51899 53 5.9001100063323975 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.4.4 56213 53 36.68111801147461 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.4.4 63439 53 22.259740829467773 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.8.8 51690 53 7.8220720291137695 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.8.8 51899 53 6.90002703666687 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.8.8 56213 53 35.68572282791138 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.8.8 63439 53 21.259624004364014 udp

Hunting tip: alert on unknown binaries initiating TLS to IP‑lookup services or unusual CDN endpoints — especially early in execution.

Persistence & Policy — Registry and Services

Registry and service telemetry points to policy awareness and environment reconnaissance rather than noisy persistence. Below is a compact view of the most relevant keys and handles; expand to see the full lists where available.

Registry Opened

34

Registry Set

0

Services Started

0

Services Opened

0

Registry Opened (Top 25)

Key
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\Lsa\FipsAlgorithmPolicy\MDMEnabled
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\GRE_Initialize\DisableUmpdBufferSizeCheck
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\Lsa\FipsAlgorithmPolicy\Enabled
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\Lsa\FipsAlgorithmPolicy\STE
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\Lsa\FipsAlgorithmPolicy
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\GRE_Initialize
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\GRE_Initialize\DisableMetaFiles
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Ole\FeatureDevelopmentProperties
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\DllNXOptions
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\AppModel\Lookaside\machine
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\WOW6432Node\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Safer\CodeIdentifiers
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\AppCompatFlags\Disable8And16BitMitigation
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\Segment Heap
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\WOW6432Node\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Nls\CustomLocale
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Wow64\x86
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\WOW6432Node\Microsoft\LanguageOverlay\OverlayPackages\en-US
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\OSDATA\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\AppCompatFlags
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\WOW6432Node\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\AppCompatFlags
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\WOW6432Node\Policies\Microsoft\MUI\Settings
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\AppModel\Lookaside\user
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\WOW6432Node\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Display
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Policies\Microsoft\Cryptography\Configuration
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\WOW6432Node\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\SideBySide\AssemblyStorageRoots
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\WOW6432Node\Microsoft\OLE
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Ole
HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Shell Folders
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\AppCompatFlags\SdbUpdates\ManifestedMergeStubSdbs
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\WOW6432Node\Microsoft\OLE\Tracing
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\WOW6432Node\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\GRE_Initialize
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\5c1ab60e6dc52fc8f94b4d389624592b7e7b57ee86e54cebe5d3eb6a.exe
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\MUI\UILanguages\en-US
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\AppCompatFlags\SdbUpdates
Show all (34 total)

Registry Set (Top 25)

Services Started (Top 15)

Services Opened (Top 15)

What To Do Now — Practical Defense Playbook

  • Contain unknowns: block first‑run binaries by default — signatures catch up, containment works now.
  • EDR controls: alert on keyboard hooks, screen capture APIs, VM/sandbox checks, and command‑shell launches.
  • Registry watch: flag queries/sets under policy paths (e.g., …\FipsAlgorithmPolicy\*).
  • Network rules: inspect outbound TLS to IP‑lookup services and unexpected CDN endpoints.
  • Hunt broadly: sweep endpoints for the indicators above and quarantine positives immediately.

Dwell time equals attacker opportunity. Reducing execution privileges and egress shrinks that window even when vendors disagree.

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