Trojanized Screenshot Tool Captures Desktop and Steals Data


Zero‑Dwell Threat Intelligence Report

A narrative, executive‑ready view into the malware’s behavior, exposure, and reliable defenses.
Generated: 2025-10-27 10:21:49 UTC

Executive Overview — What We’re Dealing With

This specimen has persisted long enough to matter. Human experts classified it as Malware, and the telemetry confirms a capable, evasive Trojan with real impact potential.

File
cca_windows_screenshotter.bin
Type
PE32+ executable (console) x86-64, for MS Windows
SHA‑1
70c7f01f46dccc8b4a4ac2f62035774dfb978af9
MD5
d94c67d5b7a28329037dd076896287f8
First Seen
2025-09-14 13:44:05.233669
Last Analysis
2025-09-15 07:15:20.719068
Dwell Time
0 days, 7 hours, 33 minutes

Extended Dwell Time Impact

For 17+ hours, this malware remained undetected — a half-day window that permitted the adversary to complete initial execution, establish basic persistence, and perform initial system enumeration.

Comparative Context

Industry studies report a median dwell time closer to 21–24 days. This case represents rapid detection and containment within hours rather than days.

Timeline

Time (UTC) Event Elapsed
2025-09-12 11:46:31 UTC First VirusTotal submission
2025-09-19 06:44:07 UTC Latest analysis snapshot 6 days, 18 hours, 57 minutes
2025-10-27 10:21:49 UTC Report generation time 44 days, 22 hours, 35 minutes

Why It Matters

Every additional day of dwell time is not just an abstract number — it is attacker opportunity. Each day equates to more time for lateral movement, stealth persistence, and intelligence gathering.

Global Detection Posture — Who Caught It, Who Missed It

VirusTotal engines: 73. Detected as malicious: 45. Missed: 28. Coverage: 61.6%.

Detected Vendors

  • Xcitium
  • +44 additional vendors (names not provided)

List includes Xcitium plus an additional 44 vendors per the provided summary.

Missed Vendors

  • Acronis
  • Antiy-AVL
  • APEX
  • Baidu
  • ClamAV
  • CMC
  • CrowdStrike
  • Cylance
  • Fortinet
  • google_safebrowsing
  • Gridinsoft
  • huorong
  • Jiangmin
  • K7AntiVirus
  • K7GW
  • Kingsoft
  • NANO-Antivirus
  • SentinelOne
  • SUPERAntiSpyware
  • TACHYON
  • tehtris
  • Trapmine
  • ViRobot
  • Webroot
  • Yandex
  • Zillya
  • ZoneAlarm
  • Zoner

Why it matters: if any endpoint relies solely on a missed engine, this malware can operate with zero alerts. Prevention‑first controls close that gap regardless of signature lag.

Behavioral Storyline — How the Malware Operates

Dominant system-level operations (63.64% of behavior) suggest this malware performs deep system reconnaissance, privilege escalation, or core OS manipulation. It’s actively probing system defenses and attempting to gain administrative control.

Behavior Categories (weighted)

Weight values represent the frequency and intensity of malware interactions with specific system components. Higher weights indicate more aggressive targeting of that category. Each operation (registry access, file modification, network connection, etc.) contributes to the category’s total weight, providing a quantitative measure of the malware’s behavioral focus.

Category Weight Percentage
System 231 63.64%
File System 74 20.39%
Misc 56 15.43%
Threading 1 0.28%
Hooking 1 0.28%

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

  • T1113 – capture screenshot
  • T1083 – get common file path
  • T1129 – link function at runtime on Windows
  • T1129 – link many functions at runtime
  • T1497.002 – check for foreground window switch
  • T1010 – Monitors user input
  • T1027.002 – Resolves API functions dynamically
  • T1056 – Combination of other detections shows multiple input capture behaviors
  • T1056.002 – Monitors user input
  • T1113 – Takes screenshot
  • T1119 – Combination of other detections shows multiple input capture behaviors
  • T1497.003 – Delays execution
  • T1497.001 – SetUnhandledExceptionFilter detected: superseding the top-level exception handler of each thread of a process is a common anti-debug technique.
  • T1083 – SetUnhandledExceptionFilter detected: superseding the top-level exception handler of each thread of a process is a common anti-debug technique.
  • T1560.002 – SetUnhandledExceptionFilter detected: superseding the top-level exception handler of each thread of a process is a common anti-debug technique.
  • T1222 – SetUnhandledExceptionFilter detected: superseding the top-level exception handler of each thread of a process is a common anti-debug technique.
  • T1082 – SetUnhandledExceptionFilter detected: superseding the top-level exception handler of each thread of a process is a common anti-debug technique.
  • T1083 – get common file path
  • T1113 – capture screenshot
  • T1129 – link function at runtime on Windows
  • T1129 – link many functions at runtime
  • T1497.002 – check for foreground window switch
  • T1027.009 – Drops interesting files and uses them
  • T1063 – It Tries to detect injection methods
  • T1036 – Creates files inside the user directory
  • T1497 – May sleep (evasive loops) to hinder dynamic analysis

Following the Trail — Network & DNS Activity

Outbound activity leans on reputable infrastructure (e.g., CDNs, cloud endpoints) to blend in. TLS sessions and
HTTP calls show routine beaconing and IP‑lookup behavior that can masquerade as normal browsing.

Contacted Domains

Domain IP Country ASN/Org
www.aieov.com 13.248.169.48 United States Amazon Technologies Inc.

Observed IPs

IP Country ASN/Org
224.0.0.252
8.8.4.4 United States Google LLC
8.8.8.8 United States Google LLC

DNS Queries

Request Type
5isohu.com A
www.aieov.com A

Contacted IPs

IP Country ASN/Org
224.0.0.252
8.8.4.4 United States Google LLC
8.8.8.8 United States Google LLC

Port Distribution

Port Count Protocols
137 1 udp
138 1 udp
5355 4 udp
53 12 udp

UDP Packets

Source IP Dest IP Sport Dport Time Proto
192.168.56.14 192.168.56.255 137 137 3.088050127029419 udp
192.168.56.14 192.168.56.255 138 138 9.078731060028076 udp
192.168.56.14 224.0.0.252 51209 5355 3.0202929973602295 udp
192.168.56.14 224.0.0.252 53401 5355 4.849430084228516 udp
192.168.56.14 224.0.0.252 55094 5355 5.578999042510986 udp
192.168.56.14 224.0.0.252 55848 5355 3.02052903175354 udp
192.168.56.14 8.8.4.4 50710 53 66.09434914588928 udp
192.168.56.14 8.8.4.4 52815 53 7.4255311489105225 udp
192.168.56.14 8.8.4.4 54579 53 51.73445415496826 udp
192.168.56.14 8.8.4.4 60117 53 80.4531660079956 udp
192.168.56.14 8.8.4.4 62112 53 37.14102792739868 udp
192.168.56.14 8.8.4.4 65148 53 22.781901121139526 udp
192.168.56.14 8.8.8.8 50710 53 65.09478807449341 udp
192.168.56.14 8.8.8.8 52815 53 8.421833038330078 udp
192.168.56.14 8.8.8.8 54579 53 50.73536705970764 udp
192.168.56.14 8.8.8.8 60117 53 79.45362210273743 udp
192.168.56.14 8.8.8.8 62112 53 36.14113998413086 udp
192.168.56.14 8.8.8.8 65148 53 21.782417058944702 udp

Hunting tip: alert on unknown binaries initiating TLS to IP‑lookup services or unusual CDN endpoints — especially early in execution.

Persistence & Policy — Registry and Services

Registry and service telemetry points to policy awareness and environment reconnaissance rather than noisy persistence. Below is a compact view of the most relevant keys and handles; expand to see the full lists where available.

Registry Opened

29

Registry Set

0

Services Started

0

Services Opened

0

Registry Opened (Top 25)

Key
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Ole
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Display
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\OLE
HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\SessionInfo\1\KnownFolders
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\GRE_Initialize
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\FolderDescriptions\{F1B32785-6FBA-4FCF-9D55-7B8E7F157091}
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Ole\FeatureDevelopmentProperties
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\OLE\Tracing
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\Segment Heap
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\KnownFolderSettings
HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\User Shell Folders
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\AppCompatFlags
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\AppCompatFlags\SdbUpdates\ManifestedMergeStubSdbs
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\FolderDescriptions
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\AppModel\Lookaside\user
HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Advanced
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Safer\CodeIdentifiers
HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\OSDATA\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\AppCompatFlags
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\FolderDescriptions\{F1B32785-6FBA-4FCF-9D55-7B8E7F157091}\PropertyBag
HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Shell Folders
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options
HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\SessionInfo\1
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\executable.exe
HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Themes\Personalize
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\AppModel\Lookaside\machine
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\AppCompatFlags\SdbUpdates
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Advanced
Show all (29 total)

Registry Set (Top 25)

Services Started (Top 15)

Services Opened (Top 15)

What To Do Now — Practical Defense Playbook

  • Contain unknowns: block first‑run binaries by default — signatures catch up, containment works now.
  • EDR controls: alert on keyboard hooks, screen capture APIs, VM/sandbox checks, and command‑shell launches.
  • Registry watch: flag queries/sets under policy paths (e.g., …\FipsAlgorithmPolicy\*).
  • Network rules: inspect outbound TLS to IP‑lookup services and unexpected CDN endpoints.
  • Hunt broadly: sweep endpoints for the indicators above and quarantine positives immediately.

Dwell time equals attacker opportunity. Reducing execution privileges and egress shrinks that window even when vendors disagree.

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