Executive Overview — What We’re Dealing With

This specimen has persisted long enough to matter. Human experts classified it as Malware, and the telemetry confirms a capable, evasive Trojan with real impact potential.

Extended Dwell Time Impact

For 17+ hours, this malware remained undetected — a half-day window that permitted the adversary to complete initial execution, establish basic persistence, and perform initial system enumeration.

Global Detection Posture — Who Caught It, Who Missed It

VirusTotal engines: 73. Detected as malicious: 57. Missed: 16. Coverage: 78.1%.

Why it matters: if any endpoint relies solely on a missed engine, this malware can operate with zero alerts. Prevention‑first controls close that gap regardless of signature lag.

Behavioral Storyline — How the Malware Operates

This threat shows heavy registry manipulation (34.72% of total behavior), indicating persistent backdoor installation, configuration tampering, or system policy modification attempts. The malware likely establishes persistence mechanisms and modifies security settings to maintain long-term access.

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

• T1620 – load .NET assembly
• T1140 – decode data using Base64 in .NET
• T1620 – invoke .NET assembly method
• T1003 – Harvests credentials from local FTP client softwares
• T1003 – Harvests information related to installed mail clients
• T1003 – Harvests information related to installed instant messenger clients
• T1552 – Harvests credentials from local FTP client softwares
• T1552 – Harvests information related to installed mail clients
• T1552 – Harvests information related to installed instant messenger clients
• T1552.001 – Harvests credentials from local FTP client softwares
• T1552.001 – Harvests information related to installed mail clients
• T1552.001 – Harvests information related to installed instant messenger clients
• T1114 – Harvests information related to installed mail clients
• T1005 – Harvests credentials from local FTP client softwares
• T1005 – Harvests information related to installed mail clients
• T1005 – Harvests information related to installed instant messenger clients
• T1547 – Installs itself for autorun at Windows startup
• T1547.001 – Installs itself for autorun at Windows startup
• T1055 – Writes to the memory another process
• T1055 – Writes an executable to the memory of another process
• T1082 – Checks available memory
• T1083 – Attempts to identify installed AV products by installation directory
• T1057 – Enumerates the modules from a process (may be used to locate base addresses in process injection)
• T1518.001 – Attempts to identify installed AV products by installation directory
• T1518 – Attempts to identify installed AV products by installation directory
• T1071 – Yara detections observed in process dumps, payloads or dropped files
• T1071 – At least one IP Address, Domain, or File Name was found in a crypto call
• T1071 – Looks up the external IP address
• T1071 – Reads data out of its own binary image
• T1071 – Terminates another process
• T1071 – A process attempted to delay the analysis task.
• T1071 – Reads from the memory of another process
• T1568 – Connects to a Dynamic DNS Domain
• T1573 – Establishes an encrypted HTTPS connection
• T1106 – Guard pages use detected – possible anti-debugging.
• T1112 – Installs itself for autorun at Windows startup
• T1027 – The binary likely contains encrypted or compressed data
• T1027.002 – The binary likely contains encrypted or compressed data
• T1064 – Executes visual basic scripts
• T1064 – Drops VBS files to the startup folder (C:\\Documents and Settings\\All Users\\Start Menu\\Programs\\Startup)
• T1064 – Found WSH timer for Javascript or VBS script (likely evasive script)
• T1547.001 – Stores files to the Windows startup directory
• T1547.001 – Creates a start menu entry (Start Menu\\Programs\\Startup)
• T1036 – Creates files inside the user directory
• T1562.001 – Creates guard pages, often used to prevent reverse engineering and debugging
• T1497 – May sleep (evasive loops) to hinder dynamic analysis
• T1497 – Allocates memory with a write watch (potentially for evading sandboxes)
• T1140 – .NET source code contains calls to encryption/decryption functions
• T1027 – Binary may include packed or crypted data
• T1027.002 – PE file has an executable .text section which is very likely to contain packed code (zlib compression ratio < 0.3)
• T1027.002 – Binary may include packed or crypted data
• T1027.002 – .NET source code contains potential unpacker
• T1003 – Tries to harvest and steal browser information (history, passwords, etc)
• T1057 – Queries a list of all running processes
• T1016 – Checks the online ip address of the machine
• T1083 – Reads ini files
• T1082 – Queries the cryptographic machine GUID
• T1082 – Checks if Microsoft Office is installed
• T1082 – Queries the volume information (name, serial number etc) of a device
• T1114 – Tries to search for mail accounts
• T1560 – .NET source code contains calls to encryption/decryption functions
• T1005 – Tries to harvest and steal browser information (history, passwords, etc)
• T1573 – Uses HTTPS
• T1105 – Downloads files from webservers via HTTP
• T1095 – Downloads files from webservers via HTTP
• T1071 – Uses a known web browser user agent for HTTP communication
• T1071 – Uses HTTPS
• T1071 – Downloads files from webservers via HTTP

Following the Trail — Network & DNS Activity

Outbound activity leans on reputable infrastructure (e.g., CDNs, cloud endpoints) to blend in. TLS sessions and
HTTP calls show routine beaconing and IP‑lookup behavior that can masquerade as normal browsing.

Hunting tip: alert on unknown binaries initiating TLS to IP‑lookup services or unusual CDN endpoints — especially early in execution.