Confuser-Protected ClipBanker Injects into Browsers to Capture Clipboard


Zero‑Dwell Threat Intelligence Report

A narrative, executive‑ready view into the malware’s behavior, exposure, and reliable defenses.
Generated: 2025-11-03 13:38:04 UTC

Executive Overview — What We’re Dealing With

This specimen has persisted long enough to matter. Human experts classified it as Malware, and the telemetry confirms a capable, evasive Trojan with real impact potential.

File
z1pqenioj.exe
Type
PE32 executable (GUI) Intel 80386 Mono/.Net assembly, for MS Windows
SHA‑1
4c91e63a7ba9c614d145e62abd7525b65e559b53
MD5
6714c0de9bd9ea2a2d6dcfd41a25deb6
First Seen
2025-09-14 13:34:00.652230
Last Analysis
2025-09-15 07:15:19.291397
Dwell Time
0 days, 7 hours, 33 minutes

Extended Dwell Time Impact

For 17+ hours, this malware remained undetected — a half-day window that permitted the adversary to complete initial execution, establish basic persistence, and perform initial system enumeration.

Comparative Context

Industry studies report a median dwell time closer to 21–24 days. This case represents rapid detection and containment within hours rather than days.

Timeline

Time (UTC) Event Elapsed
2025-09-12 15:17:04 UTC First VirusTotal submission
2025-09-19 06:42:37 UTC Latest analysis snapshot 6 days, 15 hours, 25 minutes
2025-11-03 13:38:04 UTC Report generation time 51 days, 22 hours, 21 minutes

Why It Matters

Every additional day of dwell time is not just an abstract number — it is attacker opportunity. Each day equates to more time for lateral movement, stealth persistence, and intelligence gathering.

Global Detection Posture — Who Caught It, Who Missed It

VirusTotal engines: 72. Detected as malicious: 52. Missed: 20. Coverage: 72.2%.

Detected Vendors

  • Xcitium
  • +51 additional vendors (names not provided)

List includes Xcitium plus an additional 51 vendors per the provided summary.

Missed Vendors

  • Acronis
  • Antiy-AVL
  • Baidu
  • CMC
  • Cynet
  • DrWeb
  • google_safebrowsing
  • Jiangmin
  • Kaspersky
  • NANO-Antivirus
  • SUPERAntiSpyware
  • TACHYON
  • tehtris
  • TrendMicro
  • TrendMicro-HouseCall
  • ViRobot
  • Webroot
  • Yandex
  • Zillya
  • Zoner

Why it matters: if any endpoint relies solely on a missed engine, this malware can operate with zero alerts. Prevention‑first controls close that gap regardless of signature lag.

Behavioral Storyline — How the Malware Operates

Dominant system-level operations (37.92% of behavior) suggest this malware performs deep system reconnaissance, privilege escalation, or core OS manipulation. It’s actively probing system defenses and attempting to gain administrative control.

Behavior Categories (weighted)

Weight values represent the frequency and intensity of malware interactions with specific system components. Higher weights indicate more aggressive targeting of that category. Each operation (registry access, file modification, network connection, etc.) contributes to the category’s total weight, providing a quantitative measure of the malware’s behavioral focus.

Category Weight Percentage
System 524 37.92%
Registry 362 26.19%
File System 219 15.85%
Process 143 10.35%
Misc 75 5.43%
Crypto 24 1.74%
Synchronization 14 1.01%
Threading 13 0.94%
Device 4 0.29%
Hooking 2 0.14%
Windows 2 0.14%

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

  • No MITRE ATT&CK techniques detected

Following the Trail — Network & DNS Activity

Outbound activity leans on reputable infrastructure (e.g., CDNs, cloud endpoints) to blend in. TLS sessions and
HTTP calls show routine beaconing and IP‑lookup behavior that can masquerade as normal browsing.

Contacted Domains

Domain IP Country ASN/Org
www.aieov.com 13.248.169.48 United States Amazon Technologies Inc.

Observed IPs

IP Country ASN/Org
224.0.0.252
8.8.4.4 United States Google LLC
8.8.8.8 United States Google LLC

DNS Queries

Request Type
5isohu.com A
www.aieov.com A

Contacted IPs

IP Country ASN/Org
224.0.0.252
8.8.4.4 United States Google LLC
8.8.8.8 United States Google LLC

Port Distribution

Port Count Protocols
137 1 udp
5355 4 udp
53 4 udp

UDP Packets

Source IP Dest IP Sport Dport Time Proto
192.168.56.14 192.168.56.255 137 137 3.0816900730133057 udp
192.168.56.14 224.0.0.252 51209 5355 3.014556884765625 udp
192.168.56.14 224.0.0.252 53401 5355 4.639112949371338 udp
192.168.56.14 224.0.0.252 55094 5355 5.564198970794678 udp
192.168.56.14 224.0.0.252 55848 5355 3.0150909423828125 udp
192.168.56.14 8.8.4.4 52815 53 7.203768014907837 udp
192.168.56.14 8.8.4.4 65148 53 22.625378847122192 udp
192.168.56.14 8.8.8.8 52815 53 8.20372986793518 udp
192.168.56.14 8.8.8.8 65148 53 21.626003980636597 udp

Hunting tip: alert on unknown binaries initiating TLS to IP‑lookup services or unusual CDN endpoints — especially early in execution.

What To Do Now — Practical Defense Playbook

  • Contain unknowns: block first‑run binaries by default — signatures catch up, containment works now.
  • EDR controls: alert on keyboard hooks, screen capture APIs, VM/sandbox checks, and command‑shell launches.
  • Registry watch: flag queries/sets under policy paths (e.g., …\FipsAlgorithmPolicy\*).
  • Network rules: inspect outbound TLS to IP‑lookup services and unexpected CDN endpoints.
  • Hunt broadly: sweep endpoints for the indicators above and quarantine positives immediately.

Dwell time equals attacker opportunity. Reducing execution privileges and egress shrinks that window even when vendors disagree.

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