Executive Overview — What We’re Dealing With

This specimen has persisted long enough to matter. Human experts classified it as Malware, and the telemetry confirms a capable, evasive Trojan with real impact potential.

Extended Dwell Time Impact

For 17+ hours, this malware remained undetected — a half-day window that permitted the adversary to complete initial execution, establish basic persistence, and perform initial system enumeration.

Global Detection Posture — Who Caught It, Who Missed It

VirusTotal engines: 70. Detected as malicious: 44. Missed: 26. Coverage: 62.9%.

Why it matters: if any endpoint relies solely on a missed engine, this malware can operate with zero alerts. Prevention‑first controls close that gap regardless of signature lag.

Behavioral Storyline — How the Malware Operates

Intensive file system activity (49.65% of behavior) indicates data harvesting, file encryption, or dropper behavior. The threat is actively searching for and manipulating files across the system.

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

• T1033 – get token membership
• T1027 – reference AES constants
• T1083 – get common file path
• T1564.003 – hide graphical window
• T1027 – encrypt data using AES
• T1083 – get file system object information
• T1547.009 – create shortcut via IShellLink
• T1083 – check if file exists
• T1059 – accept command line arguments
• T1082 – query environment variable
• T1140 – decrypt data using AES via x86 extensions
• T1213 – reference WMI statements
• T1082 – check OS version
• T1010 – find graphical window
• T1134 – modify access privileges
• T1012 – query or enumerate registry value
• T1222 – set file attributes
• T1027 – encode data using XOR
• T1083 – enumerate files on Windows
• T1129 – parse PE header
• T1614 – get geographical location
• T1129 – link function at runtime on Windows
• T1047 – connect to WMI namespace via WbemLocator
• T1202 – Uses suspicious command line tools or Windows utilities
• T1202 – Uses Windows utilities for basic functionality
• T1027 – The binary contains an unknown PE section name indicative of packing
• T1027.002 – The binary contains an unknown PE section name indicative of packing
• T1539 – Touches a file containing cookies, possibly for information gathering
• T1082 – Checks available memory
• T1057 – Uses Windows utilities to enumerate running processes
• T1071 – Yara detections observed in process dumps, payloads or dropped files
• T1071 – The PE file contains an overlay
• T1071 – The PE file contains a PDB path
• T1071 – Reads from the memory of another process
• T1071 – Reads data out of its own binary image
• T1106 – Created a process from a suspicious location
• T1059 – Executed a command line with /C or /R argument to terminate command shell on completion which can be used to hide execution
• T1485 – Anomalous file deletion behavior detected (10+)
• T1129 – The process attempted to dynamically load a malicious function
• T1059 – Detected command line output monitoring
• T1140 – Detected an attempt to pull out some data from the binary image
• T1129 – The process tried to load dynamically one or more functions.
• T1027.009 – The process has executed a dropped binary
• T1055 – Likely PROPagate Technique is running
• T1059 – Apparent Internal Usage of CMD.EXE
• T1027.009 – Drops interesting files and uses them
• T1063 – It Tries to detect injection methods
• T1064 – Executes batch files
• T1059 – Uses cmd line tools excessively to alter registry or file data
• T1055 – May try to detect the Windows Explorer process (often used for injection)
• T1112 – Uses reg.exe to modify the Windows registry
• T1027.002 – File is packed with WinRar
• T1027.002 – Sample is packed with UPX
• T1027 – Sample is packed with UPX
• T1057 – May try to detect the Windows Explorer process (often used for injection)
• T1057 – Queries a list of all running processes
• T1083 – Enumerates the file system
• T1083 – Reads ini files
• T1082 – Queries the volume information (name, serial number etc) of a device

Following the Trail — Network & DNS Activity

Outbound activity leans on reputable infrastructure (e.g., CDNs, cloud endpoints) to blend in. TLS sessions and
HTTP calls show routine beaconing and IP‑lookup behavior that can masquerade as normal browsing.

Hunting tip: alert on unknown binaries initiating TLS to IP‑lookup services or unusual CDN endpoints — especially early in execution.