Executive Overview — What We’re Dealing With

This specimen has persisted long enough to matter. Human experts classified it as Malware, and the telemetry confirms a capable, evasive Trojan with real impact potential.

Extended Dwell Time Impact

For 17+ hours, this malware remained undetected — a half-day window that permitted the adversary to complete initial execution, establish basic persistence, and perform initial system enumeration.

Global Detection Posture — Who Caught It, Who Missed It

VirusTotal engines: 73. Detected as malicious: 61. Missed: 12. Coverage: 83.6%.

Why it matters: if any endpoint relies solely on a missed engine, this malware can operate with zero alerts. Prevention‑first controls close that gap regardless of signature lag.

Behavioral Storyline — How the Malware Operates

Dominant system-level operations (48.48% of behavior) suggest this malware performs deep system reconnaissance, privilege escalation, or core OS manipulation. It’s actively probing system defenses and attempting to gain administrative control.

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

• T1082 – get number of processors
• T1083 – get file size
• T1129 – link function at runtime on Windows
• T1083 – enumerate files on Windows
• T1129 – parse PE header
• T1082 – query environment variable
• T1614 – get geographical location
• T1082 – check OS version
• T1027 – reference Base64 string
• T1129 – access PEB ldr_data
• T1547 – Installs itself for autorun at Windows startup
• T1547.001 – Installs itself for autorun at Windows startup
• T1055 – Writes to the memory another process
• T1055 – Contains .tls (Thread Local Storage) section
• T1055 – Writes an executable to the memory of another process
• T1071 – The PE file contains an overlay
• T1071 – Yara detections observed in process dumps, payloads or dropped files
• T1071 – Reads from the memory of another process
• T1071 – Reads data out of its own binary image
• T1112 – Installs itself for autorun at Windows startup
• T1497 – Checks for mouse movement
• T1027 – The binary likely contains encrypted or compressed data
• T1027 – The binary contains an unknown PE section name indicative of packing
• T1027.002 – The binary likely contains encrypted or compressed data
• T1027.002 – The binary contains an unknown PE section name indicative of packing
• T1057 – Enumerates running processes
• T1057 – Expresses interest in specific running processes
• T1027.002 – Creates a page with write and execute permissions
• T1027.002 – Resolves API functions dynamically
• T1055 – Writes into the memory of another process
• T1055 – Modifies control flow of another process
• T1055 – Modifies control flow of a process started from a created or modified executable
• T1055.012 – Process Hollowing
• T1057 – Enumerates running processes
• T1070.004 – Deletes file after execution
• T1112 – Installs system startup script or application
• T1115 – Captures clipboard data
• T1134 – Enables process privileges
• T1547.001 – Installs system startup script or application
• T1564.001 – Hides files
• T1564.003 – Creates process with hidden window
• T1140 – Detected an attempt to pull out some data from the binary image
• T1045 – Manalize Local SandBox Packer Harvesting
• T1059 – Apparent Internal Usage of CMD.EXE
• T1063 – It Tries to detect injection methods

Following the Trail — Network & DNS Activity

Outbound activity leans on reputable infrastructure (e.g., CDNs, cloud endpoints) to blend in. TLS sessions and
HTTP calls show routine beaconing and IP‑lookup behavior that can masquerade as normal browsing.

Hunting tip: alert on unknown binaries initiating TLS to IP‑lookup services or unusual CDN endpoints — especially early in execution.