Executive Overview — What We’re Dealing With

This specimen has persisted long enough to matter. Human experts classified it as Malware, and the telemetry confirms a capable, evasive Trojan with real impact potential.

Extended Dwell Time Impact

For 17+ hours, this malware remained undetected — a half-day window that permitted the adversary to complete initial execution, establish basic persistence, and perform initial system enumeration.

Global Detection Posture — Who Caught It, Who Missed It

VirusTotal engines: 73. Detected as malicious: 43. Missed: 30. Coverage: 58.9%.

Why it matters: if any endpoint relies solely on a missed engine, this malware can operate with zero alerts. Prevention‑first controls close that gap regardless of signature lag.

Behavioral Storyline — How the Malware Operates

Dominant system-level operations (39.39% of behavior) suggest this malware performs deep system reconnaissance, privilege escalation, or core OS manipulation. It’s actively probing system defenses and attempting to gain administrative control.

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

• T1083 – get file size
• T1129 – parse PE header
• T1129 – forwarded export
• T1027 – encode data using XOR
• T1083 – enumerate files on Windows
• T1082 – get hostname
• T1082 – query environment variable
• T1027 – encrypt data using DPAPI
• T1129 – link function at runtime on Windows
• T1012 – query or enumerate registry value
• T1614 – get geographical location
• T1071 – Adversaries may communicate using application layer protocols to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic.
• T1129 – The process tried to load dynamically one or more functions.
• T1027 – encode data using XOR
• T1083 – get file size
• T1129 – link function at runtime on Windows
• T1129 – parse PE header
• T1082 – get hostname
• T1012 – query or enumerate registry value
• T1027 – encrypt data using DPAPI
• T1083 – enumerate files on Windows
• T1082 – query environment variable
• T1614 – get geographical location
• T1129 – forwarded export
• T1063 – It Tries to detect injection methods
• T1574.002 – Tries to load missing DLLs
• T1218.011 – Runs a DLL by calling functions
• T1497 – May sleep (evasive loops) to hinder dynamic analysis
• T1497 – Contains medium sleeps (>= 30s)
• T1497 – Checks if the current process is being debugged
• T1518.001 – May try to detect the virtual machine to hinder analysis (VM artifact strings found in memory)
• T1518.001 – AV process strings found (often used to terminate AV products)
• T1518.001 – Checks if the current process is being debugged
• T1082 – Queries the volume information (name, serial number etc) of a device
• T1082 – Reads software policies

Following the Trail — Network & DNS Activity

Outbound activity leans on reputable infrastructure (e.g., CDNs, cloud endpoints) to blend in. TLS sessions and
HTTP calls show routine beaconing and IP‑lookup behavior that can masquerade as normal browsing.

Hunting tip: alert on unknown binaries initiating TLS to IP‑lookup services or unusual CDN endpoints — especially early in execution.