Salgorea/Upatre Trojan Masquerading as Microsoft Word Executable


Zero‑Dwell Threat Intelligence Report

A narrative, executive‑ready view into the malware’s behavior, exposure, and reliable defenses.
Generated: 2025-11-14 22:20:55 UTC

Executive Overview — What We’re Dealing With

This specimen has persisted long enough to matter. Human experts classified it as Malware, and the telemetry confirms a capable, evasive Trojan with real impact potential.

File
azeykn.exe
Type
PE32 executable (GUI) Intel 80386, for MS Windows
SHA‑1
9bb446bd10cb85881fa7aa46b6c2387422f2490c
MD5
21579a799e786115b811039c5117a054
First Seen
2025-10-06 05:59:00.681284
Last Analysis
2025-10-06 07:51:23.917922
Dwell Time
0 days, 7 hours, 33 minutes

Extended Dwell Time Impact

For 1+ hours, this malware remained undetected — a limited but sufficient window for the adversary to complete initial execution and establish basic system access.

Comparative Context

Industry studies report a median dwell time closer to 21–24 days. This case represents rapid detection and containment within hours rather than days.

Timeline

Time (UTC) Event Elapsed
2025-10-05 01:24:22 UTC First VirusTotal submission
2025-10-08 14:27:54 UTC Latest analysis snapshot 3 days, 13 hours, 3 minutes
2025-11-14 22:20:55 UTC Report generation time 31 days, 5 hours, 56 minutes

Why It Matters

Every additional day of dwell time is not just an abstract number — it is attacker opportunity. Each day equates to more time for lateral movement, stealth persistence, and intelligence gathering.

Global Detection Posture — Who Caught It, Who Missed It

VirusTotal engines: 73. Detected as malicious: 64. Missed: 9. Coverage: 87.7%.

Detected Vendors

  • Xcitium
  • +63 additional vendors (names not provided)

List includes Xcitium plus an additional 63 vendors per the provided summary.

Missed Vendors

  • Acronis
  • CMC
  • Paloalto
  • SUPERAntiSpyware
  • TACHYON
  • tehtris
  • TrendMicro
  • Yandex
  • Zoner

Why it matters: if any endpoint relies solely on a missed engine, this malware can operate with zero alerts. Prevention‑first controls close that gap regardless of signature lag.

Behavioral Storyline — How the Malware Operates

Dominant system-level operations (66.67% of behavior) suggest this malware performs deep system reconnaissance, privilege escalation, or core OS manipulation. It’s actively probing system defenses and attempting to gain administrative control.

Behavior Categories (weighted)

Weight values represent the frequency and intensity of malware interactions with specific system components. Higher weights indicate more aggressive targeting of that category. Each operation (registry access, file modification, network connection, etc.) contributes to the category’s total weight, providing a quantitative measure of the malware’s behavioral focus.

Category Weight Percentage
System 3224 66.67%
File System 496 10.26%
Process 248 5.13%
Misc 186 3.85%
Threading 124 2.56%
Device 124 2.56%
Registry 124 2.56%
Services 124 2.56%
Hooking 62 1.28%
Windows 62 1.28%
Crypto 62 1.28%

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

  • T1497 – check for VM using instruction VPCEXT
  • T1543.003 – modify service
  • T1569.002 – modify service
  • T1129 – link many functions at runtime
  • T1083 – get common file path
  • T1222 – set file attributes
  • T1033 – get token membership
  • T1057 – get process heap flags
  • T1083 – check if file exists
  • T1082 – get hostname
  • T1083 – get file size
  • T1027 – encode data using XOR
  • T1027 – manually build AES constants
  • T1053.005 – schedule task via ITaskScheduler
  • T1027 – reference Base64 string
  • T1129 – access PEB ldr_data
  • T1027 – encrypt data using RC4 KSA
  • T1543.003 – start service
  • T1012 – query or enumerate registry value
  • T1129 – link function at runtime on Windows
  • T1033 – get session user name
  • T1087 – get session user name
  • T1129 – Drops a binary and executes it
  • T1059 – A document or script wrote an executable file to disk
  • T1071 – Creates a slightly modified copy of itself
  • T1071 – The PE file contains an overlay
  • T1071 – A potential decoy document was displayed to the user
  • T1071 – Reads data out of its own binary image
  • T1027 – The binary likely contains encrypted or compressed data
  • T1027.002 – The binary likely contains encrypted or compressed data
  • T1486 – Exhibits possible ransomware or wiper file modification behavior: overwrites_existing_files
  • T1203 – Document exploit detected (process start blacklist hit)
  • T1036 – Icon mismatch, binary includes an Icon from a different legit application in order to fool users
  • T1082 – Queries the cryptographic machine GUID

Following the Trail — Network & DNS Activity

Outbound activity leans on reputable infrastructure (e.g., CDNs, cloud endpoints) to blend in. TLS sessions and
HTTP calls show routine beaconing and IP‑lookup behavior that can masquerade as normal browsing.

Observed IPs

IP Country ASN/Org
224.0.0.252

Contacted IPs

IP Country ASN/Org
224.0.0.252

Port Distribution

Port Count Protocols
137 1 udp
138 1 udp
5355 3 udp

UDP Packets

Source IP Dest IP Sport Dport Time Proto
192.168.56.14 192.168.56.255 137 137 6.87152099609375 udp
192.168.56.14 192.168.56.255 138 138 12.91943883895874 udp
192.168.56.14 224.0.0.252 51209 5355 6.801363945007324 udp
192.168.56.14 224.0.0.252 53401 5355 9.360785007476807 udp
192.168.56.14 224.0.0.252 55848 5355 6.803576946258545 udp

Hunting tip: alert on unknown binaries initiating TLS to IP‑lookup services or unusual CDN endpoints — especially early in execution.

Persistence & Policy — Registry and Services

Registry and service telemetry points to policy awareness and environment reconnaissance rather than noisy persistence. Below is a compact view of the most relevant keys and handles; expand to see the full lists where available.

Registry Opened

58

Registry Set

0

Services Started

0

Services Opened

1

Registry Opened (Top 25)

Key
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\GRE_Initialize\DisableUmpdBufferSizeCheck
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\Lsa\FipsAlgorithmPolicy\Enabled
HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Themes\Personalize\AppsUseLightTheme
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\Lsa\FipsAlgorithmPolicy\STE
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\Lsa\FipsAlgorithmPolicy\MDMEnabled
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\GRE_Initialize\DisableMetaFiles
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\GRE_Initialize
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\Lsa\FipsAlgorithmPolicy
HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Themes\Personalize
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\WOW6432Node\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\SideBySide
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\WOW6432Node\Microsoft\OLEAUT
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\WOW6432Node\Policies\Microsoft\MUI\Settings
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\Segment Heap
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\AppCompatFlags\Disable8And16BitMitigation
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\System\Setup
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\FileSystem
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\WOW6432Node\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\GRE_Initialize
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\WinWord.exe
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\79AF.tmp
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Nls\CustomLocale
HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Wow64\x86
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\AppModel\Lookaside\machine
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\AppCompatFlags\SdbUpdates\ManifestedMergeStubSdbs
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\F056.tmp
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\system\CurrentControlSet\control\NetworkProvider\ProviderOrder
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\WOW6432Node\Microsoft\OLE\Tracing
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\MUI\UILanguages\en-US
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\BE9D.tmp
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Wow64\x86\xtajit
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\WOW6432Node\Microsoft\Cryptography\Offload
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\WOW6432Node\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Safer\CodeIdentifiers
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Ole\FeatureDevelopmentProperties
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\WOW6432Node\Microsoft\Cryptography\Defaults\Provider Types\Type 001
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\WOW6432Node\Microsoft\OLE
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Ole
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\WOW6432Node\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\SideBySide\AssemblyStorageRoots
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Cryptography
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\121C.tmp
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\WOW6432Node\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\AppCompatFlags
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\WOW6432Node\Policies\Microsoft\Windows NT\Rpc
HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\AppCompatFlags\Layers
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\OSDATA\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\AppCompatFlags
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\system\CurrentControlSet\control\NetworkProvider\HwOrder
HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Shell Folders
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Cryptography
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\WOW6432Node\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\AppModel\Lookaside\user
Show all (58 total)
Key
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\WOW6432Node\Microsoft\Rpc
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\BA04.tmp
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\40CD.tmp
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\EDEA.tmp
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\WOW6432Node\Microsoft\Cryptography\Defaults\Provider\Microsoft Strong Cryptographic Provider
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\AppCompatFlags\SdbUpdates
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Policies\Microsoft\Cryptography\Configuration
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\WOW6432Node\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Display

Registry Set (Top 25)

Services Started (Top 15)

Services Opened (Top 15)

Service
Schedule

What To Do Now — Practical Defense Playbook

  • Contain unknowns: block first‑run binaries by default — signatures catch up, containment works now.
  • EDR controls: alert on keyboard hooks, screen capture APIs, VM/sandbox checks, and command‑shell launches.
  • Registry watch: flag queries/sets under policy paths (e.g., …\FipsAlgorithmPolicy\*).
  • Network rules: inspect outbound TLS to IP‑lookup services and unexpected CDN endpoints.
  • Hunt broadly: sweep endpoints for the indicators above and quarantine positives immediately.

Dwell time equals attacker opportunity. Reducing execution privileges and egress shrinks that window even when vendors disagree.

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