Spora-Linked BQTLock Ransomware Targets Windows Systems with Precision


Zero‑Dwell Threat Intelligence Report

A narrative, executive‑ready view into the malware’s behavior, exposure, and reliable defenses.
Generated: 2025-11-20 08:23:42 UTC

Executive Overview — What We’re Dealing With

This specimen has persisted long enough to matter. Human experts classified it as Malware, and the telemetry confirms a capable, evasive Trojan with real impact potential.

File
4b4d6e2ffbbc2f2e13202125cbff097b2eedd654
Type
Microsoft Visual C++ compiled executable (generic)
SHA‑1
4b4d6e2ffbbc2f2e13202125cbff097b2eedd654
MD5
110df49522d46b612a28bafbdff3405c
First Seen
2025-11-14 14:42:45.273985
Last Analysis
2025-11-14 20:05:28.417031
Dwell Time
0 days, 7 hours, 33 minutes

Extended Dwell Time Impact

For 5+ hours, this malware remained undetected — a limited but sufficient window for the adversary to complete initial execution and establish basic system access.

Comparative Context

Industry studies report a median dwell time closer to 21–24 days. This case represents rapid detection and containment within hours rather than days.

Timeline

Time (UTC) Event Elapsed
2025-07-23 04:00:42 UTC First VirusTotal submission
2025-11-18 19:44:10 UTC Latest analysis snapshot 118 days, 15 hours, 43 minutes
2025-11-20 08:23:42 UTC Report generation time 120 days, 4 hours, 23 minutes

Why It Matters

Every additional day of dwell time is not just an abstract number — it is attacker opportunity. Each day equates to more time for lateral movement, stealth persistence, and intelligence gathering.

Global Detection Posture — Who Caught It, Who Missed It

VirusTotal engines: 73. Detected as malicious: 56. Missed: 17. Coverage: 76.7%.

Detected Vendors

  • Xcitium
  • +55 additional vendors (names not provided)

List includes Xcitium plus an additional 55 vendors per the provided summary.

Missed Vendors

  • Acronis
  • Antiy-AVL
  • APEX
  • Baidu
  • ClamAV
  • CMC
  • google_safebrowsing
  • Gridinsoft
  • Jiangmin
  • NANO-Antivirus
  • Skyhigh
  • SUPERAntiSpyware
  • TACHYON
  • tehtris
  • Trapmine
  • VBA32
  • Zoner

Why it matters: if any endpoint relies solely on a missed engine, this malware can operate with zero alerts. Prevention‑first controls close that gap regardless of signature lag.

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

  • T1129 – parse PE header
  • T1082 – enumerate disk volumes
  • T1531 – delete user account
  • T1082 – get hostname
  • T1053.005 – schedule task via schtasks
  • T1012 – query or enumerate registry value
  • T1129 – link function at runtime on Windows
  • T1083 – get common file path
  • T1047 – connect to WMI namespace via WbemLocator
  • T1134 – modify access privileges
  • T1082 – query environment variable
  • T1497.001 – reference anti-VM strings targeting VirtualBox
  • T1113 – capture screenshot
  • T1055.012 – use process replacement
  • T1620 – use process replacement
  • T1082 – get disk size
  • T1082 – get disk information
  • T1083 – check if file exists
  • T1027 – encode data using XOR
  • T1490 – delete volume shadow copies
  • T1070.004 – delete volume shadow copies
  • T1057 – enumerate processes
  • T1518 – enumerate processes
  • T1136 – add user account
  • T1070.004 – self delete
  • T1083 – get file size
  • T1098 – add user account to group
  • T1490 – disable automatic Windows recovery features
  • T1134 – acquire debug privileges
  • T1071 – Binary file triggered multiple YARA rules
  • T1071 – Anomalous binary characteristics
  • T1055 – Contains .tls (Thread Local Storage) section
  • T1027 – The binary contains an unknown PE section name indicative of packing
  • T1027.002 – The binary contains an unknown PE section name indicative of packing
  • T1045 – Manalize Local SandBox Packer Harvesting
  • T1059 – Apparent Internal Usage of CMD.EXE
  • T1063 – It Tries to detect injection methods
  • T1542.003 – May use bcdedit to modify the Windows boot settings
  • T1070.004 – May delete shadow drive data (may be related to ransomware)

Following the Trail — Network & DNS Activity

Outbound activity leans on reputable infrastructure (e.g., CDNs, cloud endpoints) to blend in. TLS sessions and
HTTP calls show routine beaconing and IP‑lookup behavior that can masquerade as normal browsing.

Contacted Domains

Domain IP Country ASN/Org
www.msftncsi.com 23.200.3.20 United States Akamai Technologies, Inc.

Observed IPs

IP Country ASN/Org
224.0.0.252
239.255.255.250
8.8.4.4 United States Google LLC
8.8.8.8 United States Google LLC

DNS Queries

Request Type
www.msftncsi.com A
5isohu.com A

Contacted IPs

IP Country ASN/Org
224.0.0.252
239.255.255.250
8.8.4.4 United States Google LLC
8.8.8.8 United States Google LLC

Port Distribution

Port Count Protocols
137 1 udp
5355 5 udp
53 4 udp
3702 1 udp

UDP Packets

Source IP Dest IP Sport Dport Time Proto
192.168.56.11 192.168.56.255 137 137 3.2416510581970215 udp
192.168.56.11 224.0.0.252 49563 5355 3.1907401084899902 udp
192.168.56.11 224.0.0.252 54650 5355 3.2353460788726807 udp
192.168.56.11 224.0.0.252 55601 5355 4.337984085083008 udp
192.168.56.11 224.0.0.252 60205 5355 3.2493209838867188 udp
192.168.56.11 224.0.0.252 62798 5355 5.795776128768921 udp
192.168.56.11 239.255.255.250 62184 3702 3.242218017578125 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.4.4 51690 53 6.914281129837036 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.4.4 51899 53 5.8046629428863525 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.8.8 51690 53 7.913151025772095 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.8.8 51899 53 6.803497076034546 udp

Hunting tip: alert on unknown binaries initiating TLS to IP‑lookup services or unusual CDN endpoints — especially early in execution.

Persistence & Policy — Registry and Services

Registry and service telemetry points to policy awareness and environment reconnaissance rather than noisy persistence. Below is a compact view of the most relevant keys and handles; expand to see the full lists where available.

Registry Opened

4

Registry Set

0

Services Started

0

Services Opened

0

Registry Opened (Top 25)

Key
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\SideBySide\AssemblyStorageRoots
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Safer\CodeIdentifiers
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\Segment Heap
Show all (4 total)

Registry Set (Top 25)

Services Started (Top 15)

Services Opened (Top 15)

What To Do Now — Practical Defense Playbook

  • Contain unknowns: block first‑run binaries by default — signatures catch up, containment works now.
  • EDR controls: alert on keyboard hooks, screen capture APIs, VM/sandbox checks, and command‑shell launches.
  • Registry watch: flag queries/sets under policy paths (e.g., …\FipsAlgorithmPolicy\*).
  • Network rules: inspect outbound TLS to IP‑lookup services and unexpected CDN endpoints.
  • Hunt broadly: sweep endpoints for the indicators above and quarantine positives immediately.

Dwell time equals attacker opportunity. Reducing execution privileges and egress shrinks that window even when vendors disagree.

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