Qilin Ransomware Loader Shows High-Entropy Packing and Spreader Capabilities


Zero‑Dwell Threat Intelligence Report

A narrative, executive‑ready view into the malware’s behavior, exposure, and reliable defenses.
Generated: 2025-11-20 08:27:55 UTC

Executive Overview — What We’re Dealing With

This specimen has persisted long enough to matter. Human experts classified it as Malware, and the telemetry confirms a capable, evasive Trojan with real impact potential.

File
9bac4d59b06239ac6e5cf124e3d8bb13a7145547
Type
PE32 executable (console) Intel 80386 (stripped to external PDB), for MS Windows
SHA‑1
9bac4d59b06239ac6e5cf124e3d8bb13a7145547
MD5
a7e7d00d531cb7ca27d0f3bee448573f
First Seen
2025-03-10 17:23:57.747181
Last Analysis
2025-03-11 13:11:58.699341
Dwell Time
0 days, 7 hours, 33 minutes

Extended Dwell Time Impact

For 19+ hours, this malware remained undetected — a half-day window that permitted the adversary to complete initial execution, establish basic persistence, and perform initial system enumeration.

Comparative Context

Industry studies report a median dwell time closer to 21–24 days. This case represents rapid detection and containment within hours rather than days.

Timeline

Time (UTC) Event Elapsed
2024-11-24 00:21:37 UTC First VirusTotal submission
2025-10-27 18:28:56 UTC Latest analysis snapshot 337 days, 18 hours, 7 minutes
2025-11-20 08:27:55 UTC Report generation time 361 days, 8 hours, 6 minutes

Why It Matters

Every additional day of dwell time is not just an abstract number — it is attacker opportunity. Each day equates to more time for lateral movement, stealth persistence, and intelligence gathering.

Global Detection Posture — Who Caught It, Who Missed It

VirusTotal engines: 73. Detected as malicious: 60. Missed: 13. Coverage: 82.2%.

Detected Vendors

  • Xcitium
  • +59 additional vendors (names not provided)

List includes Xcitium plus an additional 59 vendors per the provided summary.

Missed Vendors

  • Acronis
  • Baidu
  • CMC
  • google_safebrowsing
  • Gridinsoft
  • SentinelOne
  • SUPERAntiSpyware
  • TACHYON
  • tehtris
  • Trapmine
  • ViRobot
  • Yandex
  • Zoner

Why it matters: if any endpoint relies solely on a missed engine, this malware can operate with zero alerts. Prevention‑first controls close that gap regardless of signature lag.

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

  • T1129 – parse PE header
  • T1129 – link many functions at runtime
  • T1083 – get common file path
  • T1027 – encrypt data using speck
  • T1129 – link function at runtime on Windows
  • T1027 – encrypt data using RC4 PRGA
  • T1027 – encode data using Base64
  • T1057 – enumerate process modules
  • T1027 – encode data using XOR
  • T1082 – get system information on Windows
  • T1059 – accept command line arguments
  • T1071 – Adversaries may communicate using application layer protocols to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic.
  • T1106 – Adversaries may interact with the native OS application programming interface (API) to execute behaviors.
  • T1055 – Adversaries may inject code into processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges.
  • T1027 – Adversaries may attempt to make an executable or file difficult to discover or analyze by encrypting, encoding, or otherwise obfuscating its contents on the system or in transit.
  • T1027.002 – Adversaries may perform software packing or virtual machine software protection to conceal their code.
  • T1569.002 – Found PSEXEC tool (often used for remote process execution)
  • T1574.002 – Tries to load missing DLLs
  • T1562.001 – Creates guard pages, often used to prevent reverse engineering and debugging
  • T1070.004 – May delete shadow drive data (may be related to ransomware)
  • T1056 – Creates a DirectInput object (often for capturing keystrokes)
  • T1518.001 – May try to detect the virtual machine to hinder analysis (VM artifact strings found in memory)
  • T1082 – Reads software policies
  • T1560 – Public key (encryption) found
  • T1090 – Found Tor onion address

Following the Trail — Network & DNS Activity

Outbound activity leans on reputable infrastructure (e.g., CDNs, cloud endpoints) to blend in. TLS sessions and
HTTP calls show routine beaconing and IP‑lookup behavior that can masquerade as normal browsing.

Hunting tip: alert on unknown binaries initiating TLS to IP‑lookup services or unusual CDN endpoints — especially early in execution.

Persistence & Policy — Registry and Services

Registry and service telemetry points to policy awareness and environment reconnaissance rather than noisy persistence. Below is a compact view of the most relevant keys and handles; expand to see the full lists where available.

Registry Opened

30

Registry Set

0

Services Started

0

Services Opened

0

Registry Opened (Top 25)

Key
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\GRE_Initialize\DisableMetaFiles
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\GRE_Initialize
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\GRE_Initialize\DisableUmpdBufferSizeCheck
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\System\CurrentControlSet\Control
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\WaitToKillServiceTimeout
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\RestartManager
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\win.exe
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\Segment Heap
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\WOW6432Node\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\AppCompatFlags
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\WOW6432Node\Microsoft\OLE\Tracing
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\WOW6432Node\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Display
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Wow64\x86
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\WOW6432Node\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Safer\CodeIdentifiers
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Policies\Microsoft\Cryptography\Configuration
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Ole\FeatureDevelopmentProperties
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\AppModel\Lookaside\Packages
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\WOW6432Node\Microsoft\RestartManager
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\WOW6432Node\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\system\CurrentControlSet\control\NetworkProvider\ProviderOrder
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\WOW6432Node\Microsoft\OLEAUT
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\system\CurrentControlSet\control\NetworkProvider\HwOrder
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\WOW6432Node\Microsoft\OLE
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Ole
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\AppCompatFlags\Disable8And16BitMitigation
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\WOW6432Node\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\GRE_Initialize
HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Shell Folders
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Nls\CustomLocale
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\WOW6432Node\Policies\Microsoft\MUI\Settings
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\MUI\UILanguages\en-US
Show all (30 total)

Registry Set (Top 25)

Services Started (Top 15)

Services Opened (Top 15)

What To Do Now — Practical Defense Playbook

  • Contain unknowns: block first‑run binaries by default — signatures catch up, containment works now.
  • EDR controls: alert on keyboard hooks, screen capture APIs, VM/sandbox checks, and command‑shell launches.
  • Registry watch: flag queries/sets under policy paths (e.g., …\FipsAlgorithmPolicy\*).
  • Network rules: inspect outbound TLS to IP‑lookup services and unexpected CDN endpoints.
  • Hunt broadly: sweep endpoints for the indicators above and quarantine positives immediately.

Dwell time equals attacker opportunity. Reducing execution privileges and egress shrinks that window even when vendors disagree.

Scroll to Top