Executive Overview — What We’re Dealing With

This specimen has persisted long enough to matter. Human experts classified it as Malware, and the telemetry confirms a capable, evasive Trojan with real impact potential.

Extended Dwell Time Impact

For 4+ hours, this malware remained undetected — a limited but sufficient window for the adversary to complete initial execution and establish basic system access.

Global Detection Posture — Who Caught It, Who Missed It

VirusTotal engines: 73. Detected as malicious: 54. Missed: 19. Coverage: 74.0%.

Why it matters: if any endpoint relies solely on a missed engine, this malware can operate with zero alerts. Prevention‑first controls close that gap regardless of signature lag.

Behavioral Storyline — How the Malware Operates

Dominant system-level operations (72.13% of behavior) suggest this malware performs deep system reconnaissance, privilege escalation, or core OS manipulation. It’s actively probing system defenses and attempting to gain administrative control.

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

• T1027 – encrypt data using speck
• T1027 – encode data using XOR
• T1082 – get MAC address on Windows
• T1059 – accept command line arguments
• T1016 – get local IPv4 addresses
• T1112 – delete registry value
• T1027 – encrypt data using AES via x86 extensions
• T1497.001 – reference anti-VM strings targeting VirtualBox
• T1027 – encrypt data using HC-128 via WolfSSL
• T1490 – delete volume shadow copies
• T1070.004 – delete volume shadow copies
• T1082 – get disk information
• T1082 – get hostname
• T1134 – modify access privileges
• T1027 – encrypt data using Salsa20 or ChaCha
• T1082 – get system information on Windows
• T1083 – get common file path
• T1543.003 – stop service
• T1489 – stop service
• T1027 – encrypt data using RC4 PRGA
• T1082 – enumerate disk volumes
• T1543.003 – modify service
• T1569.002 – modify service
• T1222 – set file attributes
• T1129 – link many functions at runtime
• T1129 – link function at runtime on Windows
• T1057 – enumerate process modules
• T1082 – query environment variable
• T1027.005 – contain obfuscated stackstrings
• T1033 – get session user name
• T1087 – get session user name
• T1083 – check if file exists
• T1129 – parse PE header
• T1547.001 – persist via Run registry key
• T1027 – encode data using Base64
• T1529 – shutdown system
• T1135 – enumerate network shares
• T1497.001 – reference anti-VM strings targeting Parallels
• T1497.001 – reference anti-VM strings targeting VirtualPC
• T1497.001 – reference anti-VM strings targeting Xen
• T1497.001 – reference anti-VM strings
• T1497.001 – reference anti-VM strings targeting VMWare
• T1012 – query or enumerate registry value
• T1007 – enumerate services
• T1007 – query service status
• T1071 – Binary file triggered multiple YARA rules
• T1106 – Guard pages use detected – possible anti-debugging.
• T1055 – Contains .tls (Thread Local Storage) section
• T1027 – The binary likely contains encrypted or compressed data
• T1027.002 – The binary likely contains encrypted or compressed data
• T1569.002 – Found PSEXEC tool (often used for remote process execution)
• T1542.003 – May use bcdedit to modify the Windows boot settings
• T1562.001 – Creates guard pages, often used to prevent reverse engineering and debugging
• T1070.004 – May delete shadow drive data (may be related to ransomware)
• T1560 – Public key (encryption) found
• T1090 – Found Tor onion address

Following the Trail — Network & DNS Activity

Outbound activity leans on reputable infrastructure (e.g., CDNs, cloud endpoints) to blend in. TLS sessions and
HTTP calls show routine beaconing and IP‑lookup behavior that can masquerade as normal browsing.

Hunting tip: alert on unknown binaries initiating TLS to IP‑lookup services or unusual CDN endpoints — especially early in execution.