Executive Overview — What We’re Dealing With

This specimen has persisted long enough to matter. Human experts classified it as Malware, and the telemetry confirms a capable, evasive Trojan with real impact potential.

Extended Dwell Time Impact

For 1+ days, this malware remained undetected — a brief but concerning window that permitted the adversary to establish initial foothold, perform basic system enumeration, and potentially access immediate system resources.

Global Detection Posture — Who Caught It, Who Missed It

VirusTotal engines: 73. Detected as malicious: 57. Missed: 16. Coverage: 78.1%.

Why it matters: if any endpoint relies solely on a missed engine, this malware can operate with zero alerts. Prevention‑first controls close that gap regardless of signature lag.

Behavioral Storyline — How the Malware Operates

Intensive file system activity (50.03% of behavior) indicates data harvesting, file encryption, or dropper behavior. The threat is actively searching for and manipulating files across the system.

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

• T1083 – get common file path
• T1033 – get session user name
• T1087 – get session user name
• T1082 – get disk information
• T1007 – enumerate services
• T1059 – accept command line arguments
• T1082 – get system information on Windows
• T1027 – encrypt data using Salsa20 or ChaCha
• T1027.005 – contain obfuscated stackstrings
• T1129 – link function at runtime on Windows
• T1135 – enumerate network shares
• T1027 – encrypt data using RC4 PRGA
• T1082 – enumerate disk volumes
• T1027 – encode data using Base64
• T1083 – check if file exists
• T1497.001 – reference anti-VM strings
• T1057 – enumerate process modules
• T1082 – query environment variable
• T1007 – query service status
• T1027 – encrypt data using speck
• T1543.003 – stop service
• T1489 – stop service
• T1129 – link many functions at runtime
• T1027 – encrypt data using AES via x86 extensions
• T1543.003 – modify service
• T1569.002 – modify service
• T1027 – encode data using XOR
• T1129 – parse PE header
• T1222 – set file attributes
• T1036 – A file was accessed within the Public folder.
• T1055 – Contains .tls (Thread Local Storage) section
• T1548 – A file was accessed within the Public folder.
• T1071 – Yara detections observed in process dumps, payloads or dropped files
• T1071 – Binary file triggered YARA rule
• T1106 – Guard pages use detected – possible anti-debugging.
• T1497 – Queries disk information (often used to detect virtual machines)
• T1562.001 – Creates guard pages, often used to prevent reverse engineering and debugging
• T1518.001 – Queries disk information (often used to detect virtual machines)
• T1082 – Queries disk information (often used to detect virtual machines)
• T1082 – Queries the volume information (name, serial number etc) of a device
• T1090 – Found Tor onion address

Following the Trail — Network & DNS Activity

Outbound activity leans on reputable infrastructure (e.g., CDNs, cloud endpoints) to blend in. TLS sessions and
HTTP calls show routine beaconing and IP‑lookup behavior that can masquerade as normal browsing.

Hunting tip: alert on unknown binaries initiating TLS to IP‑lookup services or unusual CDN endpoints — especially early in execution.