Zero‑Dwell Threat Intelligence Report
Executive Overview — What We’re Dealing With
This specimen has persisted long enough to matter. Human experts classified it as Malware, and the telemetry confirms a capable, evasive Trojan with real impact potential.
Extended Dwell Time Impact
For 1+ days, this malware remained undetected — a brief but concerning window that permitted the adversary to establish initial foothold, perform basic system enumeration, and potentially access immediate system resources.
Comparative Context
Industry studies report a median dwell time closer to 21–24 days. This case is significantly below that median, suggesting relatively quick detection.
Timeline
| Time (UTC) | Event | Elapsed |
|---|---|---|
| 2025-11-06 20:50:50 UTC | First VirusTotal submission | — |
| 2025-11-19 12:43:46 UTC | Latest analysis snapshot | 12 days, 15 hours, 52 minutes |
| 2025-11-20 08:36:02 UTC | Report generation time | 13 days, 11 hours, 45 minutes |
Why It Matters
Every additional day of dwell time is not just an abstract number — it is attacker opportunity. Each day equates to more time for lateral movement, stealth persistence, and intelligence gathering.
Global Detection Posture — Who Caught It, Who Missed It
VirusTotal engines: 73. Detected as malicious: 55. Missed: 18. Coverage: 75.3%.
Detected Vendors
- Xcitium
- +54 additional vendors (names not provided)
List includes Xcitium plus an additional 54 vendors per the provided summary.
Missed Vendors
- Acronis
- Antiy-AVL
- APEX
- Baidu
- Bkav
- ClamAV
- CMC
- DrWeb
- Jiangmin
- Skyhigh
- SUPERAntiSpyware
- TACHYON
- tehtris
- Trapmine
- VirIT
- Webroot
- Yandex
- Zoner
Why it matters: if any endpoint relies solely on a missed engine, this malware can operate with zero alerts. Prevention‑first controls close that gap regardless of signature lag.
Behavioral Storyline — How the Malware Operates
Dominant system-level operations (66.67% of behavior) suggest this malware performs deep system reconnaissance, privilege escalation, or core OS manipulation. It’s actively probing system defenses and attempting to gain administrative control.
Behavior Categories (weighted)
Weight values represent the frequency and intensity of malware interactions with specific system components. Higher weights indicate more aggressive targeting of that category. Each operation (registry access, file modification, network connection, etc.) contributes to the category’s total weight, providing a quantitative measure of the malware’s behavioral focus.
| Category | Weight | Percentage |
|---|---|---|
| System | 6 | 66.67% |
| Process | 2 | 22.22% |
| Synchronization | 1 | 11.11% |
MITRE ATT&CK Mapping
- T1027 – encrypt data using Salsa20 or ChaCha
- T1082 – get hostname
- T1082 – get disk information
- T1129 – link function at runtime on Windows
- T1134 – modify access privileges
- T1497.001 – reference anti-VM strings
- T1529 – shutdown system
- T1083 – get common file path
- T1112 – delete registry value
- T1497.001 – reference anti-VM strings targeting Parallels
- T1027 – encode data using Base64
- T1016 – get local IPv4 addresses
- T1057 – enumerate process modules
- T1129 – parse PE header
- T1083 – check if file exists
- T1082 – enumerate disk volumes
- T1027.005 – contain obfuscated stackstrings
- T1059 – accept command line arguments
- T1222 – set file attributes
- T1027 – encrypt data using speck
- T1027 – encrypt data using RC4 PRGA
- T1082 – get MAC address on Windows
- T1027 – encrypt data using HC-128 via WolfSSL
- T1543.003 – modify service
- T1569.002 – modify service
- T1129 – link many functions at runtime
- T1082 – get system information on Windows
- T1490 – delete volume shadow copies
- T1070.004 – delete volume shadow copies
- T1007 – enumerate services
- T1135 – enumerate network shares
- T1033 – get session user name
- T1087 – get session user name
- T1497.001 – reference anti-VM strings targeting VirtualPC
- T1497.001 – reference anti-VM strings targeting VirtualBox
- T1547.001 – persist via Run registry key
- T1497.001 – reference anti-VM strings targeting Xen
- T1027 – encrypt data using AES via x86 extensions
- T1007 – query service status
- T1543.003 – stop service
- T1489 – stop service
- T1497.001 – reference anti-VM strings targeting VMWare
- T1027 – encode data using XOR
- T1082 – query environment variable
- T1012 – query or enumerate registry value
Following the Trail — Network & DNS Activity
Outbound activity leans on reputable infrastructure (e.g., CDNs, cloud endpoints) to blend in. TLS sessions and
HTTP calls show routine beaconing and IP‑lookup behavior that can masquerade as normal browsing.
Contacted Domains
| Domain | IP | Country | ASN/Org |
|---|---|---|---|
| www.msftncsi.com | 23.200.3.71 | United States | Akamai Technologies, Inc. |
Observed IPs
| IP | Country | ASN/Org |
|---|---|---|
| 224.0.0.252 | — | — |
| 239.255.255.250 | — | — |
| 8.8.4.4 | United States | Google LLC |
| 8.8.8.8 | United States | Google LLC |
DNS Queries
| Request | Type |
|---|---|
| 5isohu.com | A |
| www.msftncsi.com | A |
Contacted IPs
| IP | Country | ASN/Org |
|---|---|---|
| 224.0.0.252 | — | — |
| 239.255.255.250 | — | — |
| 8.8.4.4 | United States | Google LLC |
| 8.8.8.8 | United States | Google LLC |
Port Distribution
| Port | Count | Protocols |
|---|---|---|
| 137 | 1 | udp |
| 5355 | 5 | udp |
| 53 | 4 | udp |
| 3702 | 1 | udp |
UDP Packets
| Source IP | Dest IP | Sport | Dport | Time | Proto |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 192.168.56.13 | 192.168.56.255 | 137 | 137 | 3.312943935394287 | udp |
| 192.168.56.13 | 224.0.0.252 | 49311 | 5355 | 5.780045986175537 | udp |
| 192.168.56.13 | 224.0.0.252 | 55150 | 5355 | 3.2192039489746094 | udp |
| 192.168.56.13 | 224.0.0.252 | 60010 | 5355 | 5.230401992797852 | udp |
| 192.168.56.13 | 224.0.0.252 | 62406 | 5355 | 3.2233529090881348 | udp |
| 192.168.56.13 | 224.0.0.252 | 63527 | 5355 | 4.479733943939209 | udp |
| 192.168.56.13 | 239.255.255.250 | 52252 | 3702 | 3.2304790019989014 | udp |
| 192.168.56.13 | 8.8.4.4 | 54879 | 53 | 7.836915016174316 | udp |
| 192.168.56.13 | 8.8.4.4 | 54881 | 53 | 7.0562660694122314 | udp |
| 192.168.56.13 | 8.8.8.8 | 54879 | 53 | 8.8367440700531 | udp |
| 192.168.56.13 | 8.8.8.8 | 54881 | 53 | 8.0554358959198 | udp |
Hunting tip: alert on unknown binaries initiating TLS to IP‑lookup services or unusual CDN endpoints — especially early in execution.
Persistence & Policy — Registry and Services
Registry and service telemetry points to policy awareness and environment reconnaissance rather than noisy persistence. Below is a compact view of the most relevant keys and handles; expand to see the full lists where available.
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Registry Opened (Top 25)
Show all (297 total)
Registry Set (Top 25)
| Key | Value |
|---|---|
| HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\Windows Error Reporting\Debug\StoreLocation | %LOCALAPPDATA%\Microsoft\Windows\WER\ReportArchive\AppCrash_D73KGB94ZU23M1EC_b55aa3c337979884fd6a751f475269227fc5f640_0a355550 |
| HKEY_USERS\S-1-5-21-575823232-3065301323-1442773979-1000\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root\Certificates\0174E68C97DDF1E0EEEA415EA336A163D2B61AFD\Blob | 5C 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 04 00 00 00 00 10 00 00 04 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 10 00 00 00 0D BE 92 DE FF 7D 36 BB 48 C4 A6 B1 15 24 95 38 0F 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 20 00 00 00 53 FE B9 19 2E D4 80 F2 09 12 4A 2C 57 D7 E8 97 7A 2E 9F 39 46 1D BF 21 4D F1 12 CB 16 02 4F A2 14 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 14 00 00 00 78 B8 30 FD 63 AC 7B 89 4A 07 3B ED F6 8A 83 9C C3 52 02 65 19 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 10 00 00 00 B5 74 AF 30 C5 C1 BA 3A 69 A7 10 02 00 82 4D D0 03 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 14 00 00 00 01 74 E6 8C 97 DD F1 E0 EE EA 41 5E A3 36 A1 63 D2 B6 1A FD 20 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 F8 05 00 00 30 82 05 F4 30 82 03 DC A0 03 02 01 02 02 09 00 E0 EA 61 4C 28 56 32 64 30 0D 06 09 2A 86 48 86 F7 0D 01 01 0B 05 00 30 81 8E 31 0B 30 09 06 03 55 04 06 13 02 49 4C 31 0F 30 0D 06 03 55 04 08 0C 06 43 65 6E 74 65 72 31 0C 30 0A 06 03 55 04 07 0C 03 4C 6F 64 31 10 30 0E 06 03 55 04 0A 0C 07 47 6F 50 72 6F 78 79 31 10 30 0E 06 03 55 04 0B 0C 07 47 6F 50 72 6F 78 79 31 1A 30 18 06 03 55 04 03 0C 11 67 6F 70 72 6F 78 79 2E 67 69 74 68 75 62 2E 69 6 |
| HKEY_USERS\S-1-5-21-575823232-3065301323-1442773979-1000\Software\Microsoft\Windows\Windows Error Reporting\Debug\StoreLocation | %LOCALAPPDATA%\Microsoft\Windows\WER\ReportArchive\AppCrash_D73KGB94ZU23M1EC_b55aa3c337979884fd6a751f475269227fc5f640_0a355550 |
Services Started (Top 15)
Services Opened (Top 15)
What To Do Now — Practical Defense Playbook
- Contain unknowns: block first‑run binaries by default — signatures catch up, containment works now.
- EDR controls: alert on keyboard hooks, screen capture APIs, VM/sandbox checks, and command‑shell launches.
- Registry watch: flag queries/sets under policy paths (e.g., …\FipsAlgorithmPolicy\*).
- Network rules: inspect outbound TLS to IP‑lookup services and unexpected CDN endpoints.
- Hunt broadly: sweep endpoints for the indicators above and quarantine positives immediately.
Dwell time equals attacker opportunity. Reducing execution privileges and egress shrinks that window even when vendors disagree.
