Qilin Performs Network Enumeration, File Encryption, and Tor Extortion Workflow


Zero‑Dwell Threat Intelligence Report

A narrative, executive‑ready view into the malware’s behavior, exposure, and reliable defenses.
Generated: 2025-11-20 08:36:02 UTC

Executive Overview — What We’re Dealing With

This specimen has persisted long enough to matter. Human experts classified it as Malware, and the telemetry confirms a capable, evasive Trojan with real impact potential.

File
4rx9v6s.exe
Type
Win32 Executable MS Visual C++ (generic)
SHA‑1
441210321635700292af8ab0a8fded25f699dcc6
MD5
6327733b1a1d51d5e3e8b668d23c9002
First Seen
2025-11-14 19:52:06.793303
Last Analysis
2025-11-15 20:48:14.421449
Dwell Time
0 days, 7 hours, 33 minutes

Extended Dwell Time Impact

For 1+ days, this malware remained undetected — a brief but concerning window that permitted the adversary to establish initial foothold, perform basic system enumeration, and potentially access immediate system resources.

Comparative Context

Industry studies report a median dwell time closer to 21–24 days. This case is significantly below that median, suggesting relatively quick detection.

Timeline

Time (UTC) Event Elapsed
2025-11-06 20:50:50 UTC First VirusTotal submission
2025-11-19 12:43:46 UTC Latest analysis snapshot 12 days, 15 hours, 52 minutes
2025-11-20 08:36:02 UTC Report generation time 13 days, 11 hours, 45 minutes

Why It Matters

Every additional day of dwell time is not just an abstract number — it is attacker opportunity. Each day equates to more time for lateral movement, stealth persistence, and intelligence gathering.

Global Detection Posture — Who Caught It, Who Missed It

VirusTotal engines: 73. Detected as malicious: 55. Missed: 18. Coverage: 75.3%.

Detected Vendors

  • Xcitium
  • +54 additional vendors (names not provided)

List includes Xcitium plus an additional 54 vendors per the provided summary.

Missed Vendors

  • Acronis
  • Antiy-AVL
  • APEX
  • Baidu
  • Bkav
  • ClamAV
  • CMC
  • DrWeb
  • Jiangmin
  • Skyhigh
  • SUPERAntiSpyware
  • TACHYON
  • tehtris
  • Trapmine
  • VirIT
  • Webroot
  • Yandex
  • Zoner

Why it matters: if any endpoint relies solely on a missed engine, this malware can operate with zero alerts. Prevention‑first controls close that gap regardless of signature lag.

Behavioral Storyline — How the Malware Operates

Dominant system-level operations (66.67% of behavior) suggest this malware performs deep system reconnaissance, privilege escalation, or core OS manipulation. It’s actively probing system defenses and attempting to gain administrative control.

Behavior Categories (weighted)

Weight values represent the frequency and intensity of malware interactions with specific system components. Higher weights indicate more aggressive targeting of that category. Each operation (registry access, file modification, network connection, etc.) contributes to the category’s total weight, providing a quantitative measure of the malware’s behavioral focus.

Category Weight Percentage
System 6 66.67%
Process 2 22.22%
Synchronization 1 11.11%

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

  • T1027 – encrypt data using Salsa20 or ChaCha
  • T1082 – get hostname
  • T1082 – get disk information
  • T1129 – link function at runtime on Windows
  • T1134 – modify access privileges
  • T1497.001 – reference anti-VM strings
  • T1529 – shutdown system
  • T1083 – get common file path
  • T1112 – delete registry value
  • T1497.001 – reference anti-VM strings targeting Parallels
  • T1027 – encode data using Base64
  • T1016 – get local IPv4 addresses
  • T1057 – enumerate process modules
  • T1129 – parse PE header
  • T1083 – check if file exists
  • T1082 – enumerate disk volumes
  • T1027.005 – contain obfuscated stackstrings
  • T1059 – accept command line arguments
  • T1222 – set file attributes
  • T1027 – encrypt data using speck
  • T1027 – encrypt data using RC4 PRGA
  • T1082 – get MAC address on Windows
  • T1027 – encrypt data using HC-128 via WolfSSL
  • T1543.003 – modify service
  • T1569.002 – modify service
  • T1129 – link many functions at runtime
  • T1082 – get system information on Windows
  • T1490 – delete volume shadow copies
  • T1070.004 – delete volume shadow copies
  • T1007 – enumerate services
  • T1135 – enumerate network shares
  • T1033 – get session user name
  • T1087 – get session user name
  • T1497.001 – reference anti-VM strings targeting VirtualPC
  • T1497.001 – reference anti-VM strings targeting VirtualBox
  • T1547.001 – persist via Run registry key
  • T1497.001 – reference anti-VM strings targeting Xen
  • T1027 – encrypt data using AES via x86 extensions
  • T1007 – query service status
  • T1543.003 – stop service
  • T1489 – stop service
  • T1497.001 – reference anti-VM strings targeting VMWare
  • T1027 – encode data using XOR
  • T1082 – query environment variable
  • T1012 – query or enumerate registry value

Following the Trail — Network & DNS Activity

Outbound activity leans on reputable infrastructure (e.g., CDNs, cloud endpoints) to blend in. TLS sessions and
HTTP calls show routine beaconing and IP‑lookup behavior that can masquerade as normal browsing.

Contacted Domains

Domain IP Country ASN/Org
www.msftncsi.com 23.200.3.71 United States Akamai Technologies, Inc.

Observed IPs

IP Country ASN/Org
224.0.0.252
239.255.255.250
8.8.4.4 United States Google LLC
8.8.8.8 United States Google LLC

DNS Queries

Request Type
5isohu.com A
www.msftncsi.com A

Contacted IPs

IP Country ASN/Org
224.0.0.252
239.255.255.250
8.8.4.4 United States Google LLC
8.8.8.8 United States Google LLC

Port Distribution

Port Count Protocols
137 1 udp
5355 5 udp
53 4 udp
3702 1 udp

UDP Packets

Source IP Dest IP Sport Dport Time Proto
192.168.56.13 192.168.56.255 137 137 3.312943935394287 udp
192.168.56.13 224.0.0.252 49311 5355 5.780045986175537 udp
192.168.56.13 224.0.0.252 55150 5355 3.2192039489746094 udp
192.168.56.13 224.0.0.252 60010 5355 5.230401992797852 udp
192.168.56.13 224.0.0.252 62406 5355 3.2233529090881348 udp
192.168.56.13 224.0.0.252 63527 5355 4.479733943939209 udp
192.168.56.13 239.255.255.250 52252 3702 3.2304790019989014 udp
192.168.56.13 8.8.4.4 54879 53 7.836915016174316 udp
192.168.56.13 8.8.4.4 54881 53 7.0562660694122314 udp
192.168.56.13 8.8.8.8 54879 53 8.8367440700531 udp
192.168.56.13 8.8.8.8 54881 53 8.0554358959198 udp

Hunting tip: alert on unknown binaries initiating TLS to IP‑lookup services or unusual CDN endpoints — especially early in execution.

Persistence & Policy — Registry and Services

Registry and service telemetry points to policy awareness and environment reconnaissance rather than noisy persistence. Below is a compact view of the most relevant keys and handles; expand to see the full lists where available.

Registry Opened

0

Registry Set

3

Services Started

0

Services Opened

0

Registry Opened (Top 25)

Show all (297 total)

Registry Set (Top 25)

Key Value
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\Windows Error Reporting\Debug\StoreLocation %LOCALAPPDATA%\Microsoft\Windows\WER\ReportArchive\AppCrash_D73KGB94ZU23M1EC_b55aa3c337979884fd6a751f475269227fc5f640_0a355550
HKEY_USERS\S-1-5-21-575823232-3065301323-1442773979-1000\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root\Certificates\0174E68C97DDF1E0EEEA415EA336A163D2B61AFD\Blob 5C 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 04 00 00 00 00 10 00 00 04 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 10 00 00 00 0D BE 92 DE FF 7D 36 BB 48 C4 A6 B1 15 24 95 38 0F 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 20 00 00 00 53 FE B9 19 2E D4 80 F2 09 12 4A 2C 57 D7 E8 97 7A 2E 9F 39 46 1D BF 21 4D F1 12 CB 16 02 4F A2 14 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 14 00 00 00 78 B8 30 FD 63 AC 7B 89 4A 07 3B ED F6 8A 83 9C C3 52 02 65 19 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 10 00 00 00 B5 74 AF 30 C5 C1 BA 3A 69 A7 10 02 00 82 4D D0 03 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 14 00 00 00 01 74 E6 8C 97 DD F1 E0 EE EA 41 5E A3 36 A1 63 D2 B6 1A FD 20 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 F8 05 00 00 30 82 05 F4 30 82 03 DC A0 03 02 01 02 02 09 00 E0 EA 61 4C 28 56 32 64 30 0D 06 09 2A 86 48 86 F7 0D 01 01 0B 05 00 30 81 8E 31 0B 30 09 06 03 55 04 06 13 02 49 4C 31 0F 30 0D 06 03 55 04 08 0C 06 43 65 6E 74 65 72 31 0C 30 0A 06 03 55 04 07 0C 03 4C 6F 64 31 10 30 0E 06 03 55 04 0A 0C 07 47 6F 50 72 6F 78 79 31 10 30 0E 06 03 55 04 0B 0C 07 47 6F 50 72 6F 78 79 31 1A 30 18 06 03 55 04 03 0C 11 67 6F 70 72 6F 78 79 2E 67 69 74 68 75 62 2E 69 6
HKEY_USERS\S-1-5-21-575823232-3065301323-1442773979-1000\Software\Microsoft\Windows\Windows Error Reporting\Debug\StoreLocation %LOCALAPPDATA%\Microsoft\Windows\WER\ReportArchive\AppCrash_D73KGB94ZU23M1EC_b55aa3c337979884fd6a751f475269227fc5f640_0a355550

Services Started (Top 15)

Services Opened (Top 15)

What To Do Now — Practical Defense Playbook

  • Contain unknowns: block first‑run binaries by default — signatures catch up, containment works now.
  • EDR controls: alert on keyboard hooks, screen capture APIs, VM/sandbox checks, and command‑shell launches.
  • Registry watch: flag queries/sets under policy paths (e.g., …\FipsAlgorithmPolicy\*).
  • Network rules: inspect outbound TLS to IP‑lookup services and unexpected CDN endpoints.
  • Hunt broadly: sweep endpoints for the indicators above and quarantine positives immediately.

Dwell time equals attacker opportunity. Reducing execution privileges and egress shrinks that window even when vendors disagree.

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