Executive Overview — What We’re Dealing With

This specimen has persisted long enough to matter. Human experts classified it as Malware, and the telemetry confirms a capable, evasive Trojan with real impact potential.

Extended Dwell Time Impact

For 1+ days, this malware remained undetected — a brief but concerning window that permitted the adversary to establish initial foothold, perform basic system enumeration, and potentially access immediate system resources.

Global Detection Posture — Who Caught It, Who Missed It

VirusTotal engines: 73. Detected as malicious: 56. Missed: 17. Coverage: 76.7%.

Why it matters: if any endpoint relies solely on a missed engine, this malware can operate with zero alerts. Prevention‑first controls close that gap regardless of signature lag.

Behavioral Storyline — How the Malware Operates

Dominant system-level operations (67.23% of behavior) suggest this malware performs deep system reconnaissance, privilege escalation, or core OS manipulation. It’s actively probing system defenses and attempting to gain administrative control.

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

• T1012 – query or enumerate registry value
• T1497.001 – reference anti-VM strings targeting Parallels
• T1027 – encrypt data using Salsa20 or ChaCha
• T1543.003 – stop service
• T1489 – stop service
• T1027.005 – contain obfuscated stackstrings
• T1497.001 – reference anti-VM strings targeting VirtualBox
• T1529 – shutdown system
• T1027 – encode data using Base64
• T1490 – delete volume shadow copies
• T1070.004 – delete volume shadow copies
• T1112 – delete registry value
• T1134 – modify access privileges
• T1082 – get disk information
• T1057 – enumerate process modules
• T1497.001 – reference anti-VM strings targeting VirtualPC
• T1007 – query service status
• T1082 – get MAC address on Windows
• T1497.001 – reference anti-VM strings targeting VMWare
• T1497.001 – reference anti-VM strings targeting Xen
• T1033 – get session user name
• T1087 – get session user name
• T1129 – parse PE header
• T1222 – set file attributes
• T1027 – encrypt data using AES via x86 extensions
• T1082 – enumerate disk volumes
• T1059 – accept command line arguments
• T1082 – query environment variable
• T1027 – encrypt data using speck
• T1547.001 – persist via Run registry key
• T1027 – encrypt data using RC4 PRGA
• T1083 – check if file exists
• T1543.003 – modify service
• T1569.002 – modify service
• T1129 – link function at runtime on Windows
• T1083 – get common file path
• T1082 – get hostname
• T1129 – link many functions at runtime
• T1007 – enumerate services
• T1027 – encrypt data using HC-128 via WolfSSL
• T1497.001 – reference anti-VM strings
• T1027 – encode data using XOR
• T1016 – get local IPv4 addresses
• T1082 – get system information on Windows
• T1135 – enumerate network shares
• T1071 – Binary file triggered multiple YARA rules
• T1106 – Guard pages use detected – possible anti-debugging.
• T1055 – Contains .tls (Thread Local Storage) section
• T1070.006 – Binary file triggered multiple YARA rules
• T1070 – Binary file triggered multiple YARA rules
• T1027 – The binary likely contains encrypted or compressed data
• T1027.002 – The binary likely contains encrypted or compressed data
• T1059 – Detected command line output monitoring
• T1057 – The process has tried to detect the debugger probing the use of page guards.
• T1059 – Apparent Internal Usage of CMD.EXE
• T1063 – It Tries to detect injection methods
• T1569.002 – Found PSEXEC tool (often used for remote process execution)
• T1542.003 – May use bcdedit to modify the Windows boot settings
• T1562.001 – Creates guard pages, often used to prevent reverse engineering and debugging
• T1070.004 – May delete shadow drive data (may be related to ransomware)
• T1560 – Public key (encryption) found
• T1090 – Found Tor onion address

Following the Trail — Network & DNS Activity

Outbound activity leans on reputable infrastructure (e.g., CDNs, cloud endpoints) to blend in. TLS sessions and
HTTP calls show routine beaconing and IP‑lookup behavior that can masquerade as normal browsing.

Hunting tip: alert on unknown binaries initiating TLS to IP‑lookup services or unusual CDN endpoints — especially early in execution.