Delphi-Compiled Vilsel/Qilin Trojan Uses Overlay Payload & WinExec Launching for Stealth Execution


Zero‑Dwell Threat Intelligence Report

A narrative, executive‑ready view into the malware’s behavior, exposure, and reliable defenses.
Generated: 2025-11-20 08:41:59 UTC

Executive Overview — What We’re Dealing With

This specimen has persisted long enough to matter. Human experts classified it as Malware, and the telemetry confirms a capable, evasive Trojan with real impact potential.

File
7z.exe (copy)
Type
Win64 Executable (generic)
SHA‑1
da829c7a95946be16eb29663bfcbe325fc6b875a
MD5
49ffe41446aea0119b9d82c51b550f90
First Seen
2025-11-14 19:59:19.892229
Last Analysis
2025-11-15 20:48:21.817042
Dwell Time
0 days, 7 hours, 33 minutes

Extended Dwell Time Impact

For 1+ days, this malware remained undetected — a brief but concerning window that permitted the adversary to establish initial foothold, perform basic system enumeration, and potentially access immediate system resources.

Comparative Context

Industry studies report a median dwell time closer to 21–24 days. This case is significantly below that median, suggesting relatively quick detection.

Timeline

Time (UTC) Event Elapsed
2025-11-06 18:32:55 UTC First VirusTotal submission
2025-11-19 08:44:29 UTC Latest analysis snapshot 12 days, 14 hours, 11 minutes
2025-11-20 08:41:59 UTC Report generation time 13 days, 14 hours, 9 minutes

Why It Matters

Every additional day of dwell time is not just an abstract number — it is attacker opportunity. Each day equates to more time for lateral movement, stealth persistence, and intelligence gathering.

Global Detection Posture — Who Caught It, Who Missed It

VirusTotal engines: 73. Detected as malicious: 63. Missed: 10. Coverage: 86.3%.

Detected Vendors

  • Xcitium
  • +62 additional vendors (names not provided)

List includes Xcitium plus an additional 62 vendors per the provided summary.

Missed Vendors

  • Acronis
  • Baidu
  • CMC
  • MaxSecure
  • SUPERAntiSpyware
  • TrendMicro
  • VirIT
  • Webroot
  • Yandex
  • Zoner

Why it matters: if any endpoint relies solely on a missed engine, this malware can operate with zero alerts. Prevention‑first controls close that gap regardless of signature lag.

Behavioral Storyline — How the Malware Operates

Intensive file system activity (33.33% of behavior) indicates data harvesting, file encryption, or dropper behavior. The threat is actively searching for and manipulating files across the system.

Behavior Categories (weighted)

Weight values represent the frequency and intensity of malware interactions with specific system components. Higher weights indicate more aggressive targeting of that category. Each operation (registry access, file modification, network connection, etc.) contributes to the category’s total weight, providing a quantitative measure of the malware’s behavioral focus.

Category Weight Percentage
File System 14 33.33%
System 13 30.95%
Registry 10 23.81%
Process 3 7.14%
Windows 1 2.38%
Synchronization 1 2.38%

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

  • T1129 – link function at runtime on Windows
  • T1614 – get geographical location
  • T1082 – get disk size
  • T1497.001 – reference anti-VM strings
  • T1222 – set file attributes
  • T1059 – accept command line arguments
  • T1083 – get common file path
  • T1012 – query or enumerate registry value
  • T1135 – enumerate network shares
  • T1083 – get file size
  • T1010 – enumerate gui resources
  • T1129 – parse PE header
  • T1082 – get hostname
  • T1082 – get disk information

Following the Trail — Network & DNS Activity

Outbound activity leans on reputable infrastructure (e.g., CDNs, cloud endpoints) to blend in. TLS sessions and
HTTP calls show routine beaconing and IP‑lookup behavior that can masquerade as normal browsing.

Contacted Domains

Domain IP Country ASN/Org
www.msftncsi.com 23.200.3.18 United States Akamai Technologies, Inc.
www.aieov.com 13.248.169.48 United States Amazon Technologies Inc.

Observed IPs

IP Country ASN/Org
224.0.0.252
239.255.255.250
8.8.4.4 United States Google LLC
8.8.8.8 United States Google LLC

DNS Queries

Request Type
5isohu.com A
www.msftncsi.com A
www.aieov.com A

Contacted IPs

IP Country ASN/Org
224.0.0.252
239.255.255.250
8.8.4.4 United States Google LLC
8.8.8.8 United States Google LLC

Port Distribution

Port Count Protocols
137 1 udp
138 1 udp
5355 5 udp
53 29 udp
3702 1 udp

UDP Packets

Source IP Dest IP Sport Dport Time Proto
192.168.56.13 192.168.56.255 137 137 3.242122173309326 udp
192.168.56.13 192.168.56.255 138 138 9.24208402633667 udp
192.168.56.13 224.0.0.252 49311 5355 5.731367111206055 udp
192.168.56.13 224.0.0.252 55150 5355 3.1716041564941406 udp
192.168.56.13 224.0.0.252 60010 5355 5.1815102100372314 udp
192.168.56.13 224.0.0.252 62406 5355 3.1764721870422363 udp
192.168.56.13 224.0.0.252 63527 5355 3.886545181274414 udp
192.168.56.13 239.255.255.250 52252 3702 3.1801559925079346 udp
192.168.56.13 8.8.4.4 50554 53 144.67904710769653 udp
192.168.56.13 8.8.4.4 54879 53 7.742386102676392 udp
192.168.56.13 8.8.4.4 54881 53 6.460251092910767 udp
192.168.56.13 8.8.4.4 55551 53 173.39782214164734 udp
192.168.56.13 8.8.4.4 56197 53 159.0384681224823 udp
192.168.56.13 8.8.4.4 57310 53 65.10157513618469 udp
192.168.56.13 8.8.4.4 57415 53 79.46061301231384 udp
192.168.56.13 8.8.4.4 58697 53 21.804781198501587 udp
192.168.56.13 8.8.4.4 58920 53 97.71089315414429 udp
192.168.56.13 8.8.4.4 60910 53 112.0703501701355 udp
192.168.56.13 8.8.4.4 61004 53 191.6483860015869 udp
192.168.56.13 8.8.4.4 62493 53 50.743959188461304 udp
192.168.56.13 8.8.4.4 62849 53 36.163597106933594 udp
192.168.56.13 8.8.4.4 64801 53 126.42977404594421 udp
192.168.56.13 8.8.8.8 50554 53 143.6799521446228 udp
192.168.56.13 8.8.8.8 54879 53 8.745029211044312 udp
192.168.56.13 8.8.8.8 54881 53 7.444969177246094 udp
192.168.56.13 8.8.8.8 55551 53 172.39899921417236 udp
192.168.56.13 8.8.8.8 56197 53 158.0389060974121 udp
192.168.56.13 8.8.8.8 57310 53 64.10184407234192 udp
192.168.56.13 8.8.8.8 57415 53 78.46099710464478 udp
192.168.56.13 8.8.8.8 58697 53 20.805249214172363 udp
192.168.56.13 8.8.8.8 58920 53 96.71098303794861 udp
192.168.56.13 8.8.8.8 60910 53 111.07041811943054 udp
192.168.56.13 8.8.8.8 61004 53 190.64995002746582 udp
192.168.56.13 8.8.8.8 62493 53 49.74271011352539 udp
192.168.56.13 8.8.8.8 62849 53 35.16396117210388 udp
192.168.56.13 8.8.8.8 64533 53 205.00757312774658 udp
192.168.56.13 8.8.8.8 64801 53 125.42956709861755 udp

Hunting tip: alert on unknown binaries initiating TLS to IP‑lookup services or unusual CDN endpoints — especially early in execution.

Persistence & Policy — Registry and Services

Registry and service telemetry points to policy awareness and environment reconnaissance rather than noisy persistence. Below is a compact view of the most relevant keys and handles; expand to see the full lists where available.

Registry Opened

0

Registry Set

3

Services Started

0

Services Opened

0

Registry Opened (Top 25)

Show all (297 total)

Registry Set (Top 25)

Key Value
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\inet.\Day 22
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\inet.\Month 1
HKEY_USERS\S-1-5-21-575823232-3065301323-1442773979-1000\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\DisableTaskMgr 0

Services Started (Top 15)

Services Opened (Top 15)

What To Do Now — Practical Defense Playbook

  • Contain unknowns: block first‑run binaries by default — signatures catch up, containment works now.
  • EDR controls: alert on keyboard hooks, screen capture APIs, VM/sandbox checks, and command‑shell launches.
  • Registry watch: flag queries/sets under policy paths (e.g., …\FipsAlgorithmPolicy\*).
  • Network rules: inspect outbound TLS to IP‑lookup services and unexpected CDN endpoints.
  • Hunt broadly: sweep endpoints for the indicators above and quarantine positives immediately.

Dwell time equals attacker opportunity. Reducing execution privileges and egress shrinks that window even when vendors disagree.

Scroll to Top