BQTLock Exhibits AES/RSA Encryption, User-Creation Abuse, and Multi-Channel C2 Traits


Zero‑Dwell Threat Intelligence Report

A narrative, executive‑ready view into the malware’s behavior, exposure, and reliable defenses.
Generated: 2025-11-20 08:42:10 UTC

Executive Overview — What We’re Dealing With

This specimen has persisted long enough to matter. Human experts classified it as Malware, and the telemetry confirms a capable, evasive Trojan with real impact potential.

File
e0e3a45da417eaa356c2ca00d71dae0edd42a24f
Type
Microsoft Visual C++ compiled executable (generic)
SHA‑1
e0e3a45da417eaa356c2ca00d71dae0edd42a24f
MD5
dae6729cc3bfcbd700fc7e46818aada2
First Seen
2025-11-14 19:58:18.432934
Last Analysis
2025-11-15 20:48:22.559584
Dwell Time
0 days, 7 hours, 33 minutes

Extended Dwell Time Impact

For 1+ days, this malware remained undetected — a brief but concerning window that permitted the adversary to establish initial foothold, perform basic system enumeration, and potentially access immediate system resources.

Comparative Context

Industry studies report a median dwell time closer to 21–24 days. This case is significantly below that median, suggesting relatively quick detection.

Timeline

Time (UTC) Event Elapsed
2025-07-17 22:06:18 UTC First VirusTotal submission
2025-11-19 12:51:24 UTC Latest analysis snapshot 124 days, 14 hours, 45 minutes
2025-11-20 08:42:10 UTC Report generation time 125 days, 10 hours, 35 minutes

Why It Matters

Every additional day of dwell time is not just an abstract number — it is attacker opportunity. Each day equates to more time for lateral movement, stealth persistence, and intelligence gathering.

Global Detection Posture — Who Caught It, Who Missed It

VirusTotal engines: 71. Detected as malicious: 56. Missed: 15. Coverage: 78.9%.

Detected Vendors

  • Xcitium
  • +55 additional vendors (names not provided)

List includes Xcitium plus an additional 55 vendors per the provided summary.

Missed Vendors

  • Acronis
  • Antiy-AVL
  • APEX
  • Baidu
  • CMC
  • google_safebrowsing
  • Gridinsoft
  • Jiangmin
  • SUPERAntiSpyware
  • TACHYON
  • tehtris
  • Trapmine
  • VBA32
  • Webroot
  • Zoner

Why it matters: if any endpoint relies solely on a missed engine, this malware can operate with zero alerts. Prevention‑first controls close that gap regardless of signature lag.

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

  • T1047 – connect to WMI namespace via WbemLocator
  • T1129 – link function at runtime on Windows
  • T1082 – enumerate disk volumes
  • T1057 – enumerate processes
  • T1518 – enumerate processes
  • T1136 – add user account
  • T1134 – modify access privileges
  • T1082 – get disk size
  • T1113 – capture screenshot
  • T1082 – get disk information
  • T1082 – get hostname
  • T1098 – add user account to group
  • T1134 – acquire debug privileges
  • T1055.012 – use process replacement
  • T1620 – use process replacement
  • T1490 – disable automatic Windows recovery features
  • T1083 – get common file path
  • T1083 – get file size
  • T1027 – encode data using XOR
  • T1070.004 – self delete
  • T1082 – query environment variable
  • T1083 – check if file exists
  • T1012 – query or enumerate registry value
  • T1053.005 – schedule task via schtasks
  • T1490 – delete volume shadow copies
  • T1070.004 – delete volume shadow copies
  • T1497.001 – reference anti-VM strings targeting VirtualBox
  • T1531 – delete user account
  • T1129 – parse PE header
  • T1071 – Anomalous binary characteristics
  • T1055 – Contains .tls (Thread Local Storage) section
  • T1027 – The binary contains an unknown PE section name indicative of packing
  • T1027.002 – The binary contains an unknown PE section name indicative of packing
  • T1045 – Manalize Local SandBox Packer Harvesting
  • T1059 – Apparent Internal Usage of CMD.EXE
  • T1063 – It Tries to detect injection methods
  • T1542.003 – May use bcdedit to modify the Windows boot settings
  • T1070.004 – May delete shadow drive data (may be related to ransomware)

Following the Trail — Network & DNS Activity

Outbound activity leans on reputable infrastructure (e.g., CDNs, cloud endpoints) to blend in. TLS sessions and
HTTP calls show routine beaconing and IP‑lookup behavior that can masquerade as normal browsing.

Contacted Domains

Domain IP Country ASN/Org
www.msftncsi.com 23.200.3.20 United States Akamai Technologies, Inc.

Observed IPs

IP Country ASN/Org
224.0.0.252
239.255.255.250
8.8.4.4 United States Google LLC
8.8.8.8 United States Google LLC

DNS Queries

Request Type
5isohu.com A
www.msftncsi.com A

Contacted IPs

IP Country ASN/Org
224.0.0.252
239.255.255.250
8.8.4.4 United States Google LLC
8.8.8.8 United States Google LLC

Port Distribution

Port Count Protocols
137 1 udp
138 1 udp
5355 5 udp
53 4 udp
3702 1 udp

UDP Packets

Source IP Dest IP Sport Dport Time Proto
192.168.56.13 192.168.56.255 137 137 3.242380142211914 udp
192.168.56.13 192.168.56.255 138 138 9.24212098121643 udp
192.168.56.13 224.0.0.252 49311 5355 5.72877311706543 udp
192.168.56.13 224.0.0.252 55150 5355 3.173535108566284 udp
192.168.56.13 224.0.0.252 60010 5355 5.186485052108765 udp
192.168.56.13 224.0.0.252 62406 5355 3.1766951084136963 udp
192.168.56.13 224.0.0.252 63527 5355 4.513978004455566 udp
192.168.56.13 239.255.255.250 52252 3702 3.1890859603881836 udp
192.168.56.13 8.8.4.4 54879 53 7.742043972015381 udp
192.168.56.13 8.8.4.4 54881 53 7.086006164550781 udp
192.168.56.13 8.8.8.8 54879 53 8.74170994758606 udp
192.168.56.13 8.8.8.8 54881 53 8.085415124893188 udp

Hunting tip: alert on unknown binaries initiating TLS to IP‑lookup services or unusual CDN endpoints — especially early in execution.

Persistence & Policy — Registry and Services

Registry and service telemetry points to policy awareness and environment reconnaissance rather than noisy persistence. Below is a compact view of the most relevant keys and handles; expand to see the full lists where available.

Registry Opened

4

Registry Set

0

Services Started

0

Services Opened

0

Registry Opened (Top 25)

Key
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Safer\CodeIdentifiers
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\SideBySide\AssemblyStorageRoots
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\Segment Heap
Show all (4 total)

Registry Set (Top 25)

Services Started (Top 15)

Services Opened (Top 15)

What To Do Now — Practical Defense Playbook

  • Contain unknowns: block first‑run binaries by default — signatures catch up, containment works now.
  • EDR controls: alert on keyboard hooks, screen capture APIs, VM/sandbox checks, and command‑shell launches.
  • Registry watch: flag queries/sets under policy paths (e.g., …\FipsAlgorithmPolicy\*).
  • Network rules: inspect outbound TLS to IP‑lookup services and unexpected CDN endpoints.
  • Hunt broadly: sweep endpoints for the indicators above and quarantine positives immediately.

Dwell time equals attacker opportunity. Reducing execution privileges and egress shrinks that window even when vendors disagree.

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