Executive Overview — What We’re Dealing With

This specimen has persisted long enough to matter. Human experts classified it as Malware, and the telemetry confirms a capable, evasive Trojan with real impact potential.

Extended Dwell Time Impact

For 1+ days, this malware remained undetected — a brief but concerning window that permitted the adversary to establish initial foothold, perform basic system enumeration, and potentially access immediate system resources.

Global Detection Posture — Who Caught It, Who Missed It

VirusTotal engines: 73. Detected as malicious: 54. Missed: 19. Coverage: 74.0%.

Why it matters: if any endpoint relies solely on a missed engine, this malware can operate with zero alerts. Prevention‑first controls close that gap regardless of signature lag.

Behavioral Storyline — How the Malware Operates

Dominant system-level operations (72.13% of behavior) suggest this malware performs deep system reconnaissance, privilege escalation, or core OS manipulation. It’s actively probing system defenses and attempting to gain administrative control.

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

• T1497.001 – reference anti-VM strings targeting VirtualPC
• T1007 – query service status
• T1129 – parse PE header
• T1027 – encode data using XOR
• T1082 – query environment variable
• T1129 – link many functions at runtime
• T1529 – shutdown system
• T1082 – get MAC address on Windows
• T1057 – enumerate process modules
• T1497.001 – reference anti-VM strings targeting VirtualBox
• T1027.005 – contain obfuscated stackstrings
• T1033 – get session user name
• T1087 – get session user name
• T1490 – delete volume shadow copies
• T1070.004 – delete volume shadow copies
• T1012 – query or enumerate registry value
• T1497.001 – reference anti-VM strings targeting VMWare
• T1082 – get hostname
• T1543.003 – modify service
• T1569.002 – modify service
• T1027 – encrypt data using AES via x86 extensions
• T1547.001 – persist via Run registry key
• T1497.001 – reference anti-VM strings targeting Xen
• T1027 – encode data using Base64
• T1083 – get common file path
• T1543.003 – stop service
• T1489 – stop service
• T1222 – set file attributes
• T1083 – check if file exists
• T1129 – link function at runtime on Windows
• T1082 – enumerate disk volumes
• T1497.001 – reference anti-VM strings targeting Parallels
• T1497.001 – reference anti-VM strings
• T1112 – delete registry value
• T1135 – enumerate network shares
• T1027 – encrypt data using Salsa20 or ChaCha
• T1059 – accept command line arguments
• T1027 – encrypt data using HC-128 via WolfSSL
• T1007 – enumerate services
• T1082 – get disk information
• T1027 – encrypt data using RC4 PRGA
• T1082 – get system information on Windows
• T1134 – modify access privileges
• T1027 – encrypt data using speck
• T1016 – get local IPv4 addresses
• T1071 – Binary file triggered multiple YARA rules
• T1106 – Guard pages use detected – possible anti-debugging.
• T1055 – Contains .tls (Thread Local Storage) section
• T1027 – The binary likely contains encrypted or compressed data
• T1027.002 – The binary likely contains encrypted or compressed data
• T1569.002 – Found PSEXEC tool (often used for remote process execution)
• T1542.003 – May use bcdedit to modify the Windows boot settings
• T1562.001 – Creates guard pages, often used to prevent reverse engineering and debugging
• T1070.004 – May delete shadow drive data (may be related to ransomware)
• T1560 – Public key (encryption) found
• T1090 – Found Tor onion address

Following the Trail — Network & DNS Activity

Outbound activity leans on reputable infrastructure (e.g., CDNs, cloud endpoints) to blend in. TLS sessions and
HTTP calls show routine beaconing and IP‑lookup behavior that can masquerade as normal browsing.

Hunting tip: alert on unknown binaries initiating TLS to IP‑lookup services or unusual CDN endpoints — especially early in execution.