Signed XWorm Backdoor Abuses Shell-Open Registry for Stealth Persistence


Zero‑Dwell Threat Intelligence Report

A narrative, executive‑ready view into the malware’s behavior, exposure, and reliable defenses.
Generated: 2025-11-27 12:50:58 UTC

Executive Overview — What We’re Dealing With

This specimen has persisted long enough to matter. Human experts classified it as Malware, and the telemetry confirms a capable, evasive Trojan with real impact potential.

File
dwq5r27pr.exe
Type
Microsoft Visual C++ compiled executable (generic)
SHA‑1
29c7e772d8d70cee9c0df1cebb4e9a5bc7b405b4
MD5
bdcccb8c675e9a477ff94b41c5a7d92a
First Seen
2025-11-25 08:00:56.673999
Last Analysis
2025-11-25 09:01:54.745662
Dwell Time
0 days, 7 hours, 33 minutes

Extended Dwell Time Impact

For 1+ hours, this malware remained undetected — a limited but sufficient window for the adversary to complete initial execution and establish basic system access.

Comparative Context

Industry studies report a median dwell time closer to 21–24 days. This case represents rapid detection and containment within hours rather than days.

Timeline

Time (UTC) Event Elapsed
2025-11-23 18:54:35 UTC First VirusTotal submission
2025-11-27 06:59:23 UTC Latest analysis snapshot 3 days, 12 hours, 4 minutes
2025-11-27 12:50:58 UTC Report generation time 3 days, 17 hours, 56 minutes

Why It Matters

Every additional day of dwell time is not just an abstract number — it is attacker opportunity. Each day equates to more time for lateral movement, stealth persistence, and intelligence gathering.

Global Detection Posture — Who Caught It, Who Missed It

VirusTotal engines: 72. Detected as malicious: 59. Missed: 13. Coverage: 81.9%.

Detected Vendors

  • Xcitium
  • +58 additional vendors (names not provided)

List includes Xcitium plus an additional 58 vendors per the provided summary.

Missed Vendors

  • Acronis
  • Antiy-AVL
  • Avira
  • Baidu
  • CMC
  • NANO-Antivirus
  • TACHYON
  • tehtris
  • TrendMicro
  • TrendMicro-HouseCall
  • VBA32
  • ZoneAlarm
  • Zoner

Why it matters: if any endpoint relies solely on a missed engine, this malware can operate with zero alerts. Prevention‑first controls close that gap regardless of signature lag.

Behavioral Storyline — How the Malware Operates

Intensive file system activity (57.50% of behavior) indicates data harvesting, file encryption, or dropper behavior. The threat is actively searching for and manipulating files across the system.

Behavior Categories (weighted)

Weight values represent the frequency and intensity of malware interactions with specific system components. Higher weights indicate more aggressive targeting of that category. Each operation (registry access, file modification, network connection, etc.) contributes to the category’s total weight, providing a quantitative measure of the malware’s behavioral focus.

Category Weight Percentage
File System 1866 57.50%
System 739 22.77%
Registry 443 13.65%
Process 147 4.53%
Threading 24 0.74%
Misc 20 0.62%
Hooking 4 0.12%
Network 1 0.03%
Synchronization 1 0.03%

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

  • T1083 – get file size
  • T1082 – get disk information
  • T1222 – set file attributes
  • T1083 – check if file exists
  • T1059 – accept command line arguments
  • T1027 – encode data using XOR
  • T1546.001 – persist via default file association registry key
  • T1497.001 – reference anti-VM strings targeting VirtualBox
  • T1083 – get common file path
  • T1614 – get geographical location
  • T1129 – parse PE header
  • T1129 – link function at runtime on Windows
  • T1027 – encrypt data using RC4 PRGA

Following the Trail — Network & DNS Activity

Outbound activity leans on reputable infrastructure (e.g., CDNs, cloud endpoints) to blend in. TLS sessions and
HTTP calls show routine beaconing and IP‑lookup behavior that can masquerade as normal browsing.

Contacted Domains

Domain IP Country ASN/Org
www.aieov.com 76.223.54.146 United States Amazon.com, Inc.
www.msftncsi.com 23.200.3.18 United States Akamai Technologies, Inc.

Observed IPs

IP Country ASN/Org
224.0.0.252
239.255.255.250
8.8.4.4 United States Google LLC
8.8.8.8 United States Google LLC

DNS Queries

Request Type
www.msftncsi.com A
5isohu.com A
www.aieov.com A

Contacted IPs

IP Country ASN/Org
224.0.0.252
239.255.255.250
8.8.4.4 United States Google LLC
8.8.8.8 United States Google LLC

Port Distribution

Port Count Protocols
137 1 udp
5355 5 udp
53 22 udp
3702 1 udp

UDP Packets

Source IP Dest IP Sport Dport Time Proto
192.168.56.11 192.168.56.255 137 137 3.24558687210083 udp
192.168.56.11 224.0.0.252 49563 5355 3.174654006958008 udp
192.168.56.11 224.0.0.252 54650 5355 3.1775119304656982 udp
192.168.56.11 224.0.0.252 55601 5355 3.9108328819274902 udp
192.168.56.11 224.0.0.252 60205 5355 3.1841509342193604 udp
192.168.56.11 224.0.0.252 62798 5355 5.760304927825928 udp
192.168.56.11 239.255.255.250 62184 3702 3.186145067214966 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.4.4 51628 53 113.22839403152466 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.4.4 51690 53 6.760767936706543 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.4.4 51899 53 5.916697025299072 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.4.4 56213 53 36.66632699966431 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.4.4 56473 53 98.80628705024719 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.4.4 58917 53 80.38469290733337 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.4.4 59770 53 51.49582290649414 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.4.4 60334 53 127.75982689857483 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.4.4 61507 53 146.2754988670349 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.4.4 62329 53 65.91630387306213 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.4.4 63439 53 22.228394985198975 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.8.8 51628 53 112.22916603088379 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.8.8 51690 53 7.760094881057739 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.8.8 51899 53 6.916234016418457 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.8.8 56213 53 35.66671895980835 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.8.8 56473 53 97.80724501609802 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.8.8 58917 53 79.38614797592163 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.8.8 59770 53 50.49473595619202 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.8.8 60334 53 126.7595739364624 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.8.8 61507 53 145.28794407844543 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.8.8 62329 53 64.92287588119507 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.8.8 63439 53 21.229431867599487 udp

Hunting tip: alert on unknown binaries initiating TLS to IP‑lookup services or unusual CDN endpoints — especially early in execution.

Persistence & Policy — Registry and Services

Registry and service telemetry points to policy awareness and environment reconnaissance rather than noisy persistence. Below is a compact view of the most relevant keys and handles; expand to see the full lists where available.

Registry Opened

0

Registry Set

2

Services Started

0

Services Opened

0

Registry Opened (Top 25)

Show all (297 total)

Registry Set (Top 25)

Key Value
\\Registry\Machine\Software\Classes\exefile\shell\open\command\(Default)
\\Registry\Machine\Software\Classes\exefile\shell\open\command\IsolatedCommand

Services Started (Top 15)

Services Opened (Top 15)

What To Do Now — Practical Defense Playbook

  • Contain unknowns: block first‑run binaries by default — signatures catch up, containment works now.
  • EDR controls: alert on keyboard hooks, screen capture APIs, VM/sandbox checks, and command‑shell launches.
  • Registry watch: flag queries/sets under policy paths (e.g., …\FipsAlgorithmPolicy\*).
  • Network rules: inspect outbound TLS to IP‑lookup services and unexpected CDN endpoints.
  • Hunt broadly: sweep endpoints for the indicators above and quarantine positives immediately.

Dwell time equals attacker opportunity. Reducing execution privileges and egress shrinks that window even when vendors disagree.

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