Executive Overview — What We’re Dealing With

This specimen has persisted long enough to matter. Human experts classified it as Malware, and the telemetry confirms a capable, evasive Trojan with real impact potential.

Extended Dwell Time Impact

For 1+ hours, this malware remained undetected — a limited but sufficient window for the adversary to complete initial execution and establish basic system access.

Global Detection Posture — Who Caught It, Who Missed It

VirusTotal engines: 69. Detected as malicious: 58. Missed: 11. Coverage: 84.1%.

Why it matters: if any endpoint relies solely on a missed engine, this malware can operate with zero alerts. Prevention‑first controls close that gap regardless of signature lag.

Behavioral Storyline — How the Malware Operates

Dominant system-level operations (43.49% of behavior) suggest this malware performs deep system reconnaissance, privilege escalation, or core OS manipulation. It’s actively probing system defenses and attempting to gain administrative control.

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

• T1140 – decode data using Base64 in .NET
• T1033 – get session user name
• T1087 – get session user name
• T1560.002 – compress data using GZip in .NET
• T1056.001 – log keystrokes
• T1082 – get hostname
• T1112 – delete registry key
• T1012 – query or enumerate registry value
• T1027 – encode data using Base64
• T1083 – check if file exists
• T1213 – reference WMI statements
• T1113 – capture screenshot
• T1057 – enumerate processes
• T1518 – enumerate processes
• T1033 – get session integrity level
• T1082 – get OS version in .NET
• T1047 – access WMI data in .NET
• T1105 – download and write a file
• T1083 – get common file path
• T1056.001 – log keystrokes via polling
• T1614.001 – get keyboard layout
• T1082 – get number of processors
• T1620 – load .NET assembly
• T1620 – invoke .NET assembly method
• T1070.004 – self delete
• T1082 – get disk size
• T1057 – find process by PID
• T1033 – Collects and encrypts information about the computer likely to send to C2 server
• T1082 – Checks available memory
• T1071 – Binary file triggered YARA rule
• T1071 – Yara detections observed in process dumps, payloads or dropped files
• T1071 – At least one IP Address, Domain, or File Name was found in a crypto call
• T1106 – Guard pages use detected – possible anti-debugging.
• T1560 – Collects and encrypts information about the computer likely to send to C2 server
• T1047 – Checks if Antivirus program is installed (via WMI)
• T1047 – Queries sensitive video device information (via WMI, Win32_VideoController, often done to detect virtual machines)
• T1055 – May try to detect the Windows Explorer process (often used for injection)
• T1562.001 – Creates guard pages, often used to prevent reverse engineering and debugging
• T1497 – Queries sensitive video device information (via WMI, Win32_VideoController, often done to detect virtual machines)
• T1497 – Allocates memory with a write watch (potentially for evading sandboxes)
• T1497 – May sleep (evasive loops) to hinder dynamic analysis
• T1140 – .NET source code contains calls to encryption/decryption functions
• T1027.002 – .NET source code contains method to dynamically call methods (often used by packers)
• T1056 – Contains functionality to log keystrokes (.Net Source)
• T1518.001 – Checks if Antivirus program is installed (via WMI)
• T1518.001 – Queries sensitive video device information (via WMI, Win32_VideoController, often done to detect virtual machines)
• T1057 – May try to detect the Windows Explorer process (often used for injection)
• T1057 – Queries a list of all running processes
• T1082 – Checks the free space of harddrives
• T1082 – Queries the cryptographic machine GUID
• T1082 – Queries the volume information (name, serial number etc) of a device
• T1560 – .NET source code contains calls to encryption/decryption functions
• T1571 – Detected TCP or UDP traffic on non-standard ports
• T1071 – C2 URLs / IPs found in malware configuration

Following the Trail — Network & DNS Activity

Outbound activity leans on reputable infrastructure (e.g., CDNs, cloud endpoints) to blend in. TLS sessions and
HTTP calls show routine beaconing and IP‑lookup behavior that can masquerade as normal browsing.

Hunting tip: alert on unknown binaries initiating TLS to IP‑lookup services or unusual CDN endpoints — especially early in execution.