Executive Overview — What We’re Dealing With

This specimen has persisted long enough to matter. Human experts classified it as Malware, and the telemetry confirms a capable, evasive Trojan with real impact potential.

Extended Dwell Time Impact

For 1+ hours, this malware remained undetected — a limited but sufficient window for the adversary to complete initial execution and establish basic system access.

Global Detection Posture — Who Caught It, Who Missed It

VirusTotal engines: 73. Detected as malicious: 58. Missed: 15. Coverage: 79.5%.

Why it matters: if any endpoint relies solely on a missed engine, this malware can operate with zero alerts. Prevention‑first controls close that gap regardless of signature lag.

Behavioral Storyline — How the Malware Operates

Intensive file system activity (51.00% of behavior) indicates data harvesting, file encryption, or dropper behavior. The threat is actively searching for and manipulating files across the system.

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

• T1082 – query environment variable
• T1497.001 – reference anti-VM strings targeting Xen
• T1083 – check if file exists
• T1027 – The binary likely contains encrypted or compressed data
• T1027.002 – The binary likely contains encrypted or compressed data
• T1082 – Checks available memory
• T1071 – HTTP traffic contains suspicious features which may be indicative of malware related traffic
• T1071 – Yara detections observed in process dumps, payloads or dropped files
• T1071 – Looks up the external IP address
• T1071 – Reads from the memory of another process
• T1106 – Created a process from a suspicious location
• T1106 – Guard pages use detected – possible anti-debugging.
• T1140 – SetUnhandledExceptionFilter detected: superseding the top-level exception handler of each thread of a process is a common anti-debug technique.
• T1047 – SetUnhandledExceptionFilter detected: superseding the top-level exception handler of each thread of a process is a common anti-debug technique.
• T1497.001 – SetUnhandledExceptionFilter detected: superseding the top-level exception handler of each thread of a process is a common anti-debug technique.
• T1027 – SetUnhandledExceptionFilter detected: superseding the top-level exception handler of each thread of a process is a common anti-debug technique.
• T1056.001 – SetUnhandledExceptionFilter detected: superseding the top-level exception handler of each thread of a process is a common anti-debug technique.
• T1105 – SetUnhandledExceptionFilter detected: superseding the top-level exception handler of each thread of a process is a common anti-debug technique.
• T1082 – SetUnhandledExceptionFilter detected: superseding the top-level exception handler of each thread of a process is a common anti-debug technique.
• T1083 – SetUnhandledExceptionFilter detected: superseding the top-level exception handler of each thread of a process is a common anti-debug technique.
• T1012 – SetUnhandledExceptionFilter detected: superseding the top-level exception handler of each thread of a process is a common anti-debug technique.
• T1518 – SetUnhandledExceptionFilter detected: superseding the top-level exception handler of each thread of a process is a common anti-debug technique.
• T1129 – SetUnhandledExceptionFilter detected: superseding the top-level exception handler of each thread of a process is a common anti-debug technique.
• T1057 – SetUnhandledExceptionFilter detected: superseding the top-level exception handler of each thread of a process is a common anti-debug technique.
• T1055 – SetUnhandledExceptionFilter detected: superseding the top-level exception handler of each thread of a process is a common anti-debug technique.
• T1129 – The process attempted to dynamically load a malicious function
• T1129 – The process tried to load dynamically one or more functions.
• T1057 – The process has tried to detect the debugger probing the use of page guards.
• T1140 – Detected a call to the Crypt API containing an IP address, a domain, or a filename
• T1047 – Detected a call to the Crypt API containing an IP address, a domain, or a filename
• T1497.001 – Detected a call to the Crypt API containing an IP address, a domain, or a filename
• T1027 – Detected a call to the Crypt API containing an IP address, a domain, or a filename
• T1056.001 – Detected a call to the Crypt API containing an IP address, a domain, or a filename
• T1105 – Detected a call to the Crypt API containing an IP address, a domain, or a filename
• T1082 – Detected a call to the Crypt API containing an IP address, a domain, or a filename
• T1083 – Detected a call to the Crypt API containing an IP address, a domain, or a filename
• T1012 – Detected a call to the Crypt API containing an IP address, a domain, or a filename
• T1518 – Detected a call to the Crypt API containing an IP address, a domain, or a filename
• T1129 – Detected a call to the Crypt API containing an IP address, a domain, or a filename
• T1057 – Detected a call to the Crypt API containing an IP address, a domain, or a filename
• T1055 – Detected a call to the Crypt API containing an IP address, a domain, or a filename
• T1027.009 – The process has executed a dropped binary
• T1071 – Detected one or more anomalous HTTP requests
• T1071 – Detected HTTP requests to some non white-listed domains
• T1057 – The process attempted to detect a running debugger using common APIs
• T1089 – The process has tried to suspend a sandbox-related thread (possible sandbox evasion attempt)
• T1063 – The process has tried to detect Sandboxie (loading its library)
• T1129 – The process has tried to detect Sandboxie (loading its library)
• T1082 – Queries for the computername
• T1082 – The process tried to collect informations about the system reading some known registry keys
• T1012 – The process tried to collect informations about the system reading some known registry keys
• T1027.009 – Drops interesting files and uses them
• T1036 – Creates files inside the user directory
• T1036 – Creates files with lurking names (e.g. Crack.exe)
• T1112 – Stores large binary data to the registry
• T1562.001 – Creates guard pages, often used to prevent reverse engineering and debugging
• T1497 – May sleep (evasive loops) to hinder dynamic analysis
• T1497 – Allocates memory with a write watch (potentially for evading sandboxes)
• T1140 – .NET source code contains calls to encryption/decryption functions
• T1027.002 – .NET source code contains method to dynamically call methods (often used by packers)
• T1027.002 – .NET source code contains potential unpacker
• T1016 – Checks the online ip address of the machine
• T1083 – Reads ini files
• T1082 – Queries the cryptographic machine GUID
• T1082 – Checks the free space of harddrives
• T1082 – Queries the volume information (name, serial number etc) of a device
• T1560 – .NET source code contains calls to encryption/decryption functions
• T1071 – C2 URLs / IPs found in malware configuration

Following the Trail — Network & DNS Activity

Outbound activity leans on reputable infrastructure (e.g., CDNs, cloud endpoints) to blend in. TLS sessions and
HTTP calls show routine beaconing and IP‑lookup behavior that can masquerade as normal browsing.

Hunting tip: alert on unknown binaries initiating TLS to IP‑lookup services or unusual CDN endpoints — especially early in execution.