Executive Overview — What We’re Dealing With

This specimen has persisted long enough to matter. Human experts classified it as Malware, and the telemetry confirms a capable, evasive Trojan with real impact potential.

Extended Dwell Time Impact

For 1+ hours, this malware remained undetected — a limited but sufficient window for the adversary to complete initial execution and establish basic system access.

Global Detection Posture — Who Caught It, Who Missed It

VirusTotal engines: 73. Detected as malicious: 54. Missed: 19. Coverage: 74.0%.

Why it matters: if any endpoint relies solely on a missed engine, this malware can operate with zero alerts. Prevention‑first controls close that gap regardless of signature lag.

Behavioral Storyline — How the Malware Operates

Dominant system-level operations (35.31% of behavior) suggest this malware performs deep system reconnaissance, privilege escalation, or core OS manipulation. It’s actively probing system defenses and attempting to gain administrative control.

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

• T1083 – check if directory exists
• T1083 – get file system object information
• T1027.004 – compile .NET assembly
• T1620 – load .NET assembly
• T1012 – query or enumerate registry key
• T1027.004 – compile Visual Basic in .NET
• T1016.001 – check Internet connectivity via WinINet
• T1012 – query or enumerate registry value
• T1027 – encode data using Base64
• T1083 – get file size
• T1115 – read clipboard data
• T1083 – enumerate files in .NET
• T1033 – get session user name
• T1087 – get session user name
• T1083 – get file version info
• T1083 – check if file exists
• T1497.001 – reference anti-VM strings targeting VMWare
• T1497.001 – reference anti-VM strings targeting VirtualBox
• T1560.002 – compress data using GZip in .NET
• T1140 – decode data using Base64 in .NET
• T1082 – Checks available memory
• T1057 – Enumerates the modules from a process (may be used to locate base addresses in process injection)
• T1071 – Yara detections observed in process dumps, payloads or dropped files
• T1071 – Binary file triggered multiple YARA rules
• T1071 – Reads from the memory of another process
• T1071 – The PE file contains a suspicious PDB path
• T1071 – At least one IP Address, Domain, or File Name was found in a crypto call
• T1106 – Guard pages use detected – possible anti-debugging.
• T1542.003 – May use bcdedit to modify the Windows boot settings
• T1055 – May try to detect the Windows Explorer process (often used for injection)
• T1497 – Checks if the current process is being debugged
• T1497 – Allocates memory with a write watch (potentially for evading sandboxes)
• T1562.001 – Creates guard pages, often used to prevent reverse engineering and debugging
• T1562.001 – Launches processes in debugging mode, may be used to hinder debugging
• T1140 – .NET source code contains calls to encryption/decryption functions
• T1056 – Sample has functionality to log and monitor keystrokes, analyze it with the keystroke simulation cookbook
• T1056 – Installs a raw input device (often for capturing keystrokes)
• T1518.001 – Checks if the current process is being debugged
• T1057 – May try to detect the Windows Explorer process (often used for injection)
• T1082 – Queries the volume information (name, serial number etc) of a device
• T1082 – Queries the cryptographic machine GUID
• T1560 – .NET source code contains calls to encryption/decryption functions

Following the Trail — Network & DNS Activity

Outbound activity leans on reputable infrastructure (e.g., CDNs, cloud endpoints) to blend in. TLS sessions and
HTTP calls show routine beaconing and IP‑lookup behavior that can masquerade as normal browsing.

Hunting tip: alert on unknown binaries initiating TLS to IP‑lookup services or unusual CDN endpoints — especially early in execution.