Executive Overview — What We’re Dealing With

This specimen has persisted long enough to matter. Human experts classified it as Malware, and the telemetry confirms a capable, evasive Trojan with real impact potential.

Extended Dwell Time Impact

For 2+ hours, this malware remained undetected — a limited but sufficient window for the adversary to complete initial execution and establish basic system access.

Global Detection Posture — Who Caught It, Who Missed It

VirusTotal engines: 72. Detected as malicious: 55. Missed: 17. Coverage: 76.4%.

Why it matters: if any endpoint relies solely on a missed engine, this malware can operate with zero alerts. Prevention‑first controls close that gap regardless of signature lag.

Behavioral Storyline — How the Malware Operates

Significant process manipulation (47.94% of behavior) suggests code injection, process hollowing, or privilege escalation techniques. The malware is actively compromising running processes to hide its activities.

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

• T1083 – get common file path
• T1140 – decode data using Base64 in .NET
• T1082 – query environment variable
• T1497.001 – reference anti-VM strings targeting Xen
• T1027 – decrypt data using AES via .NET
• T1082 – Checks available memory
• T1497 – Checks for mouse movement
• T1071 – Reads from the memory of another process
• T1071 – Yara detections observed in process dumps, payloads or dropped files
• T1106 – Created a process from a suspicious location
• T1106 – Guard pages use detected – possible anti-debugging.
• T1027 – The binary likely contains encrypted or compressed data
• T1027.002 – The binary likely contains encrypted or compressed data
• T1106 – .NET source code references suspicious native API functions
• T1055 – .NET source code contains process injector
• T1112 – Stores large binary data to the registry
• T1562.001 – Creates guard pages, often used to prevent reverse engineering and debugging
• T1497 – May sleep (evasive loops) to hinder dynamic analysis
• T1497 – Allocates memory with a write watch (potentially for evading sandboxes)
• T1027.002 – .NET source code contains potential unpacker
• T1070.006 – Binary contains a suspicious time stamp
• T1057 – Queries a list of all running processes
• T1083 – Reads ini files
• T1082 – Queries the volume information (name, serial number etc) of a device
• T1082 – Queries the cryptographic machine GUID

Following the Trail — Network & DNS Activity

Outbound activity leans on reputable infrastructure (e.g., CDNs, cloud endpoints) to blend in. TLS sessions and
HTTP calls show routine beaconing and IP‑lookup behavior that can masquerade as normal browsing.

Hunting tip: alert on unknown binaries initiating TLS to IP‑lookup services or unusual CDN endpoints — especially early in execution.