Executive Overview — What We’re Dealing With

This specimen has persisted long enough to matter. Human experts classified it as Malware, and the telemetry confirms a capable, evasive Trojan with real impact potential.

Extended Dwell Time Impact

For 2+ hours, this malware remained undetected — a limited but sufficient window for the adversary to complete initial execution and establish basic system access.

Global Detection Posture — Who Caught It, Who Missed It

VirusTotal engines: 73. Detected as malicious: 60. Missed: 13. Coverage: 82.2%.

Why it matters: if any endpoint relies solely on a missed engine, this malware can operate with zero alerts. Prevention‑first controls close that gap regardless of signature lag.

Behavioral Storyline — How the Malware Operates

Heavy cryptographic operations (99.87% of behavior) indicate potential ransomware, data encryption for exfiltration, or secure C2 communications. The malware is actively encrypting or decrypting sensitive data.

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

• T1053.005 – schedule task via schtasks
• T1560.002 – compress data using GZip in .NET
• T1082 – query environment variable
• T1082 – get disk size
• T1056.001 – log keystrokes via polling
• T1033 – get session integrity level
• T1213 – reference WMI statements
• T1547.001 – persist via Run registry key
• T1082 – get hostname
• T1057 – find process by name
• T1112 – delete registry value
• T1012 – query or enumerate registry key
• T1082 – get number of processors
• T1070.004 – self delete
• T1083 – check if file exists
• T1112 – delete registry key
• T1047 – access WMI data in .NET
• T1083 – get common file path
• T1033 – get session user name
• T1087 – get session user name
• T1614.001 – get keyboard layout
• T1620 – invoke .NET assembly method
• T1620 – load .NET assembly
• T1082 – get OS version in .NET
• T1056.001 – log keystrokes
• T1057 – find process by PID
• T1057 – enumerate processes
• T1518 – enumerate processes
• T1012 – query or enumerate registry value
• T1027 – encode data using Base64
• T1140 – decode data using Base64 in .NET
• T1082 – Checks available memory
• T1071 – Yara detections observed in process dumps, payloads or dropped files
• T1106 – Guard pages use detected – possible anti-debugging.
• T1106 – .NET source code references suspicious native API functions
• T1036 – Creates files inside the user directory
• T1497 – Allocates memory with a write watch (potentially for evading sandboxes)
• T1562.001 – Creates guard pages, often used to prevent reverse engineering and debugging
• T1027 – .NET source code contains long base64-encoded strings
• T1027.002 – .NET source code contains potential unpacker
• T1056 – Contains functionality to log keystrokes (.Net Source)
• T1057 – Queries a list of all running processes
• T1082 – Checks the free space of harddrives
• T1082 – Queries the volume information (name, serial number etc) of a device
• T1082 – Queries the cryptographic machine GUID

Following the Trail — Network & DNS Activity

Outbound activity leans on reputable infrastructure (e.g., CDNs, cloud endpoints) to blend in. TLS sessions and
HTTP calls show routine beaconing and IP‑lookup behavior that can masquerade as normal browsing.

Hunting tip: alert on unknown binaries initiating TLS to IP‑lookup services or unusual CDN endpoints — especially early in execution.