Executive Overview — What We’re Dealing With

This specimen has persisted long enough to matter. Human experts classified it as Malware, and the telemetry confirms a capable, evasive Trojan with real impact potential.

Extended Dwell Time Impact

For 2+ hours, this malware remained undetected — a limited but sufficient window for the adversary to complete initial execution and establish basic system access.

Global Detection Posture — Who Caught It, Who Missed It

VirusTotal engines: 72. Detected as malicious: 53. Missed: 19. Coverage: 73.6%.

Why it matters: if any endpoint relies solely on a missed engine, this malware can operate with zero alerts. Prevention‑first controls close that gap regardless of signature lag.

Behavioral Storyline — How the Malware Operates

Dominant system-level operations (42.10% of behavior) suggest this malware performs deep system reconnaissance, privilege escalation, or core OS manipulation. It’s actively probing system defenses and attempting to gain administrative control.

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

• T1497.001 – reference anti-VM strings
• T1016 – get domain information
• T1134 – acquire debug privileges
• T1497.001 – reference anti-VM strings targeting VirtualBox
• T1652 – enumerate device drivers on Windows
• T1140 – decode data using Base64 in .NET
• T1555.003 – gather chrome based browser login information
• T1497.001 – reference anti-VM strings targeting Xen
• T1222 – set file attributes
• T1083 – get file size
• T1547.001 – reference startup folder
• T1083 – get common file path
• T1082 – get disk information
• T1027 – encrypt data using DPAPI
• T1057 – enumerate processes
• T1518 – enumerate processes
• T1213 – reference WMI statements
• T1033 – get session user name
• T1087 – get session user name
• T1083 – check if directory exists
• T1083 – enumerate files in .NET
• T1497.001 – reference anti-VM strings targeting VMWare
• T1082 – get disk size
• T1083 – enumerate files on Windows
• T1115 – check clipboard data
• T1016 – get networking interfaces
• T1027 – encode data using Base64
• T1134 – modify access privileges
• T1082 – get system information on Windows
• T1059.001 – run PowerShell expression
• T1033 – get session integrity level
• T1213 – reference SQL statements
• T1129 – link function at runtime on Windows
• T1012 – query or enumerate registry key
• T1012 – query or enumerate registry value
• T1555.003 – gather firefox profile information
• T1033 – get session information
• T1082 – get hostname
• T1555.004 – acquire credentials from Windows Credential Manager
• T1620 – load .NET assembly
• T1082 – get MAC address in .NET
• T1083 – check if file exists
• T1082 – query environment variable
• T1057 – find process by PID
• T1057 – find process by name
• T1087 – list user accounts
• T1083 – get file system object information
• T1087 – get logon sessions
• T1115 – read clipboard data
• T1047 – access WMI data in .NET
• T1016.001 – list domain servers
• T1083 – get file version info
• T1082 – get OS version in .NET
• T1082 – get number of processors
• T1134.001 – impersonate user
• T1620 – invoke .NET assembly method
• T1036 – A file was accessed within the Public folder.
• T1070.006 – Binary compilation timestomping detected
• T1548 – A file was accessed within the Public folder.
• T1070 – Binary compilation timestomping detected
• T1027 – The binary likely contains encrypted or compressed data
• T1027.002 – The binary likely contains encrypted or compressed data
• T1082 – Checks available memory
• T1071 – Binary file triggered multiple YARA rules
• T1071 – The PE file contains a PDB path
• T1106 – Guard pages use detected – possible anti-debugging.
• T1497 – Allocates memory with a write watch (potentially for evading sandboxes)
• T1562.001 – Creates guard pages, often used to prevent reverse engineering and debugging
• T1070.006 – Binary contains a suspicious time stamp
• T1083 – Enumerates the file system
• T1082 – Queries the volume information (name, serial number etc) of a device

Following the Trail — Network & DNS Activity

Outbound activity leans on reputable infrastructure (e.g., CDNs, cloud endpoints) to blend in. TLS sessions and
HTTP calls show routine beaconing and IP‑lookup behavior that can masquerade as normal browsing.

Hunting tip: alert on unknown binaries initiating TLS to IP‑lookup services or unusual CDN endpoints — especially early in execution.