Zero‑Dwell Threat Intelligence Report
Executive Overview — What We’re Dealing With
This specimen has persisted long enough to matter. Human experts classified it as Malware, and the telemetry confirms a capable, evasive Trojan with real impact potential.
Extended Dwell Time Impact
For 2+ hours, this malware remained undetected — a limited but sufficient window for the adversary to complete initial execution and establish basic system access.
Comparative Context
Industry studies report a median dwell time closer to 21–24 days. This case represents rapid detection and containment within hours rather than days.
Timeline
| Time (UTC) | Event | Elapsed |
|---|---|---|
| 2025-11-17 20:40:58 UTC | First VirusTotal submission | — |
| 2025-12-14 19:57:31 UTC | Latest analysis snapshot | 26 days, 23 hours, 16 minutes |
| 2025-12-16 07:09:51 UTC | Report generation time | 28 days, 10 hours, 28 minutes |
Why It Matters
Every additional day of dwell time is not just an abstract number — it is attacker opportunity. Each day equates to more time for lateral movement, stealth persistence, and intelligence gathering.
Global Detection Posture — Who Caught It, Who Missed It
VirusTotal engines: 72. Detected as malicious: 56. Missed: 16. Coverage: 77.8%.
Detected Vendors
- Xcitium
- +55 additional vendors (names not provided)
List includes Xcitium plus an additional 55 vendors per the provided summary.
Missed Vendors
- Acronis
- Antiy-AVL
- APEX
- Baidu
- CMC
- Cynet
- Jiangmin
- NANO-Antivirus
- SUPERAntiSpyware
- TACHYON
- tehtris
- Trapmine
- ViRobot
- Webroot
- Yandex
- Zoner
Why it matters: if any endpoint relies solely on a missed engine, this malware can operate with zero alerts. Prevention‑first controls close that gap regardless of signature lag.
Behavioral Storyline — How the Malware Operates
Intensive file system activity (32.73% of behavior) indicates data harvesting, file encryption, or dropper behavior. The threat is actively searching for and manipulating files across the system.
Behavior Categories (weighted)
Weight values represent the frequency and intensity of malware interactions with specific system components. Higher weights indicate more aggressive targeting of that category. Each operation (registry access, file modification, network connection, etc.) contributes to the category’s total weight, providing a quantitative measure of the malware’s behavioral focus.
| Category | Weight | Percentage |
|---|---|---|
| File System | 122903 | 32.73% |
| Crypto | 122803 | 32.70% |
| Synchronization | 122264 | 32.56% |
| Registry | 3775 | 1.01% |
| System | 3055 | 0.81% |
| Process | 281 | 0.07% |
| Com | 270 | 0.07% |
| Misc | 91 | 0.02% |
| Threading | 60 | 0.02% |
| Device | 16 | 0.00% |
| Services | 6 | 0.00% |
| Hooking | 2 | 0.00% |
| Windows | 2 | 0.00% |
MITRE ATT&CK Mapping
- T1070.004 – self delete
- T1497.001 – reference anti-VM strings targeting VMWare
- T1027 – encrypt or decrypt data via BCrypt
- T1082 – get OS version in .NET
- T1056.001 – log keystrokes
- T1555.003 – gather firefox profile information
- T1115 – monitor clipboard content
- T1010 – enumerate gui resources
- T1010 – find graphical window
- T1082 – get CPU information
- T1053.005 – schedule task via schtasks
- T1543.003 – persist via Windows service
- T1569.002 – persist via Windows service
- T1614.001 – get keyboard layout
- T1082 – query environment variable
- T1497.001 – reference anti-VM strings targeting VirtualBox
- T1083 – enumerate files in .NET
- T1548.002 – bypass UAC via scheduled task environment variable
- T1083 – get file version info
- T1134.001 – impersonate user
- T1620 – load .NET assembly
- T1620 – invoke .NET assembly method
- T1027 – decrypt data using AES via .NET
- T1213 – reference WMI statements
- T1125 – capture webcam image
- T1057 – enumerate processes
- T1518 – enumerate processes
- T1497.001 – reference anti-VM strings
- T1056.001 – log keystrokes via polling
- T1071.001 – set HTTP cookie
- T1140 – decode data using Base64 in .NET
- T1082 – get disk information
- T1497.001 – reference anti-VM strings targeting Xen
- T1027.004 – compile CSharp in .NET
- T1082 – get hostname
- T1012 – query or enumerate registry value
- T1564.003 – hide graphical window
- T1115 – clear clipboard data
- T1560.002 – compress data using GZip in .NET
- T1496 – reference cryptocurrency strings
- T1016.001 – list domain servers
- T1213 – reference SQL statements
- T1546.001 – persist via default file association registry key
- T1113 – capture screenshot
- T1083 – check if directory exists
- T1027 – encrypt data using DPAPI
- T1083 – check if file exists
- T1112 – delete registry value
- T1027 – encode data using Base64
- T1047 – access WMI data in .NET
- T1083 – get common file path
- T1057 – find process by PID
- T1115 – read clipboard data
- T1547.001 – persist via Run registry key
- T1027 – encrypt data using AES via .NET
- T1016 – get networking interfaces
- T1222 – set file attributes
- T1057 – find process by name
- T1112 – delete registry key
- T1082 – get number of processors
- T1027.004 – compile .NET assembly
- T1082 – get kernel version
- T1564 – hide the Windows taskbar
- T1082 – get system information on Windows
- T1083 – get file size
- T1082 – get disk size
- T1123 – capture microphone audio
- T1012 – query or enumerate registry key
- T1033 – get session integrity level
- T1129 – link function at runtime on Windows
- T1033 – get session user name
- T1087 – get session user name
- T1055.003 – inject thread
- T1620 – inject thread
- T1056.001 – log keystrokes via application hook
Following the Trail — Network & DNS Activity
Outbound activity leans on reputable infrastructure (e.g., CDNs, cloud endpoints) to blend in. TLS sessions and
HTTP calls show routine beaconing and IP‑lookup behavior that can masquerade as normal browsing.
Contacted Domains
| Domain | IP | Country | ASN/Org |
|---|---|---|---|
| www.msftncsi.com | 23.200.3.71 | United States | Akamai Technologies, Inc. |
| www.aieov.com | 76.223.54.146 | United States | Amazon.com, Inc. |
Observed IPs
| IP | Country | ASN/Org |
|---|---|---|
| 224.0.0.252 | — | — |
| 239.255.255.250 | — | — |
| 8.8.4.4 | United States | Google LLC |
| 8.8.8.8 | United States | Google LLC |
DNS Queries
| Request | Type |
|---|---|
| 5isohu.com | A |
| www.msftncsi.com | A |
| www.aieov.com | A |
Contacted IPs
| IP | Country | ASN/Org |
|---|---|---|
| 224.0.0.252 | — | — |
| 239.255.255.250 | — | — |
| 8.8.4.4 | United States | Google LLC |
| 8.8.8.8 | United States | Google LLC |
Port Distribution
| Port | Count | Protocols |
|---|---|---|
| 137 | 1 | udp |
| 5355 | 5 | udp |
| 53 | 16 | udp |
| 3702 | 1 | udp |
UDP Packets
| Source IP | Dest IP | Sport | Dport | Time | Proto |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 192.168.56.13 | 192.168.56.255 | 137 | 137 | 3.2447309494018555 | udp |
| 192.168.56.13 | 224.0.0.252 | 49311 | 5355 | 5.730604887008667 | udp |
| 192.168.56.13 | 224.0.0.252 | 55150 | 5355 | 3.1730079650878906 | udp |
| 192.168.56.13 | 224.0.0.252 | 60010 | 5355 | 5.182973861694336 | udp |
| 192.168.56.13 | 224.0.0.252 | 62406 | 5355 | 3.175539970397949 | udp |
| 192.168.56.13 | 224.0.0.252 | 63527 | 5355 | 3.749030828475952 | udp |
| 192.168.56.13 | 239.255.255.250 | 52252 | 3702 | 3.1815710067749023 | udp |
| 192.168.56.13 | 8.8.4.4 | 54879 | 53 | 7.744472980499268 | udp |
| 192.168.56.13 | 8.8.4.4 | 54881 | 53 | 6.344213962554932 | udp |
| 192.168.56.13 | 8.8.4.4 | 57310 | 53 | 65.58792996406555 | udp |
| 192.168.56.13 | 8.8.4.4 | 57415 | 53 | 79.94733691215515 | udp |
| 192.168.56.13 | 8.8.4.4 | 58697 | 53 | 21.869248867034912 | udp |
| 192.168.56.13 | 8.8.4.4 | 58920 | 53 | 98.19712591171265 | udp |
| 192.168.56.13 | 8.8.4.4 | 62493 | 53 | 51.22856092453003 | udp |
| 192.168.56.13 | 8.8.4.4 | 62849 | 53 | 36.26005697250366 | udp |
| 192.168.56.13 | 8.8.8.8 | 54879 | 53 | 8.743783950805664 | udp |
| 192.168.56.13 | 8.8.8.8 | 54881 | 53 | 7.337977886199951 | udp |
| 192.168.56.13 | 8.8.8.8 | 57310 | 53 | 64.58815503120422 | udp |
| 192.168.56.13 | 8.8.8.8 | 57415 | 53 | 78.94741487503052 | udp |
| 192.168.56.13 | 8.8.8.8 | 58697 | 53 | 20.838406801223755 | udp |
| 192.168.56.13 | 8.8.8.8 | 58920 | 53 | 97.19763398170471 | udp |
| 192.168.56.13 | 8.8.8.8 | 62493 | 53 | 50.2441987991333 | udp |
| 192.168.56.13 | 8.8.8.8 | 62849 | 53 | 35.26857590675354 | udp |
Hunting tip: alert on unknown binaries initiating TLS to IP‑lookup services or unusual CDN endpoints — especially early in execution.
Persistence & Policy — Registry and Services
Registry and service telemetry points to policy awareness and environment reconnaissance rather than noisy persistence. Below is a compact view of the most relevant keys and handles; expand to see the full lists where available.
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Registry Opened (Top 25)
Show all (297 total)
Registry Set (Top 25)
| Key | Value |
|---|---|
| HKEY_USERS\S-1-5-21-575823232-3065301323-1442773979-1000\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root\Certificates\0174E68C97DDF1E0EEEA415EA336A163D2B61AFD\Blob | 5C 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 04 00 00 00 00 10 00 00 04 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 10 00 00 00 0D BE 92 DE FF 7D 36 BB 48 C4 A6 B1 15 24 95 38 0F 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 20 00 00 00 53 FE B9 19 2E D4 80 F2 09 12 4A 2C 57 D7 E8 97 7A 2E 9F 39 46 1D BF 21 4D F1 12 CB 16 02 4F A2 14 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 14 00 00 00 78 B8 30 FD 63 AC 7B 89 4A 07 3B ED F6 8A 83 9C C3 52 02 65 19 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 10 00 00 00 B5 74 AF 30 C5 C1 BA 3A 69 A7 10 02 00 82 4D D0 03 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 14 00 00 00 01 74 E6 8C 97 DD F1 E0 EE EA 41 5E A3 36 A1 63 D2 B6 1A FD 20 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 F8 05 00 00 30 82 05 F4 30 82 03 DC A0 03 02 01 02 02 09 00 E0 EA 61 4C 28 56 32 64 30 0D 06 09 2A 86 48 86 F7 0D 01 01 0B 05 00 30 81 8E 31 0B 30 09 06 03 55 04 06 13 02 49 4C 31 0F 30 0D 06 03 55 04 08 0C 06 43 65 6E 74 65 72 31 0C 30 0A 06 03 55 04 07 0C 03 4C 6F 64 31 10 30 0E 06 03 55 04 0A 0C 07 47 6F 50 72 6F 78 79 31 10 30 0E 06 03 55 04 0B 0C 07 47 6F 50 72 6F 78 79 31 1A 30 18 06 03 55 04 03 0C 11 67 6F 70 72 6F 78 79 2E 67 69 74 68 75 62 2E 69 6 |
| HKEY_USERS\S-1-5-21-575823232-3065301323-1442773979-1000\Software\Microsoft\Windows\Windows Error Reporting\Debug\StoreLocation | %LOCALAPPDATA%\Microsoft\Windows\WER\ReportArchive\AppCrash_5Z8AFIREUQC80AI1_e18d114defd6ab36dc339c366f969c47bbd2135_0aa13e56 |
Services Started (Top 15)
Services Opened (Top 15)
What To Do Now — Practical Defense Playbook
- Contain unknowns: block first‑run binaries by default — signatures catch up, containment works now.
- EDR controls: alert on keyboard hooks, screen capture APIs, VM/sandbox checks, and command‑shell launches.
- Registry watch: flag queries/sets under policy paths (e.g., …\FipsAlgorithmPolicy\*).
- Network rules: inspect outbound TLS to IP‑lookup services and unexpected CDN endpoints.
- Hunt broadly: sweep endpoints for the indicators above and quarantine positives immediately.
Dwell time equals attacker opportunity. Reducing execution privileges and egress shrinks that window even when vendors disagree.
