Executive Overview — What We’re Dealing With

This specimen has persisted long enough to matter. Human experts classified it as Malware, and the telemetry confirms a capable, evasive Trojan with real impact potential.

Extended Dwell Time Impact

For 2+ hours, this malware remained undetected — a limited but sufficient window for the adversary to complete initial execution and establish basic system access.

Global Detection Posture — Who Caught It, Who Missed It

VirusTotal engines: 72. Detected as malicious: 62. Missed: 10. Coverage: 86.1%.

Why it matters: if any endpoint relies solely on a missed engine, this malware can operate with zero alerts. Prevention‑first controls close that gap regardless of signature lag.

Behavioral Storyline — How the Malware Operates

Heavy cryptographic operations (99.89% of behavior) indicate potential ransomware, data encryption for exfiltration, or secure C2 communications. The malware is actively encrypting or decrypting sensitive data.

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

• T1027 – encode data using Base64
• T1112 – delete registry key
• T1614 – get geographical location
• T1620 – invoke .NET assembly method
• T1057 – find process by PID
• T1027 – reference Base64 string
• T1553.005 – bypass Mark of the Web
• T1222 – set file attributes
• T1129 – link function at runtime on Windows
• T1083 – check if file exists
• T1614.001 – get keyboard layout
• T1083 – check if directory exists
• T1213 – reference WMI statements
• T1083 – enumerate files in .NET
• T1027 – encrypt data using DPAPI
• T1033 – get session integrity level
• T1010 – enumerate gui resources
• T1053.005 – schedule task via schtasks
• T1562 – set TCP connection state
• T1555.003 – gather chrome based browser login information
• T1027 – encrypt data using Salsa20 or ChaCha
• T1033 – get session user name
• T1087 – get session user name
• T1083 – get file size
• T1213 – reference SQL statements
• T1082 – query environment variable
• T1057 – enumerate processes
• T1518 – enumerate processes
• T1012 – query or enumerate registry key
• T1057 – find process by name
• T1140 – decode data using Base64 in .NET
• T1082 – get MAC address in .NET
• T1082 – get disk information
• T1083 – get common file path
• T1012 – query or enumerate registry value
• T1082 – get hostname
• T1082 – get OS version in .NET
• T1047 – access WMI data in .NET
• T1112 – delete registry value
• T1016 – get networking interfaces
• T1056.001 – log keystrokes via polling
• T1016 – get domain information
• T1564 – A process created a hidden window
• T1202 – Uses Windows utilities for basic functionality
• T1202 – Uses suspicious command line tools or Windows utilities
• T1112 – Installs itself for autorun at Windows startup
• T1564.003 – A process created a hidden window
• T1082 – Checks available memory
• T1071 – Yara detections observed in process dumps, payloads or dropped files
• T1053 – Installs itself for autorun at Windows startup
• T1106 – Guard pages use detected – possible anti-debugging.
• T1129 – The process attempted to dynamically load a malicious function
• T1129 – The process tried to load dynamically one or more functions.
• T1057 – The process has tried to detect the debugger probing the use of page guards.
• T1057 – The process attempted to detect a running debugger using common APIs
• T1071 – The process behaves as a known keylogger (iSpy)
• T1053 – Uses schtasks.exe or at.exe to add and modify task schedules
• T1036 – Drops PE files to the windows directory (C:\\Windows)
• T1036 – Drops a PE files to the windows directory (C:\\Windows) and starts it
• T1036 – Creates files inside the system directory
• T1497 – Allocates memory with a write watch (potentially for evading sandboxes)
• T1562.001 – Creates guard pages, often used to prevent reverse engineering and debugging
• T1564.001 – Hides that the sample has been downloaded from the Internet (zone.identifier)
• T1016 – Checks the online ip address of the machine
• T1082 – Queries the volume information (name, serial number etc) of a device
• T1082 – Queries the cryptographic machine GUID

Following the Trail — Network & DNS Activity

Outbound activity leans on reputable infrastructure (e.g., CDNs, cloud endpoints) to blend in. TLS sessions and
HTTP calls show routine beaconing and IP‑lookup behavior that can masquerade as normal browsing.

Hunting tip: alert on unknown binaries initiating TLS to IP‑lookup services or unusual CDN endpoints — especially early in execution.