Anubis Ransomware Executable Showing Strong Encryption Capabilities


Zero‑Dwell Threat Intelligence Report

A narrative, executive‑ready view into the malware’s behavior, exposure, and reliable defenses.
Generated: 2025-12-30 07:34:57 UTC

Executive Overview — What We’re Dealing With

This specimen has persisted long enough to matter. Human experts classified it as Malware, and the telemetry confirms a capable, evasive Trojan with real impact potential.

File
2137eeaa84e961b71f281bfc4c867e417253ad5f
Type
PE32+ executable (console) x86-64 (stripped to external PDB), for MS Windows
SHA‑1
2137eeaa84e961b71f281bfc4c867e417253ad5f
MD5
06edda688a05fd0eaf3a14aba20568c4
First Seen
2025-06-17 07:22:19.588175
Last Analysis
2025-06-17 11:41:27.738760
Dwell Time
0 days, 7 hours, 33 minutes

Extended Dwell Time Impact

For 4+ hours, this malware remained undetected — a limited but sufficient window for the adversary to complete initial execution and establish basic system access.

Comparative Context

Industry studies report a median dwell time closer to 21–24 days. This case represents rapid detection and containment within hours rather than days.

Timeline

Time (UTC) Event Elapsed
2025-04-29 01:52:36 UTC First VirusTotal submission
2025-12-13 07:57:25 UTC Latest analysis snapshot 228 days, 6 hours, 4 minutes
2025-12-30 07:34:57 UTC Report generation time 245 days, 5 hours, 42 minutes

Why It Matters

Every additional day of dwell time is not just an abstract number — it is attacker opportunity. Each day equates to more time for lateral movement, stealth persistence, and intelligence gathering.

Global Detection Posture — Who Caught It, Who Missed It

VirusTotal engines: 73. Detected as malicious: 56. Missed: 17. Coverage: 76.7%.

Detected Vendors

  • Xcitium
  • +55 additional vendors (names not provided)

List includes Xcitium plus an additional 55 vendors per the provided summary.

Missed Vendors

  • Acronis
  • Alibaba
  • Antiy-AVL
  • APEX
  • Baidu
  • CMC
  • Gridinsoft
  • Jiangmin
  • MaxSecure
  • SentinelOne
  • SUPERAntiSpyware
  • TACHYON
  • tehtris
  • Trapmine
  • ViRobot
  • Yandex
  • Zoner

Why it matters: if any endpoint relies solely on a missed engine, this malware can operate with zero alerts. Prevention‑first controls close that gap regardless of signature lag.

Behavioral Storyline — How the Malware Operates

Dominant system-level operations (68.32% of behavior) suggest this malware performs deep system reconnaissance, privilege escalation, or core OS manipulation. It’s actively probing system defenses and attempting to gain administrative control.

Behavior Categories (weighted)

Weight values represent the frequency and intensity of malware interactions with specific system components. Higher weights indicate more aggressive targeting of that category. Each operation (registry access, file modification, network connection, etc.) contributes to the category’s total weight, providing a quantitative measure of the malware’s behavioral focus.

Category Weight Percentage
System 138 68.32%
Registry 29 14.36%
Process 13 6.44%
File System 10 4.95%
Misc 6 2.97%
Threading 3 1.49%
Device 2 0.99%
Network 1 0.50%

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

  • T1071 – Adversaries may communicate using application layer protocols to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic.
  • T1055 – Adversaries may inject code into processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges.
  • T1027 – Adversaries may attempt to make an executable or file difficult to discover or analyze by encrypting, encoding, or otherwise obfuscating its contents on the system or in transit.
  • T1027.002 – Adversaries may perform software packing or virtual machine software protection to conceal their code.
  • T1129 – The process attempted to dynamically load a malicious function
  • T1129 – The process tried to load dynamically one or more functions.
  • T1045 – Manalize Local SandBox Packer Harvesting
  • T1059 – Sample might require command line arguments, analyze it with the command line cookbook
  • T1059 – Sample may offer command line options, please run it with the command line option cookbook (it’s possible that the command line switches require additional characters like)
  • T1574.002 – Tries to load missing DLLs
  • T1070.004 – May delete shadow drive data (may be related to ransomware)
  • T1518.001 – May try to detect the virtual machine to hinder analysis (VM artifact strings found in memory)
  • T1518.001 – Tries to detect sandboxes and other dynamic analysis tools
  • T1082 – Reads software policies
  • T1090 – Found Tor onion address

Following the Trail — Network & DNS Activity

Outbound activity leans on reputable infrastructure (e.g., CDNs, cloud endpoints) to blend in. TLS sessions and
HTTP calls show routine beaconing and IP‑lookup behavior that can masquerade as normal browsing.

Contacted Domains

Domain IP Country ASN/Org
www.msftncsi.com 23.44.129.37 United States Akamai Technologies, Inc.

Observed IPs

IP Country ASN/Org
224.0.0.252
239.255.255.250
8.8.4.4 United States Google LLC
8.8.8.8 United States Google LLC

DNS Queries

Request Type
www.msftncsi.com A
5isohu.com A

Contacted IPs

IP Country ASN/Org
224.0.0.252
239.255.255.250
8.8.4.4 United States Google LLC
8.8.8.8 United States Google LLC

Port Distribution

Port Count Protocols
137 1 udp
5355 5 udp
53 4 udp
3702 1 udp

UDP Packets

Source IP Dest IP Sport Dport Time Proto
192.168.56.11 192.168.56.255 137 137 3.2447869777679443 udp
192.168.56.11 224.0.0.252 49563 5355 3.1736319065093994 udp
192.168.56.11 224.0.0.252 54650 5355 3.176086902618408 udp
192.168.56.11 224.0.0.252 55601 5355 3.9542219638824463 udp
192.168.56.11 224.0.0.252 60205 5355 3.1869308948516846 udp
192.168.56.11 224.0.0.252 62798 5355 5.948215961456299 udp
192.168.56.11 239.255.255.250 62184 3702 3.1835038661956787 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.4.4 51690 53 6.760096073150635 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.4.4 51899 53 5.9955549240112305 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.8.8 51690 53 7.760231018066406 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.8.8 51899 53 6.994679927825928 udp

Hunting tip: alert on unknown binaries initiating TLS to IP‑lookup services or unusual CDN endpoints — especially early in execution.

Persistence & Policy — Registry and Services

Registry and service telemetry points to policy awareness and environment reconnaissance rather than noisy persistence. Below is a compact view of the most relevant keys and handles; expand to see the full lists where available.

Registry Opened

27

Registry Set

0

Services Started

0

Services Opened

0

Registry Opened (Top 25)

Key
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\Lsa\SspiCache\credssp.dll\Comment
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\Lsa\SspiCache\credssp.dll
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\Lsa\SspiCache\credssp.dll\Name
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\Lsa\SspiCache\credssp.dll\Version
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\Lsa\FipsAlgorithmPolicy\MDMEnabled
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\SecurityProviders\SecurityProviders
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\Lsa\SspiCache\credssp.dll\Capabilities
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\Lsa\SspiCache\credssp.dll\RpcId
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\Lsa\SspiCache\credssp.dll\TokenSize
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\Lsa\FipsAlgorithmPolicy
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\Lsa\SspiCache\credssp.dll\Type
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\Lsa\FipsAlgorithmPolicy\Enabled
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\Lsa\FipsAlgorithmPolicy\STE
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\AppCompatFlags
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\win.exe
HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Shell Folders
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\Segment Heap
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows NT\Rpc
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Safer\CodeIdentifiers
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Policies\Microsoft\MUI\Settings
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\System\Setup
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\LanguageOverlay\OverlayPackages\en-US
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Rpc
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\AppModel\Lookaside\Packages
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Policies\Microsoft\Cryptography\Configuration
Show all (27 total)

Registry Set (Top 25)

Services Started (Top 15)

Services Opened (Top 15)

What To Do Now — Practical Defense Playbook

  • Contain unknowns: block first‑run binaries by default — signatures catch up, containment works now.
  • EDR controls: alert on keyboard hooks, screen capture APIs, VM/sandbox checks, and command‑shell launches.
  • Registry watch: flag queries/sets under policy paths (e.g., …\FipsAlgorithmPolicy\*).
  • Network rules: inspect outbound TLS to IP‑lookup services and unexpected CDN endpoints.
  • Hunt broadly: sweep endpoints for the indicators above and quarantine positives immediately.

Dwell time equals attacker opportunity. Reducing execution privileges and egress shrinks that window even when vendors disagree.

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