Lynx Ransomware Loader Ensuring Reboot Survival Via Dual Persistence


Zero‑Dwell Threat Intelligence Report

A narrative, executive‑ready view into the malware’s behavior, exposure, and reliable defenses.
Generated: 2026-01-09 15:10:19 UTC

Executive Overview — What We’re Dealing With

This specimen has persisted long enough to matter. Human experts classified it as Malware, and the telemetry confirms a capable, evasive Trojan with real impact potential.

File
loocjo6i.exe
Type
Generic CIL Executable (.NET, Mono, etc.)
SHA‑1
18c5a5c903792fbe539b3f0efa2aec7289bd7122
MD5
aa8dc316b214e0efd71b8d1b64a66746
First Seen
2026-01-08 13:02:27.322831
Last Analysis
2026-01-08 13:06:36.714723
Dwell Time
0 days, 7 hours, 33 minutes

Extended Dwell Time Impact

For 4+ minutes, this malware was rapidly detected — demonstrating excellent security controls that intercepted the threat during initial execution phases, severely limiting adversary capabilities.

Comparative Context

Industry studies report a median dwell time closer to 21–24 days. This case represents extremely rapid detection within minutes.

Timeline

Time (UTC) Event Elapsed
2025-12-08 09:10:09 UTC First VirusTotal submission
2026-01-09 14:17:45 UTC Latest analysis snapshot 32 days, 5 hours, 7 minutes
2026-01-09 15:10:19 UTC Report generation time 32 days, 6 hours, 0 minutes

Why It Matters

Every additional day of dwell time is not just an abstract number — it is attacker opportunity. Each day equates to more time for lateral movement, stealth persistence, and intelligence gathering.

Global Detection Posture — Who Caught It, Who Missed It

VirusTotal engines: 72. Detected as malicious: 53. Missed: 19. Coverage: 73.6%.

Detected Vendors

  • Xcitium
  • +52 additional vendors (names not provided)

List includes Xcitium plus an additional 52 vendors per the provided summary.

Missed Vendors

  • Acronis
  • Antiy-AVL
  • Baidu
  • CAT-QuickHeal
  • CMC
  • Cynet
  • Gridinsoft
  • Jiangmin
  • Skyhigh
  • SUPERAntiSpyware
  • TACHYON
  • tehtris
  • TrendMicro
  • VBA32
  • Webroot
  • Yandex
  • Zillya
  • ZoneAlarm
  • Zoner

Why it matters: if any endpoint relies solely on a missed engine, this malware can operate with zero alerts. Prevention‑first controls close that gap regardless of signature lag.

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

  • T1083 – check if file exists
  • T1070.004 – self delete
  • T1620 – load .NET assembly
  • T1057 – find process by name
  • T1083 – get common file path
  • T1140 – decode data using Base64 in .NET
  • T1129 – link function at runtime on Windows

Following the Trail — Network & DNS Activity

Outbound activity leans on reputable infrastructure (e.g., CDNs, cloud endpoints) to blend in. TLS sessions and
HTTP calls show routine beaconing and IP‑lookup behavior that can masquerade as normal browsing.

Contacted Domains

Domain IP Country ASN/Org
www.msftncsi.com 23.219.36.106 United States Akamai Technologies, Inc.

Observed IPs

IP Country ASN/Org
224.0.0.252
239.255.255.250
8.8.4.4 United States Google LLC
8.8.8.8 United States Google LLC

DNS Queries

Request Type
5isohu.com A
www.msftncsi.com A

Contacted IPs

IP Country ASN/Org
224.0.0.252
239.255.255.250
8.8.4.4 United States Google LLC
8.8.8.8 United States Google LLC

Port Distribution

Port Count Protocols
137 1 udp
5355 4 udp
53 4 udp
3702 1 udp

UDP Packets

Source IP Dest IP Sport Dport Time Proto
192.168.56.13 192.168.56.255 137 137 7.174566984176636 udp
192.168.56.13 224.0.0.252 55150 5355 7.103511095046997 udp
192.168.56.13 224.0.0.252 60010 5355 9.660664081573486 udp
192.168.56.13 224.0.0.252 62406 5355 7.105921983718872 udp
192.168.56.13 224.0.0.252 63527 5355 9.113985061645508 udp
192.168.56.13 239.255.255.250 52252 3702 7.112668037414551 udp
192.168.56.13 8.8.4.4 49311 53 10.550246000289917 udp
192.168.56.13 8.8.4.4 54881 53 11.674939155578613 udp
192.168.56.13 8.8.8.8 49311 53 11.549354076385498 udp
192.168.56.13 8.8.8.8 54881 53 12.674814939498901 udp

Hunting tip: alert on unknown binaries initiating TLS to IP‑lookup services or unusual CDN endpoints — especially early in execution.

What To Do Now — Practical Defense Playbook

  • Contain unknowns: block first‑run binaries by default — signatures catch up, containment works now.
  • EDR controls: alert on keyboard hooks, screen capture APIs, VM/sandbox checks, and command‑shell launches.
  • Registry watch: flag queries/sets under policy paths (e.g., …\FipsAlgorithmPolicy\*).
  • Network rules: inspect outbound TLS to IP‑lookup services and unexpected CDN endpoints.
  • Hunt broadly: sweep endpoints for the indicators above and quarantine positives immediately.

Dwell time equals attacker opportunity. Reducing execution privileges and egress shrinks that window even when vendors disagree.

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