Executive Overview — What We’re Dealing With

This specimen has persisted long enough to matter. Human experts classified it as Malware, and the telemetry confirms a capable, evasive Trojan with real impact potential.

Extended Dwell Time Impact

For 7+ minutes, this malware was rapidly detected — demonstrating excellent security controls that intercepted the threat during initial execution phases, severely limiting adversary capabilities.

Global Detection Posture — Who Caught It, Who Missed It

VirusTotal engines: 72. Detected as malicious: 54. Missed: 18. Coverage: 75.0%.

Why it matters: if any endpoint relies solely on a missed engine, this malware can operate with zero alerts. Prevention‑first controls close that gap regardless of signature lag.

Behavioral Storyline — How the Malware Operates

Dominant system-level operations (46.23% of behavior) suggest this malware performs deep system reconnaissance, privilege escalation, or core OS manipulation. It’s actively probing system defenses and attempting to gain administrative control.

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

• T1497.001 – reference anti-VM strings targeting Xen
• T1140 – decode data using Base64 in .NET
• T1027.002 – packed with Confuser
• T1129 – link function at runtime on Windows
• T1620 – load .NET assembly
• T1082 – Checks available memory
• T1071 – Yara detections observed in process dumps, payloads or dropped files
• T1071 – Binary file triggered multiple YARA rules
• T1071 – At least one IP Address, Domain, or File Name was found in a crypto call
• T1053 – Installs itself for autorun at Windows startup
• T1106 – Guard pages use detected – possible anti-debugging.
• T1055 – Creates a process in a suspended state, likely for injection
• T1055 – Writes to the memory another process
• T1055 – Writes an executable to the memory of another process
• T1202 – Uses Windows utilities for basic functionality
• T1202 – Uses suspicious command line tools or Windows utilities
• T1112 – Installs itself for autorun at Windows startup
• T1027 – The binary likely contains encrypted or compressed data
• T1027.002 – The binary likely contains encrypted or compressed data
• T1053 – Uses schtasks.exe or at.exe to add and modify task schedules
• T1106 – .NET source code references suspicious native API functions
• T1055 – .NET source code contains process injector
• T1055 – Injects a PE file into a foreign processes
• T1055 – May try to detect the Windows Explorer process (often used for injection)
• T1036 – Creates files inside the user directory
• T1562.001 – Creates guard pages, often used to prevent reverse engineering and debugging
• T1497 – Checks if the current process is being debugged
• T1497 – Allocates memory with a write watch (potentially for evading sandboxes)
• T1497 – May sleep (evasive loops) to hinder dynamic analysis
• T1140 – .NET source code contains calls to encryption/decryption functions
• T1564.001 – Hides that the sample has been downloaded from the Internet (zone.identifier)
• T1027.002 – .NET source code contains potential unpacker
• T1518.001 – Checks if the current process is being debugged
• T1057 – May try to detect the Windows Explorer process (often used for injection)
• T1082 – Queries the cryptographic machine GUID
• T1082 – Queries the volume information (name, serial number etc) of a device
• T1560 – .NET source code contains calls to encryption/decryption functions

Following the Trail — Network & DNS Activity

Outbound activity leans on reputable infrastructure (e.g., CDNs, cloud endpoints) to blend in. TLS sessions and
HTTP calls show routine beaconing and IP‑lookup behavior that can masquerade as normal browsing.

Hunting tip: alert on unknown binaries initiating TLS to IP‑lookup services or unusual CDN endpoints — especially early in execution.