Aggressive File Discovery and Locking Workflow Observed During Nova Ransomware Attacks


Zero‑Dwell Threat Intelligence Report

A narrative, executive‑ready view into the malware’s behavior, exposure, and reliable defenses.
Generated: 2026-01-13 11:03:13 UTC

Executive Overview — What We’re Dealing With

This specimen has persisted long enough to matter. Human experts classified it as Malware, and the telemetry confirms a capable, evasive Trojan with real impact potential.

File
7383b93d94c0ec1d710e46d60509ff6c5de36718
Type
PE32 executable (console) Intel 80386, for MS Windows
SHA‑1
7383b93d94c0ec1d710e46d60509ff6c5de36718
MD5
aa5dd9410506e0145e1bdc3698d88beb
First Seen
2025-05-20 11:18:54.540847
Last Analysis
2025-05-20 15:08:59.071965
Dwell Time
0 days, 7 hours, 33 minutes

Extended Dwell Time Impact

For 3+ hours, this malware remained undetected — a limited but sufficient window for the adversary to complete initial execution and establish basic system access.

Comparative Context

Industry studies report a median dwell time closer to 21–24 days. This case represents rapid detection and containment within hours rather than days.

Timeline

Time (UTC) Event Elapsed
2025-05-18 09:24:15 UTC First VirusTotal submission
2025-12-16 04:56:58 UTC Latest analysis snapshot 211 days, 19 hours, 32 minutes
2026-01-13 11:03:13 UTC Report generation time 240 days, 1 hours, 38 minutes

Why It Matters

Every additional day of dwell time is not just an abstract number — it is attacker opportunity. Each day equates to more time for lateral movement, stealth persistence, and intelligence gathering.

Global Detection Posture — Who Caught It, Who Missed It

VirusTotal engines: 73. Detected as malicious: 52. Missed: 21. Coverage: 71.2%.

Detected Vendors

  • Xcitium
  • +51 additional vendors (names not provided)

List includes Xcitium plus an additional 51 vendors per the provided summary.

Missed Vendors

  • Acronis
  • Antiy-AVL
  • Baidu
  • ClamAV
  • CMC
  • google_safebrowsing
  • Gridinsoft
  • Jiangmin
  • Kingsoft
  • NANO-Antivirus
  • SentinelOne
  • SUPERAntiSpyware
  • TACHYON
  • tehtris
  • Trapmine
  • VBA32
  • ViRobot
  • Webroot
  • Yandex
  • ZoneAlarm
  • Zoner

Why it matters: if any endpoint relies solely on a missed engine, this malware can operate with zero alerts. Prevention‑first controls close that gap regardless of signature lag.

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

  • T1027 – encode data using XOR
  • T1564.003 – hide graphical window
  • T1083 – enumerate files recursively
  • T1033 – get session user name
  • T1087 – get session user name
  • T1083 – get common file path
  • T1027 – create new key via CryptAcquireContext
  • T1082 – query environment variable
  • T1027 – encrypt or decrypt via WinCrypt
  • T1082 – get system information on Windows
  • T1082 – get hostname
  • T1129 – parse PE header
  • T1027 – encrypt data using AES via WinAPI
  • T1083 – enumerate files on Windows
  • T1082 – get memory capacity
  • T1129 – link function at runtime on Windows
  • T1082 – An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware, including version, patches, hotfixes, service packs, and architecture.
  • T1071 – Adversaries may communicate using application layer protocols to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic.
  • T1055 – Adversaries may inject code into processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges.
  • T1027 – Adversaries may attempt to make an executable or file difficult to discover or analyze by encrypting, encoding, or otherwise obfuscating its contents on the system or in transit.
  • T1027.002 – Adversaries may perform software packing or virtual machine software protection to conceal their code.
  • T1074 – Adversaries may stage collected data in a central location or directory prior to Exfiltration.
  • T1486 – Adversaries may encrypt data on target systems or on large numbers of systems in a network to interrupt availability to system and network resources.
  • T1485 – Adversaries may destroy data and files on specific systems or in large numbers on a network to interrupt availability to systems, services, and network resources.
  • T1045 – Manalize Local SandBox Packer Harvesting
  • T1564.003 – hide graphical window
  • T1027 – encode data using XOR
  • T1129 – parse PE header
  • T1082 – query environment variable
  • T1083 – get common file path
  • T1027 – create new key via CryptAcquireContext
  • T1082 – get memory capacity
  • T1082 – get system information on Windows
  • T1082 – get hostname
  • T1027 – encrypt or decrypt via WinCrypt
  • T1027 – encrypt data using AES via WinAPI
  • T1083 – enumerate files on Windows
  • T1083 – enumerate files recursively
  • T1129 – link function at runtime on Windows
  • T1083 – One or more potentially interesting buffers were extracted, these generally contain injected code, configuration data, etc…
  • T1564.003 – One or more potentially interesting buffers were extracted, these generally contain injected code, configuration data, etc…
  • T1033 – One or more potentially interesting buffers were extracted, these generally contain injected code, configuration data, etc…
  • T1087 – One or more potentially interesting buffers were extracted, these generally contain injected code, configuration data, etc…
  • T1082 – One or more potentially interesting buffers were extracted, these generally contain injected code, configuration data, etc…
  • T1129 – One or more potentially interesting buffers were extracted, these generally contain injected code, configuration data, etc…
  • T1027 – One or more potentially interesting buffers were extracted, these generally contain injected code, configuration data, etc…
  • T1082 – Queries for the computername
  • T1033 – get session user name
  • T1087 – get session user name
  • T1083 – At least one dumped buffer contains an embedded PE file
  • T1564.003 – At least one dumped buffer contains an embedded PE file
  • T1033 – At least one dumped buffer contains an embedded PE file
  • T1087 – At least one dumped buffer contains an embedded PE file
  • T1082 – At least one dumped buffer contains an embedded PE file
  • T1129 – At least one dumped buffer contains an embedded PE file
  • T1027 – At least one dumped buffer contains an embedded PE file
  • T1027.009 – Drops interesting files and uses them
  • T1542.003 – May use bcdedit to modify the Windows boot settings
  • T1574.002 – Tries to load missing DLLs
  • T1036 – Creates files inside the user directory
  • T1562.001 – Launches processes in debugging mode, may be used to hinder debugging
  • T1497 – Checks if the current process is being debugged
  • T1564.001 – Creates files in the recycle bin to hide itself
  • T1518.001 – Checks if the current process is being debugged
  • T1518.001 – May try to detect the virtual machine to hinder analysis (VM artifact strings found in memory)
  • T1518.001 – AV process strings found (often used to terminate AV products)
  • T1518.001 – Tries to detect sandboxes and other dynamic analysis tools
  • T1083 – Enumerates the file system
  • T1083 – Reads ini files
  • T1082 – Queries the cryptographic machine GUID
  • T1082 – Reads software policies
  • T1095 – Performs DNS lookups
  • T1071 – Performs DNS lookups

Following the Trail — Network & DNS Activity

Outbound activity leans on reputable infrastructure (e.g., CDNs, cloud endpoints) to blend in. TLS sessions and
HTTP calls show routine beaconing and IP‑lookup behavior that can masquerade as normal browsing.

Hunting tip: alert on unknown binaries initiating TLS to IP‑lookup services or unusual CDN endpoints — especially early in execution.

Persistence & Policy — Registry and Services

Registry and service telemetry points to policy awareness and environment reconnaissance rather than noisy persistence. Below is a compact view of the most relevant keys and handles; expand to see the full lists where available.

Registry Opened

56

Registry Set

17

Services Started

0

Services Opened

0

Registry Opened (Top 25)

Key
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\ComputerName\ActiveComputerName
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\WindowsSelfhost\FIDs
HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\IdentityCRL\Immersive\production\Property
HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\AppCompatFlags\Layers
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\OSDATA\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\AppCompatFlags
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\CPSS\Store\AllowTelemetry
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\WOW6432Node\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\SideBySide
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\WindowsSelfHost\FIDs\Unknown
HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Shell Folders
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\WOW6432Node\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Display
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\WerFault.exe
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\System\Setup
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\WOW6432Node\Policies\Microsoft\Windows NT\Rpc
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\CPSS\DevicePolicy\AllowTelemetry
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Flighting\Build
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\WOW6432Node\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\TenantRestrictions\Payload
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\WOW6432Node\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\GRE_Initialize
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Cryptography
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\DataCollection
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\WOW6432Node\Microsoft\Rpc
HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\CPSS\DevicePolicy\AllowTelemetry\NULL
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Cryptography
\REGISTRY\A\{8875775a-c2fb-f2bf-fe48-bd4bf1e10541}\Root
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\AppModel\Lookaside\user
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\DeviceAccess
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\WOW6432Node\Microsoft\Cryptography\Defaults\Provider Types\Type 024
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\WOW6432Node\Microsoft\Cryptography\Defaults\Provider\Microsoft Enhanced RSA and AES Cryptographic Provider
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\CPSS\Store
\REGISTRY\A\{8875775a-c2fb-f2bf-fe48-bd4bf1e10541}\Root\InventoryApplicationFile
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\TenantRestrictions\Payload
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\CPSS\NULL
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\WOW6432Node\Microsoft\IdentityCRL\ClockData
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\WOW6432Node\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\AeDebug
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\WOW6432Node\Microsoft\Cryptography\DESHashSessionKeyBackward
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\WOW6432Node\Microsoft\Cryptography\Offload
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Nls\CustomLocale
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\MUI\UILanguages\en-US
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\AppModel\Lookaside\machine
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\32bit.exe
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\CPSS
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\WOW6432Node\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Safer\CodeIdentifiers
HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\IdentityCRL\Immersive\production\Token\{67082621-8D18-4333-9C64-10DE93676363}
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\AppCompatFlags\SdbUpdates\ManifestedMergeStubSdbs
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\Segment Heap
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Policies\Microsoft\Cryptography\Configuration
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\CPSS\Edition\DevicePolicy\AllowTelemetry
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\WindowsSelfHost\FIDs\ByFID
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Wow64\x86
Show all (56 total)
Key
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Wow64\x86\xtajit
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\WOW6432Node\Policies\Microsoft\MUI\Settings
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\WOW6432Node\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\AppCompatFlags
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\AppCompatFlags\SdbUpdates
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\WOW6432Node\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\AppCompatFlags\Disable8And16BitMitigation

Registry Set (Top 25)

Key Value
\REGISTRY\A\{8875775a-c2fb-f2bf-fe48-bd4bf1e10541}\Root\InventoryApplicationFile\PermissionsCheckTestKey
\REGISTRY\A\{8875775a-c2fb-f2bf-fe48-bd4bf1e10541}\Root\InventoryApplicationFile\32bit.exe|d243de99a2fc96cf
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\WOW6432Node\Microsoft\IdentityCRL\ClockData
\REGISTRY\A\{8875775a-c2fb-f2bf-fe48-bd4bf1e10541}\Root\InventoryApplicationFile\32bit.exe|d243de99a2fc96cf\ProgramId 0006e740b1984b3152cd7591b2e7910c27490000ffff
\REGISTRY\A\{8875775a-c2fb-f2bf-fe48-bd4bf1e10541}\Root\InventoryApplicationFile\32bit.exe|d243de99a2fc96cf\FileId 00007383b93d94c0ec1d710e46d60509ff6c5de36718
\REGISTRY\A\{8875775a-c2fb-f2bf-fe48-bd4bf1e10541}\Root\InventoryApplicationFile\32bit.exe|d243de99a2fc96cf\LowerCaseLongPath c:\users\user\desktop\32bit.exe
\REGISTRY\A\{8875775a-c2fb-f2bf-fe48-bd4bf1e10541}\Root\InventoryApplicationFile\32bit.exe|d243de99a2fc96cf\Name 32bit.exe
\REGISTRY\A\{8875775a-c2fb-f2bf-fe48-bd4bf1e10541}\Root\InventoryApplicationFile\32bit.exe|d243de99a2fc96cf\BinaryType pe32_i386
\REGISTRY\A\{8875775a-c2fb-f2bf-fe48-bd4bf1e10541}\Root\InventoryApplicationFile\32bit.exe|d243de99a2fc96cf\LinkDate 05/18/2025 09:13:22
\REGISTRY\A\{8875775a-c2fb-f2bf-fe48-bd4bf1e10541}\Root\InventoryApplicationFile\32bit.exe|d243de99a2fc96cf\Size A8 7A 07 00 00 00 00 00
\REGISTRY\A\{8875775a-c2fb-f2bf-fe48-bd4bf1e10541}\Root\InventoryApplicationFile\32bit.exe|d243de99a2fc96cf\Usn 50 89 86 0F 00 00 00 00
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\WOW6432Node\Microsoft\IdentityCRL\ClockData\ClockTimeSeconds B7 A9 29 68 00 00 00 00
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\WOW6432Node\Microsoft\IdentityCRL\ClockData\TickCount 66 C3 47 00 00 00 00 00
HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\IdentityCRL\Immersive\production\Property\00180014B08ACFC6 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 D0 8C 9D DF 01 15 D1 11 8C 7A 00 C0 4F C2 97 EB 01 00 00 00 6A E8 DD 99 26 B
HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\IdentityCRL\Immersive\production\Token\{67082621-8D18-4333-9C64-10DE93676363}\DeviceTicket 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 D0 8C 9D DF 01 15 D1 11 8C 7A 00 C0 4F C2 97 EB 01 00 00 00 6A E8 DD 99 26 B
HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\IdentityCRL\Immersive\production\Token\{67082621-8D18-4333-9C64-10DE93676363}\DeviceId 00180014B08ACFC6
\REGISTRY\A\{8875775a-c2fb-f2bf-fe48-bd4bf1e10541}\Root\InventoryApplicationFile\32bit.exe|d243de99a2fc96cf\Language 0

Services Started (Top 15)

Services Opened (Top 15)

What To Do Now — Practical Defense Playbook

  • Contain unknowns: block first‑run binaries by default — signatures catch up, containment works now.
  • EDR controls: alert on keyboard hooks, screen capture APIs, VM/sandbox checks, and command‑shell launches.
  • Registry watch: flag queries/sets under policy paths (e.g., …\FipsAlgorithmPolicy\*).
  • Network rules: inspect outbound TLS to IP‑lookup services and unexpected CDN endpoints.
  • Hunt broadly: sweep endpoints for the indicators above and quarantine positives immediately.

Dwell time equals attacker opportunity. Reducing execution privileges and egress shrinks that window even when vendors disagree.

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