Zero‑Dwell Threat Intelligence Report
Executive Overview — What We’re Dealing With
This specimen has persisted long enough to matter. Human experts classified it as Malware, and the telemetry confirms a capable, evasive Trojan with real impact potential.
Extended Dwell Time Impact
For 3+ hours, this malware remained undetected — a limited but sufficient window for the adversary to complete initial execution and establish basic system access.
Comparative Context
Industry studies report a median dwell time closer to 21–24 days. This case represents rapid detection and containment within hours rather than days.
Timeline
| Time (UTC) | Event | Elapsed |
|---|---|---|
| 2025-05-18 09:24:15 UTC | First VirusTotal submission | — |
| 2025-12-16 04:56:58 UTC | Latest analysis snapshot | 211 days, 19 hours, 32 minutes |
| 2026-01-13 11:03:13 UTC | Report generation time | 240 days, 1 hours, 38 minutes |
Why It Matters
Every additional day of dwell time is not just an abstract number — it is attacker opportunity. Each day equates to more time for lateral movement, stealth persistence, and intelligence gathering.
Global Detection Posture — Who Caught It, Who Missed It
VirusTotal engines: 73. Detected as malicious: 52. Missed: 21. Coverage: 71.2%.
Detected Vendors
- Xcitium
- +51 additional vendors (names not provided)
List includes Xcitium plus an additional 51 vendors per the provided summary.
Missed Vendors
- Acronis
- Antiy-AVL
- Baidu
- ClamAV
- CMC
- google_safebrowsing
- Gridinsoft
- Jiangmin
- Kingsoft
- NANO-Antivirus
- SentinelOne
- SUPERAntiSpyware
- TACHYON
- tehtris
- Trapmine
- VBA32
- ViRobot
- Webroot
- Yandex
- ZoneAlarm
- Zoner
Why it matters: if any endpoint relies solely on a missed engine, this malware can operate with zero alerts. Prevention‑first controls close that gap regardless of signature lag.
MITRE ATT&CK Mapping
- T1027 – encode data using XOR
- T1564.003 – hide graphical window
- T1083 – enumerate files recursively
- T1033 – get session user name
- T1087 – get session user name
- T1083 – get common file path
- T1027 – create new key via CryptAcquireContext
- T1082 – query environment variable
- T1027 – encrypt or decrypt via WinCrypt
- T1082 – get system information on Windows
- T1082 – get hostname
- T1129 – parse PE header
- T1027 – encrypt data using AES via WinAPI
- T1083 – enumerate files on Windows
- T1082 – get memory capacity
- T1129 – link function at runtime on Windows
- T1082 – An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware, including version, patches, hotfixes, service packs, and architecture.
- T1071 – Adversaries may communicate using application layer protocols to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic.
- T1055 – Adversaries may inject code into processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges.
- T1027 – Adversaries may attempt to make an executable or file difficult to discover or analyze by encrypting, encoding, or otherwise obfuscating its contents on the system or in transit.
- T1027.002 – Adversaries may perform software packing or virtual machine software protection to conceal their code.
- T1074 – Adversaries may stage collected data in a central location or directory prior to Exfiltration.
- T1486 – Adversaries may encrypt data on target systems or on large numbers of systems in a network to interrupt availability to system and network resources.
- T1485 – Adversaries may destroy data and files on specific systems or in large numbers on a network to interrupt availability to systems, services, and network resources.
- T1045 – Manalize Local SandBox Packer Harvesting
- T1564.003 – hide graphical window
- T1027 – encode data using XOR
- T1129 – parse PE header
- T1082 – query environment variable
- T1083 – get common file path
- T1027 – create new key via CryptAcquireContext
- T1082 – get memory capacity
- T1082 – get system information on Windows
- T1082 – get hostname
- T1027 – encrypt or decrypt via WinCrypt
- T1027 – encrypt data using AES via WinAPI
- T1083 – enumerate files on Windows
- T1083 – enumerate files recursively
- T1129 – link function at runtime on Windows
- T1083 – One or more potentially interesting buffers were extracted, these generally contain injected code, configuration data, etc…
- T1564.003 – One or more potentially interesting buffers were extracted, these generally contain injected code, configuration data, etc…
- T1033 – One or more potentially interesting buffers were extracted, these generally contain injected code, configuration data, etc…
- T1087 – One or more potentially interesting buffers were extracted, these generally contain injected code, configuration data, etc…
- T1082 – One or more potentially interesting buffers were extracted, these generally contain injected code, configuration data, etc…
- T1129 – One or more potentially interesting buffers were extracted, these generally contain injected code, configuration data, etc…
- T1027 – One or more potentially interesting buffers were extracted, these generally contain injected code, configuration data, etc…
- T1082 – Queries for the computername
- T1033 – get session user name
- T1087 – get session user name
- T1083 – At least one dumped buffer contains an embedded PE file
- T1564.003 – At least one dumped buffer contains an embedded PE file
- T1033 – At least one dumped buffer contains an embedded PE file
- T1087 – At least one dumped buffer contains an embedded PE file
- T1082 – At least one dumped buffer contains an embedded PE file
- T1129 – At least one dumped buffer contains an embedded PE file
- T1027 – At least one dumped buffer contains an embedded PE file
- T1027.009 – Drops interesting files and uses them
- T1542.003 – May use bcdedit to modify the Windows boot settings
- T1574.002 – Tries to load missing DLLs
- T1036 – Creates files inside the user directory
- T1562.001 – Launches processes in debugging mode, may be used to hinder debugging
- T1497 – Checks if the current process is being debugged
- T1564.001 – Creates files in the recycle bin to hide itself
- T1518.001 – Checks if the current process is being debugged
- T1518.001 – May try to detect the virtual machine to hinder analysis (VM artifact strings found in memory)
- T1518.001 – AV process strings found (often used to terminate AV products)
- T1518.001 – Tries to detect sandboxes and other dynamic analysis tools
- T1083 – Enumerates the file system
- T1083 – Reads ini files
- T1082 – Queries the cryptographic machine GUID
- T1082 – Reads software policies
- T1095 – Performs DNS lookups
- T1071 – Performs DNS lookups
Following the Trail — Network & DNS Activity
Outbound activity leans on reputable infrastructure (e.g., CDNs, cloud endpoints) to blend in. TLS sessions and
HTTP calls show routine beaconing and IP‑lookup behavior that can masquerade as normal browsing.
Hunting tip: alert on unknown binaries initiating TLS to IP‑lookup services or unusual CDN endpoints — especially early in execution.
Persistence & Policy — Registry and Services
Registry and service telemetry points to policy awareness and environment reconnaissance rather than noisy persistence. Below is a compact view of the most relevant keys and handles; expand to see the full lists where available.
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Registry Opened (Top 25)
| Key |
|---|
| HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\ComputerName\ActiveComputerName |
| HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\WindowsSelfhost\FIDs |
| HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\IdentityCRL\Immersive\production\Property |
| HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\AppCompatFlags\Layers |
| HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\OSDATA\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\AppCompatFlags |
| HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\CPSS\Store\AllowTelemetry |
| HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\WOW6432Node\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\SideBySide |
| HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\WindowsSelfHost\FIDs\Unknown |
| HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Shell Folders |
| HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\WOW6432Node\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Display |
| HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\WerFault.exe |
| HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\System\Setup |
| HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\WOW6432Node\Policies\Microsoft\Windows NT\Rpc |
| HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\CPSS\DevicePolicy\AllowTelemetry |
| HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Flighting\Build |
| HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\WOW6432Node\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\TenantRestrictions\Payload |
| HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\WOW6432Node\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\GRE_Initialize |
| HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Cryptography |
| HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\DataCollection |
| HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\WOW6432Node\Microsoft\Rpc |
| HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion |
| HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\CPSS\DevicePolicy\AllowTelemetry\NULL |
| HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Cryptography |
| \REGISTRY\A\{8875775a-c2fb-f2bf-fe48-bd4bf1e10541}\Root |
| HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\AppModel\Lookaside\user |
| HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\DeviceAccess |
| HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\WOW6432Node\Microsoft\Cryptography\Defaults\Provider Types\Type 024 |
| HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\WOW6432Node\Microsoft\Cryptography\Defaults\Provider\Microsoft Enhanced RSA and AES Cryptographic Provider |
| HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\CPSS\Store |
| \REGISTRY\A\{8875775a-c2fb-f2bf-fe48-bd4bf1e10541}\Root\InventoryApplicationFile |
| HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\TenantRestrictions\Payload |
| HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\CPSS\NULL |
| HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\WOW6432Node\Microsoft\IdentityCRL\ClockData |
| HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\WOW6432Node\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\AeDebug |
| HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\WOW6432Node\Microsoft\Cryptography\DESHashSessionKeyBackward |
| HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\WOW6432Node\Microsoft\Cryptography\Offload |
| HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Nls\CustomLocale |
| HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\MUI\UILanguages\en-US |
| HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\AppModel\Lookaside\machine |
| HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\32bit.exe |
| HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\CPSS |
| HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager |
| HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\WOW6432Node\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Safer\CodeIdentifiers |
| HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\IdentityCRL\Immersive\production\Token\{67082621-8D18-4333-9C64-10DE93676363} |
| HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\AppCompatFlags\SdbUpdates\ManifestedMergeStubSdbs |
| HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\Segment Heap |
| HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Policies\Microsoft\Cryptography\Configuration |
| HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\CPSS\Edition\DevicePolicy\AllowTelemetry |
| HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\WindowsSelfHost\FIDs\ByFID |
| HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Wow64\x86 |
Show all (56 total)
| Key |
|---|
| HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Wow64\x86\xtajit |
| HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\WOW6432Node\Policies\Microsoft\MUI\Settings |
| HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\WOW6432Node\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\AppCompatFlags |
| HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\AppCompatFlags\SdbUpdates |
| HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\WOW6432Node\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options |
| HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\AppCompatFlags\Disable8And16BitMitigation |
Registry Set (Top 25)
| Key | Value |
|---|---|
| \REGISTRY\A\{8875775a-c2fb-f2bf-fe48-bd4bf1e10541}\Root\InventoryApplicationFile\PermissionsCheckTestKey | — |
| \REGISTRY\A\{8875775a-c2fb-f2bf-fe48-bd4bf1e10541}\Root\InventoryApplicationFile\32bit.exe|d243de99a2fc96cf | — |
| HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\WOW6432Node\Microsoft\IdentityCRL\ClockData | — |
| \REGISTRY\A\{8875775a-c2fb-f2bf-fe48-bd4bf1e10541}\Root\InventoryApplicationFile\32bit.exe|d243de99a2fc96cf\ProgramId | 0006e740b1984b3152cd7591b2e7910c27490000ffff |
| \REGISTRY\A\{8875775a-c2fb-f2bf-fe48-bd4bf1e10541}\Root\InventoryApplicationFile\32bit.exe|d243de99a2fc96cf\FileId | 00007383b93d94c0ec1d710e46d60509ff6c5de36718 |
| \REGISTRY\A\{8875775a-c2fb-f2bf-fe48-bd4bf1e10541}\Root\InventoryApplicationFile\32bit.exe|d243de99a2fc96cf\LowerCaseLongPath | c:\users\user\desktop\32bit.exe |
| \REGISTRY\A\{8875775a-c2fb-f2bf-fe48-bd4bf1e10541}\Root\InventoryApplicationFile\32bit.exe|d243de99a2fc96cf\Name | 32bit.exe |
| \REGISTRY\A\{8875775a-c2fb-f2bf-fe48-bd4bf1e10541}\Root\InventoryApplicationFile\32bit.exe|d243de99a2fc96cf\BinaryType | pe32_i386 |
| \REGISTRY\A\{8875775a-c2fb-f2bf-fe48-bd4bf1e10541}\Root\InventoryApplicationFile\32bit.exe|d243de99a2fc96cf\LinkDate | 05/18/2025 09:13:22 |
| \REGISTRY\A\{8875775a-c2fb-f2bf-fe48-bd4bf1e10541}\Root\InventoryApplicationFile\32bit.exe|d243de99a2fc96cf\Size | A8 7A 07 00 00 00 00 00 |
| \REGISTRY\A\{8875775a-c2fb-f2bf-fe48-bd4bf1e10541}\Root\InventoryApplicationFile\32bit.exe|d243de99a2fc96cf\Usn | 50 89 86 0F 00 00 00 00 |
| HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\WOW6432Node\Microsoft\IdentityCRL\ClockData\ClockTimeSeconds | B7 A9 29 68 00 00 00 00 |
| HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\WOW6432Node\Microsoft\IdentityCRL\ClockData\TickCount | 66 C3 47 00 00 00 00 00 |
| HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\IdentityCRL\Immersive\production\Property\00180014B08ACFC6 | 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 D0 8C 9D DF 01 15 D1 11 8C 7A 00 C0 4F C2 97 EB 01 00 00 00 6A E8 DD 99 26 B |
| HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\IdentityCRL\Immersive\production\Token\{67082621-8D18-4333-9C64-10DE93676363}\DeviceTicket | 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 D0 8C 9D DF 01 15 D1 11 8C 7A 00 C0 4F C2 97 EB 01 00 00 00 6A E8 DD 99 26 B |
| HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\IdentityCRL\Immersive\production\Token\{67082621-8D18-4333-9C64-10DE93676363}\DeviceId | 00180014B08ACFC6 |
| \REGISTRY\A\{8875775a-c2fb-f2bf-fe48-bd4bf1e10541}\Root\InventoryApplicationFile\32bit.exe|d243de99a2fc96cf\Language | 0 |
Services Started (Top 15)
Services Opened (Top 15)
What To Do Now — Practical Defense Playbook
- Contain unknowns: block first‑run binaries by default — signatures catch up, containment works now.
- EDR controls: alert on keyboard hooks, screen capture APIs, VM/sandbox checks, and command‑shell launches.
- Registry watch: flag queries/sets under policy paths (e.g., …\FipsAlgorithmPolicy\*).
- Network rules: inspect outbound TLS to IP‑lookup services and unexpected CDN endpoints.
- Hunt broadly: sweep endpoints for the indicators above and quarantine positives immediately.
Dwell time equals attacker opportunity. Reducing execution privileges and egress shrinks that window even when vendors disagree.
