Privilege Escalation via Token Impersonation Drives Enterprise-Scale DevMan Attacks


Zero‑Dwell Threat Intelligence Report

A narrative, executive‑ready view into the malware’s behavior, exposure, and reliable defenses.
Generated: 2026-01-29 15:20:30 UTC

Executive Overview — What We’re Dealing With

This specimen has persisted long enough to matter. Human experts classified it as Malware, and the telemetry confirms a capable, evasive Trojan with real impact potential.

File
ntdll.dll
Type
Win64 Executable (generic)
SHA‑1
8fccaf76aa9c6450da4ca9750c81d61a3318beed
MD5
16594656cf923af32ccdd0a7ab70e9ff
First Seen
2026-01-29 08:26:45.224763
Last Analysis
2026-01-29 10:11:10.974611
Dwell Time
0 days, 7 hours, 33 minutes

Extended Dwell Time Impact

For 1+ hours, this malware remained undetected — a limited but sufficient window for the adversary to complete initial execution and establish basic system access.

Comparative Context

Industry studies report a median dwell time closer to 21–24 days. This case represents rapid detection and containment within hours rather than days.

Timeline

Time (UTC) Event Elapsed
2026-01-05 14:02:42 UTC First VirusTotal submission
2026-01-29 14:00:44 UTC Latest analysis snapshot 23 days, 23 hours, 58 minutes
2026-01-29 15:20:30 UTC Report generation time 24 days, 1 hours, 17 minutes

Why It Matters

Every additional day of dwell time is not just an abstract number — it is attacker opportunity. Each day equates to more time for lateral movement, stealth persistence, and intelligence gathering.

Global Detection Posture — Who Caught It, Who Missed It

VirusTotal engines: 71. Detected as malicious: 57. Missed: 14. Coverage: 80.3%.

Detected Vendors

  • Xcitium
  • +56 additional vendors (names not provided)

List includes Xcitium plus an additional 56 vendors per the provided summary.

Missed Vendors

  • Acronis
  • ALYac
  • Avira
  • Baidu
  • CAT-QuickHeal
  • ClamAV
  • CMC
  • F-Secure
  • Gridinsoft
  • Jiangmin
  • TACHYON
  • Xcitium
  • Yandex
  • Zoner

Why it matters: if any endpoint relies solely on a missed engine, this malware can operate with zero alerts. Prevention‑first controls close that gap regardless of signature lag.

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

  • T1082 – get hostname
  • T1027.005 – contain obfuscated stackstrings
  • T1007 – query service status
  • T1497.001 – reference anti-VM strings targeting VMWare
  • T1027 – encode data using XOR
  • T1083 – enumerate files on Windows
  • T1027 – encrypt data using Curve25519
  • T1033 – get session user name
  • T1087 – get session user name
  • T1129 – parse PE header
  • T1070.001 – clear Windows event logs
  • T1082 – get system information on Windows
  • T1490 – delete volume shadow copies
  • T1070.004 – delete volume shadow copies
  • T1027 – reference Base64 string
  • T1070.004 – self delete
  • T1083 – get file size
  • T1053.005 – schedule task via schtasks
  • T1016 – get local IPv4 addresses
  • T1222 – set file attributes
  • T1134 – modify access privileges
  • T1057 – get process heap flags
  • T1082 – get disk information
  • T1134 – acquire debug privileges
  • T1083 – check if file exists
  • T1083 – get common file path
  • T1543.003 – delete service
  • T1129 – access PEB ldr_data
  • T1135 – enumerate network shares
  • T1129 – link function at runtime on Windows
  • T1053.002 – schedule task via at
  • T1082 – query environment variable
  • T1543.003 – start service
  • T1057 – enumerate processes
  • T1518 – enumerate processes
  • T1497.001 – reference anti-VM strings targeting VirtualBox
  • T1543.003 – stop service
  • T1489 – stop service
  • T1006 – Accesses volumes directly
  • T1016 – Reads network adapter information
  • T1016 – Queries a host’s domain name
  • T1057 – Enumerates running processes
  • T1134 – Enables process privileges
  • T1134 – Enables critical process privileges
  • T1486 – Appends new extensions to many filenames
  • T1489 – Tries to disable antivirus software
  • T1489 – Disables a crucial system service
  • T1490 – Modifies Windows automatic backups
  • T1491.001 – Changes the desktop wallpaper
  • T1562.001 – Tries to disable antivirus software
  • T1564.003 – Creates process with hidden window
  • T1129 – The process attempted to dynamically load a malicious function
  • T1059 – Detected command line output monitoring
  • T1564.003 – Detected the creation of a hidden window (common execution hiding technique)
  • T1057 – The process may have looked for a particular process running on the system
  • T1057 – The process searched for a process without success: maybe some not-found process was needed (browser?)
  • T1129 – The process tried to load dynamically one or more functions.
  • T1045 – Manalize Local SandBox Packer Harvesting
  • T1107 – The process attempted to delete some Shadow Volume Copies (typical in ransomware)
  • T1106 – The process attempted to delete some Shadow Volume Copies (typical in ransomware)
  • T1082 – Queries for the computername
  • T1031 – The process has tried to stop some active services
  • T1107 – The process acted as a ransomware (suspicious behaviours common in ransomwares were detected)
  • T1105 – The process acted as a ransomware (suspicious behaviours common in ransomwares were detected)
  • T1027.009 – Drops interesting files and uses them
  • T1063 – It Tries to detect injection methods

Following the Trail — Network & DNS Activity

Outbound activity leans on reputable infrastructure (e.g., CDNs, cloud endpoints) to blend in. TLS sessions and
HTTP calls show routine beaconing and IP‑lookup behavior that can masquerade as normal browsing.

Hunting tip: alert on unknown binaries initiating TLS to IP‑lookup services or unusual CDN endpoints — especially early in execution.

Persistence & Policy — Registry and Services

Registry and service telemetry points to policy awareness and environment reconnaissance rather than noisy persistence. Below is a compact view of the most relevant keys and handles; expand to see the full lists where available.

Registry Opened

0

Registry Set

0

Services Started

1

Services Opened

0

Registry Opened (Top 25)

Show all (297 total)

Registry Set (Top 25)

Services Started (Top 15)

Service
SNMPTRAP

Services Opened (Top 15)

What To Do Now — Practical Defense Playbook

  • Contain unknowns: block first‑run binaries by default — signatures catch up, containment works now.
  • EDR controls: alert on keyboard hooks, screen capture APIs, VM/sandbox checks, and command‑shell launches.
  • Registry watch: flag queries/sets under policy paths (e.g., …\FipsAlgorithmPolicy\*).
  • Network rules: inspect outbound TLS to IP‑lookup services and unexpected CDN endpoints.
  • Hunt broadly: sweep endpoints for the indicators above and quarantine positives immediately.

Dwell time equals attacker opportunity. Reducing execution privileges and egress shrinks that window even when vendors disagree.

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