Zero‑Dwell Threat Intelligence Report
Executive Overview — What We’re Dealing With
This specimen has persisted long enough to matter. Human experts classified it as Malware, and the telemetry confirms a capable, evasive Trojan with real impact potential.
Extended Dwell Time Impact
For 1+ hours, this malware remained undetected — a limited but sufficient window for the adversary to complete initial execution and establish basic system access.
Comparative Context
Industry studies report a median dwell time closer to 21–24 days. This case represents rapid detection and containment within hours rather than days.
Timeline
| Time (UTC) | Event | Elapsed |
|---|---|---|
| 2026-01-12 19:32:54 UTC | First VirusTotal submission | — |
| 2026-01-29 14:00:34 UTC | Latest analysis snapshot | 16 days, 18 hours, 27 minutes |
| 2026-01-29 15:21:43 UTC | Report generation time | 16 days, 19 hours, 48 minutes |
Why It Matters
Every additional day of dwell time is not just an abstract number — it is attacker opportunity. Each day equates to more time for lateral movement, stealth persistence, and intelligence gathering.
Global Detection Posture — Who Caught It, Who Missed It
VirusTotal engines: 72. Detected as malicious: 57. Missed: 15. Coverage: 79.2%.
Detected Vendors
- Xcitium
- +56 additional vendors (names not provided)
List includes Xcitium plus an additional 56 vendors per the provided summary.
Missed Vendors
- Acronis
- ALYac
- Avira
- Baidu
- CAT-QuickHeal
- ClamAV
- CMC
- F-Secure
- google_safebrowsing
- Jiangmin
- TACHYON
- Xcitium
- Yandex
- Zillya
- Zoner
Why it matters: if any endpoint relies solely on a missed engine, this malware can operate with zero alerts. Prevention‑first controls close that gap regardless of signature lag.
Behavioral Storyline — How the Malware Operates
Intensive file system activity (53.94% of behavior) indicates data harvesting, file encryption, or dropper behavior. The threat is actively searching for and manipulating files across the system.
Behavior Categories (weighted)
Weight values represent the frequency and intensity of malware interactions with specific system components. Higher weights indicate more aggressive targeting of that category. Each operation (registry access, file modification, network connection, etc.) contributes to the category’s total weight, providing a quantitative measure of the malware’s behavioral focus.
| Category | Weight | Percentage |
|---|---|---|
| File System | 19339 | 53.94% |
| System | 9427 | 26.29% |
| Process | 3431 | 9.57% |
| Registry | 3266 | 9.11% |
| Com | 152 | 0.42% |
| Services | 96 | 0.27% |
| Device | 61 | 0.17% |
| Threading | 29 | 0.08% |
| Misc | 18 | 0.05% |
| Synchronization | 18 | 0.05% |
| Hooking | 10 | 0.03% |
| Windows | 7 | 0.02% |
| Crypto | 2 | 0.01% |
MITRE ATT&CK Mapping
- T1082 – query environment variable
- T1543.003 – delete service
- T1007 – query service status
- T1222 – set file attributes
- T1543.003 – start service
- T1134 – modify access privileges
- T1057 – get process heap flags
- T1082 – get disk information
- T1129 – parse PE header
- T1129 – link function at runtime on Windows
- T1027 – reference Base64 string
- T1135 – enumerate network shares
- T1083 – get common file path
- T1053.002 – schedule task via at
- T1129 – access PEB ldr_data
- T1016 – get local IPv4 addresses
- T1497.001 – reference anti-VM strings targeting VMWare
- T1070.001 – clear Windows event logs
- T1057 – enumerate processes
- T1518 – enumerate processes
- T1053.005 – schedule task via schtasks
- T1083 – get file size
- T1543.003 – stop service
- T1489 – stop service
- T1083 – enumerate files on Windows
- T1033 – get session user name
- T1087 – get session user name
- T1490 – delete volume shadow copies
- T1070.004 – delete volume shadow copies
- T1027 – encrypt data using Curve25519
- T1082 – get system information on Windows
- T1083 – check if file exists
- T1082 – get hostname
- T1027.005 – contain obfuscated stackstrings
- T1497.001 – reference anti-VM strings targeting VirtualBox
- T1134 – acquire debug privileges
- T1027 – encode data using XOR
- T1070.004 – self delete
- T1006 – Accesses volumes directly
- T1016 – Reads network adapter information
- T1016 – Queries a host’s domain name
- T1057 – Enumerates running processes
- T1134 – Enables process privileges
- T1134 – Enables critical process privileges
- T1486 – Appends new extensions to many filenames
- T1489 – Tries to disable antivirus software
- T1489 – Disables a crucial system service
- T1490 – Modifies Windows automatic backups
- T1491.001 – Changes the desktop wallpaper
- T1562.001 – Tries to disable antivirus software
- T1564.003 – Creates process with hidden window
- T1547.001 – SetUnhandledExceptionFilter detected: superseding the top-level exception handler of each thread of a process is a common anti-debug technique.
- T1222 – SetUnhandledExceptionFilter detected: superseding the top-level exception handler of each thread of a process is a common anti-debug technique.
- T1134 – SetUnhandledExceptionFilter detected: superseding the top-level exception handler of each thread of a process is a common anti-debug technique.
- T1529 – SetUnhandledExceptionFilter detected: superseding the top-level exception handler of each thread of a process is a common anti-debug technique.
- T1112 – SetUnhandledExceptionFilter detected: superseding the top-level exception handler of each thread of a process is a common anti-debug technique.
- T1012 – SetUnhandledExceptionFilter detected: superseding the top-level exception handler of each thread of a process is a common anti-debug technique.
- T1083 – SetUnhandledExceptionFilter detected: superseding the top-level exception handler of each thread of a process is a common anti-debug technique.
- T1082 – SetUnhandledExceptionFilter detected: superseding the top-level exception handler of each thread of a process is a common anti-debug technique.
- T1129 – SetUnhandledExceptionFilter detected: superseding the top-level exception handler of each thread of a process is a common anti-debug technique.
- T1059 – Detected command line output monitoring
- T1129 – The process attempted to dynamically load a malicious function
- T1564.003 – Detected the creation of a hidden window (common execution hiding technique)
- T1057 – The process searched for a process without success: maybe some not-found process was needed (browser?)
- T1057 – The process may have looked for a particular process running on the system
- T1129 – The process tried to load dynamically one or more functions.
- T1045 – Manalize Local SandBox Packer Harvesting
- T1107 – The process attempted to delete some Shadow Volume Copies (typical in ransomware)
- T1106 – The process attempted to delete some Shadow Volume Copies (typical in ransomware)
- T1082 – Queries for the computername
- T1031 – The process has tried to stop some active services
- T1107 – The process acted as a ransomware (suspicious behaviours common in ransomwares were detected)
- T1105 – The process acted as a ransomware (suspicious behaviours common in ransomwares were detected)
- T1547.001 – Manalize Local SandBox Find Crypto
- T1222 – Manalize Local SandBox Find Crypto
- T1134 – Manalize Local SandBox Find Crypto
- T1529 – Manalize Local SandBox Find Crypto
- T1112 – Manalize Local SandBox Find Crypto
- T1012 – Manalize Local SandBox Find Crypto
- T1083 – Manalize Local SandBox Find Crypto
- T1082 – Manalize Local SandBox Find Crypto
- T1129 – Manalize Local SandBox Find Crypto
- T1547.001 – Manalize Local SandBox Strings
- T1222 – Manalize Local SandBox Strings
- T1134 – Manalize Local SandBox Strings
- T1529 – Manalize Local SandBox Strings
- T1112 – Manalize Local SandBox Strings
- T1012 – Manalize Local SandBox Strings
- T1083 – Manalize Local SandBox Strings
- T1082 – Manalize Local SandBox Strings
- T1129 – Manalize Local SandBox Strings
- T1547.001 – The process wrote a message on disk that could be related to a ransomware activity
- T1222 – The process wrote a message on disk that could be related to a ransomware activity
- T1134 – The process wrote a message on disk that could be related to a ransomware activity
- T1529 – The process wrote a message on disk that could be related to a ransomware activity
- T1112 – The process wrote a message on disk that could be related to a ransomware activity
- T1012 – The process wrote a message on disk that could be related to a ransomware activity
- T1083 – The process wrote a message on disk that could be related to a ransomware activity
- T1082 – The process wrote a message on disk that could be related to a ransomware activity
- T1129 – The process wrote a message on disk that could be related to a ransomware activity
- T1027.009 – Drops interesting files and uses them
- T1063 – It Tries to detect injection methods
Following the Trail — Network & DNS Activity
Outbound activity leans on reputable infrastructure (e.g., CDNs, cloud endpoints) to blend in. TLS sessions and
HTTP calls show routine beaconing and IP‑lookup behavior that can masquerade as normal browsing.
Contacted Domains
| Domain | IP | Country | ASN/Org |
|---|---|---|---|
| www.msftncsi.com | 23.219.36.108 | United States | Akamai Technologies, Inc. |
| www.aieov.com | 76.223.54.146 | United States | Amazon.com, Inc. |
Observed IPs
| IP | Country | ASN/Org |
|---|---|---|
| 224.0.0.252 | — | — |
| 239.255.255.250 | — | — |
| 8.8.4.4 | United States | Google LLC |
| 8.8.8.8 | United States | Google LLC |
DNS Queries
| Request | Type |
|---|---|
| 5isohu.com | A |
| www.msftncsi.com | A |
| www.aieov.com | A |
Contacted IPs
| IP | Country | ASN/Org |
|---|---|---|
| 224.0.0.252 | — | — |
| 239.255.255.250 | — | — |
| 8.8.4.4 | United States | Google LLC |
| 8.8.8.8 | United States | Google LLC |
Port Distribution
| Port | Count | Protocols |
|---|---|---|
| 137 | 1 | udp |
| 5355 | 13 | udp |
| 53 | 18 | udp |
| 3702 | 2 | udp |
UDP Packets
| Source IP | Dest IP | Sport | Dport | Time | Proto |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 192.168.56.13 | 192.168.56.255 | 137 | 137 | 7.568113088607788 | udp |
| 192.168.56.13 | 224.0.0.252 | 49311 | 5355 | 10.08191204071045 | udp |
| 192.168.56.13 | 224.0.0.252 | 49733 | 5355 | 139.39667987823486 | udp |
| 192.168.56.13 | 224.0.0.252 | 49837 | 5355 | 136.63593411445618 | udp |
| 192.168.56.13 | 224.0.0.252 | 55150 | 5355 | 7.485635042190552 | udp |
| 192.168.56.13 | 224.0.0.252 | 56323 | 5355 | 133.98645091056824 | udp |
| 192.168.56.13 | 224.0.0.252 | 57003 | 5355 | 130.91761088371277 | udp |
| 192.168.56.13 | 224.0.0.252 | 57262 | 5355 | 131.34778308868408 | udp |
| 192.168.56.13 | 224.0.0.252 | 60010 | 5355 | 9.770320892333984 | udp |
| 192.168.56.13 | 224.0.0.252 | 60810 | 5355 | 128.7851550579071 | udp |
| 192.168.56.13 | 224.0.0.252 | 62406 | 5355 | 7.492429971694946 | udp |
| 192.168.56.13 | 224.0.0.252 | 63382 | 5355 | 126.22678089141846 | udp |
| 192.168.56.13 | 224.0.0.252 | 63527 | 5355 | 7.678692102432251 | udp |
| 192.168.56.13 | 224.0.0.252 | 63759 | 5355 | 126.3315908908844 | udp |
| 192.168.56.13 | 239.255.255.250 | 49152 | 3702 | 126.11940789222717 | udp |
| 192.168.56.13 | 239.255.255.250 | 52252 | 3702 | 7.497282981872559 | udp |
| 192.168.56.13 | 8.8.4.4 | 54879 | 53 | 12.441373109817505 | udp |
| 192.168.56.13 | 8.8.4.4 | 54881 | 53 | 10.36430311203003 | udp |
| 192.168.56.13 | 8.8.4.4 | 57310 | 53 | 69.45684909820557 | udp |
| 192.168.56.13 | 8.8.4.4 | 57415 | 53 | 83.86302590370178 | udp |
| 192.168.56.13 | 8.8.4.4 | 58697 | 53 | 25.81591796875 | udp |
| 192.168.56.13 | 8.8.4.4 | 58920 | 53 | 102.84717392921448 | udp |
| 192.168.56.13 | 8.8.4.4 | 60267 | 53 | 133.87778401374817 | udp |
| 192.168.56.13 | 8.8.4.4 | 62493 | 53 | 55.05052590370178 | udp |
| 192.168.56.13 | 8.8.4.4 | 62849 | 53 | 40.175501108169556 | udp |
| 192.168.56.13 | 8.8.8.8 | 54879 | 53 | 13.440623998641968 | udp |
| 192.168.56.13 | 8.8.8.8 | 54881 | 53 | 11.363054037094116 | udp |
| 192.168.56.13 | 8.8.8.8 | 57310 | 53 | 68.46753001213074 | udp |
| 192.168.56.13 | 8.8.8.8 | 57415 | 53 | 82.86895298957825 | udp |
| 192.168.56.13 | 8.8.8.8 | 58697 | 53 | 24.821742057800293 | udp |
| 192.168.56.13 | 8.8.8.8 | 58920 | 53 | 101.85353493690491 | udp |
| 192.168.56.13 | 8.8.8.8 | 60267 | 53 | 134.86331391334534 | udp |
| 192.168.56.13 | 8.8.8.8 | 62493 | 53 | 54.05482292175293 | udp |
| 192.168.56.13 | 8.8.8.8 | 62849 | 53 | 39.18023705482483 | udp |
Hunting tip: alert on unknown binaries initiating TLS to IP‑lookup services or unusual CDN endpoints — especially early in execution.
Persistence & Policy — Registry and Services
Registry and service telemetry points to policy awareness and environment reconnaissance rather than noisy persistence. Below is a compact view of the most relevant keys and handles; expand to see the full lists where available.
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Registry Opened (Top 25)
Show all (297 total)
Registry Set (Top 25)
| Key | Value |
|---|---|
| HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\System\CurrentControlSet\services\WinDefend\Start | DWORD (0x00000004) |
| HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\System\CurrentControlSet\services\wscsvc\Start | DWORD (0x00000004) |
| HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\System\CurrentControlSet\services\MpsSvc\Start | DWORD (0x00000004) |
| HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\System\CurrentControlSet\services\mpsdrv\Start | DWORD (0x00000004) |
| HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\System\CurrentControlSet\services\BFE\Start | DWORD (0x00000004) |
| HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\System\CurrentControlSet\services\eventlog\Start | DWORD (0x00000004) |
| HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\System\CurrentControlSet\services\SNMPTRAP\Start | DWORD (0x00000004) |
| HKEY_USERS\S-1-5-21-4270068108-2931534202-3907561125-1001\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\FileExts\.exe\OpenWithProgids\exefile | Binary Data |
Services Started (Top 15)
| Service |
|---|
| SNMPTRAP |
Services Opened (Top 15)
What To Do Now — Practical Defense Playbook
- Contain unknowns: block first‑run binaries by default — signatures catch up, containment works now.
- EDR controls: alert on keyboard hooks, screen capture APIs, VM/sandbox checks, and command‑shell launches.
- Registry watch: flag queries/sets under policy paths (e.g., …\FipsAlgorithmPolicy\*).
- Network rules: inspect outbound TLS to IP‑lookup services and unexpected CDN endpoints.
- Hunt broadly: sweep endpoints for the indicators above and quarantine positives immediately.
Dwell time equals attacker opportunity. Reducing execution privileges and egress shrinks that window even when vendors disagree.
