Executive Overview — What We’re Dealing With

This specimen has persisted long enough to matter. Human experts classified it as Malware, and the telemetry confirms a capable, evasive Trojan with real impact potential.

Extended Dwell Time Impact

For 5+ minutes, this malware was rapidly detected — demonstrating excellent security controls that intercepted the threat during initial execution phases, severely limiting adversary capabilities.

Global Detection Posture — Who Caught It, Who Missed It

VirusTotal engines: 72. Detected as malicious: 49. Missed: 23. Coverage: 68.1%.

Why it matters: if any endpoint relies solely on a missed engine, this malware can operate with zero alerts. Prevention‑first controls close that gap regardless of signature lag.

Behavioral Storyline — How the Malware Operates

Dominant system-level operations (76.19% of behavior) suggest this malware performs deep system reconnaissance, privilege escalation, or core OS manipulation. It’s actively probing system defenses and attempting to gain administrative control.

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

• T1027 – encode data using XOR
• T1027 – encrypt data using AES via x86 extensions
• T1027 – encrypt data using AES
• T1129 – get kernel32 base address
• T1027 – encrypt data using RC4 PRGA
• T1027 – encrypt data using Salsa20 or ChaCha
• T1027 – reference Base64 string
• T1129 – access PEB ldr_data
• T1027 – reference AES constants
• T1140 – decrypt data using AES via x86 extensions
• T1027 – encode data using Base64
• T1543 – Created a service that was not started
• T1547 – Installs itself for autorun at Windows startup
• T1543.003 – Created a service that was not started
• T1053 – Installs itself for autorun at Windows startup
• T1547.001 – Installs itself for autorun at Windows startup
• T1564 – A process created a hidden window
• T1202 – Uses Windows utilities for basic functionality
• T1562 – Tries to unhook or modify Windows functions monitored by CAPE
• T1070.006 – Reads data out of its own binary image
• T1070.006 – At least one IP Address, Domain, or File Name was found in a crypto call
• T1070.006 – Attempts to connect to a dead IP:Port
• T1070.006 – Reads from the memory of another process
• T1112 – Installs itself for autorun at Windows startup
• T1112 – Installs itself for autorun at Windows startup
• T1070 – Reads data out of its own binary image
• T1070 – At least one IP Address, Domain, or File Name was found in a crypto call
• T1070 – Deletes executed files from disk
• T1070 – Attempts to connect to a dead IP:Port
• T1070 – Reads from the memory of another process
• T1064 – A scripting utility was executed
• T1064 – Attempts to execute suspicious powershell command arguments
• T1562.001 – Tries to unhook or modify Windows functions monitored by CAPE
• T1027 – The binary contains an unknown PE section name indicative of packing
• T1564.003 – A process created a hidden window
• T1027.002 – The binary contains an unknown PE section name indicative of packing
• T1082 – Checks available memory
• T1057 – Enumerates running processes
• T1057 – Expresses interest in specific running processes
• T1071 – Reads data out of its own binary image
• T1071 – At least one IP Address, Domain, or File Name was found in a crypto call
• T1071 – Attempts to connect to a dead IP:Port
• T1071 – Reads from the memory of another process
• T1106 – Guard pages use detected – possible anti-debugging.
• T1059 – A scripting utility was executed
• T1059 – Attempts to execute suspicious powershell command arguments
• T1059.001 – Attempts to execute suspicious powershell command arguments
• T1485 – Anomalous file deletion behavior detected (10+)
• T1045 – Manalize Local SandBox Packer Harvesting
• T1036 – Creates files inside the user directory
• T1497 – May sleep (evasive loops) to hinder dynamic analysis
• T1057 – Queries a list of all running processes
• T1082 – Queries the volume information (name, serial number etc) of a device
• T1090 – Found Tor onion address

Following the Trail — Network & DNS Activity

Outbound activity leans on reputable infrastructure (e.g., CDNs, cloud endpoints) to blend in. TLS sessions and
HTTP calls show routine beaconing and IP‑lookup behavior that can masquerade as normal browsing.

Hunting tip: alert on unknown binaries initiating TLS to IP‑lookup services or unusual CDN endpoints — especially early in execution.