Debug-Aware Control Flow Embedded in High-Confidence Gentlemen Payload

  • February 6, 2026
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Zero‑Dwell Threat Intelligence Report

A narrative, executive‑ready view into the malware’s behavior, exposure, and reliable defenses.
Generated: 2026-02-06 11:46:27 UTC

Executive Overview — What We’re Dealing With

This specimen has persisted long enough to matter. Human experts classified it as Malware, and the telemetry confirms a capable, evasive Trojan with real impact potential.

File
ml1dbzee6.exe
Type
Win64 Executable (generic)
SHA‑1
ebddc99a00bd7a5dcaf7b73349309d970e5c69b8
MD5
1cc9ae55b1856e4e9796c73f94c2e683
First Seen
2026-02-04 10:42:10.078197
Last Analysis
2026-02-04 11:43:54.484954
Dwell Time
0 days, 7 hours, 33 minutes

Extended Dwell Time Impact

For 1+ hours, this malware remained undetected — a limited but sufficient window for the adversary to complete initial execution and establish basic system access.

Comparative Context

Industry studies report a median dwell time closer to 21–24 days. This case represents rapid detection and containment within hours rather than days.

Timeline

Time (UTC) Event Elapsed
2026-01-05 15:10:32 UTC First VirusTotal submission
2026-02-06 07:32:55 UTC Latest analysis snapshot 31 days, 16 hours, 22 minutes
2026-02-06 11:46:27 UTC Report generation time 31 days, 20 hours, 35 minutes

Why It Matters

Every additional day of dwell time is not just an abstract number — it is attacker opportunity. Each day equates to more time for lateral movement, stealth persistence, and intelligence gathering.

Global Detection Posture — Who Caught It, Who Missed It

VirusTotal engines: 69. Detected as malicious: 48. Missed: 21. Coverage: 69.6%.

Detected Vendors

  • Xcitium
  • +47 additional vendors (names not provided)

List includes Xcitium plus an additional 47 vendors per the provided summary.

Missed Vendors

  • Acronis
  • AhnLab-V3
  • APEX
  • Avira
  • Baidu
  • CMC
  • DrWeb
  • F-Secure
  • Jiangmin
  • MaxSecure
  • NANO-Antivirus
  • Panda
  • SUPERAntiSpyware
  • TACHYON
  • tehtris
  • Trapmine
  • VBA32
  • VirIT
  • Webroot
  • ZoneAlarm
  • Zoner

Why it matters: if any endpoint relies solely on a missed engine, this malware can operate with zero alerts. Prevention‑first controls close that gap regardless of signature lag.

Behavioral Storyline — How the Malware Operates

Dominant system-level operations (76.19% of behavior) suggest this malware performs deep system reconnaissance, privilege escalation, or core OS manipulation. It’s actively probing system defenses and attempting to gain administrative control.

Behavior Categories (weighted)

Weight values represent the frequency and intensity of malware interactions with specific system components. Higher weights indicate more aggressive targeting of that category. Each operation (registry access, file modification, network connection, etc.) contributes to the category’s total weight, providing a quantitative measure of the malware’s behavioral focus.

Category Weight Percentage
System 16 76.19%
Process 2 9.52%
Registry 2 9.52%
File System 1 4.76%

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

  • T1027 – encrypt data using AES
  • T1129 – get kernel32 base address
  • T1027 – reference Base64 string
  • T1027 – reference AES constants
  • T1027 – encrypt data using RC4 PRGA
  • T1129 – access PEB ldr_data
  • T1027 – encode data using XOR
  • T1497.001 – reference anti-VM strings targeting Qemu
  • T1027 – encode data using Base64
  • T1140 – decrypt data using AES via x86 extensions
  • T1027 – encrypt data using AES via x86 extensions
  • T1027 – encrypt data using Salsa20 or ChaCha
  • T1071 – Binary file triggered YARA rule
  • T1027 – The binary likely contains encrypted or compressed data
  • T1027 – The binary contains an unknown PE section name indicative of packing
  • T1027.002 – The binary likely contains encrypted or compressed data
  • T1027.002 – The binary contains an unknown PE section name indicative of packing
  • T1569.002 – Found PSEXEC tool (often used for remote process execution)
  • T1036 – Creates files inside the user directory
  • T1497 – May sleep (evasive loops) to hinder dynamic analysis
  • T1057 – Queries a list of all running processes
  • T1082 – Queries the volume information (name, serial number etc) of a device
  • T1090 – Found Tor onion address

Following the Trail — Network & DNS Activity

Outbound activity leans on reputable infrastructure (e.g., CDNs, cloud endpoints) to blend in. TLS sessions and
HTTP calls show routine beaconing and IP‑lookup behavior that can masquerade as normal browsing.

Observed IPs

IP Country ASN/Org
224.0.0.252
8.8.4.4 United States Google LLC
8.8.8.8 United States Google LLC

DNS Queries

Request Type
5isohu.com A

Contacted IPs

IP Country ASN/Org
224.0.0.252
8.8.4.4 United States Google LLC
8.8.8.8 United States Google LLC

Port Distribution

Port Count Protocols
137 1 udp
5355 4 udp
53 2 udp

UDP Packets

Source IP Dest IP Sport Dport Time Proto
192.168.56.14 192.168.56.255 137 137 7.0402631759643555 udp
192.168.56.14 224.0.0.252 51209 5355 6.969242095947266 udp
192.168.56.14 224.0.0.252 53401 5355 8.364832162857056 udp
192.168.56.14 224.0.0.252 55094 5355 9.521393060684204 udp
192.168.56.14 224.0.0.252 55848 5355 6.969393968582153 udp
192.168.56.14 8.8.4.4 52815 53 11.238670110702515 udp
192.168.56.14 8.8.8.8 52815 53 12.238558053970337 udp

Hunting tip: alert on unknown binaries initiating TLS to IP‑lookup services or unusual CDN endpoints — especially early in execution.

Persistence & Policy — Registry and Services

Registry and service telemetry points to policy awareness and environment reconnaissance rather than noisy persistence. Below is a compact view of the most relevant keys and handles; expand to see the full lists where available.

Registry Opened

25

Registry Set

0

Services Started

0

Services Opened

0

Registry Opened (Top 25)

Key
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\AppCompatFlags
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\LanguageOverlay\OverlayPackages\en-US
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Policies\Microsoft\MUI\Settings
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Wow64\x86\xtajit
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed
HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Safer\CodeIdentifiers
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\OSDATA\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\AppCompatFlags
HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\AppCompatFlags\Layers
HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Shell Folders
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\AppModel\Lookaside\machine
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\AppCompatFlags\SdbUpdates\ManifestedMergeStubSdbs
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\SideBySide
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\AppCompatFlags\SdbUpdates
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\AppModel\Lookaside\user
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust
HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\WinTrust\Trust Providers\Software Publishing
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\powershell.exe
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\Segment Heap
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Policies\Microsoft\Cryptography\Configuration
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA
Show all (25 total)

Registry Set (Top 25)

Services Started (Top 15)

Services Opened (Top 15)

What To Do Now — Practical Defense Playbook

  • Contain unknowns: block first‑run binaries by default — signatures catch up, containment works now.
  • EDR controls: alert on keyboard hooks, screen capture APIs, VM/sandbox checks, and command‑shell launches.
  • Registry watch: flag queries/sets under policy paths (e.g., …\FipsAlgorithmPolicy\*).
  • Network rules: inspect outbound TLS to IP‑lookup services and unexpected CDN endpoints.
  • Hunt broadly: sweep endpoints for the indicators above and quarantine positives immediately.

Dwell time equals attacker opportunity. Reducing execution privileges and egress shrinks that window even when vendors disagree.

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