Executive Overview — What We’re Dealing With

This specimen has persisted long enough to matter. Human experts classified it as Malware, and the telemetry confirms a capable, evasive Trojan with real impact potential.

Extended Dwell Time Impact

For 2+ hours, this malware remained undetected — a limited but sufficient window for the adversary to complete initial execution and establish basic system access.

Global Detection Posture — Who Caught It, Who Missed It

VirusTotal engines: 72. Detected as malicious: 54. Missed: 18. Coverage: 75.0%.

Why it matters: if any endpoint relies solely on a missed engine, this malware can operate with zero alerts. Prevention‑first controls close that gap regardless of signature lag.

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

• T1027 – reference Base64 string
• T1027 – encrypt data using RC4 PRGA
• T1027 – reference AES constants
• T1027 – encode data using XOR
• T1027 – encrypt data using AES
• T1027 – encrypt data using Salsa20 or ChaCha
• T1129 – access PEB ldr_data
• T1027 – encode data using Base64
• T1027 – encrypt data using AES via x86 extensions
• T1129 – get kernel32 base address
• T1071 – Adversaries may communicate using application layer protocols to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic.
• T1055 – Adversaries may inject code into processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges.
• T1027 – Adversaries may attempt to make an executable or file difficult to discover or analyze by encrypting, encoding, or otherwise obfuscating its contents on the system or in transit.
• T1027.002 – Adversaries may perform software packing or virtual machine software protection to conceal their code.
• T1486 – Adversaries may encrypt data on target systems or on large numbers of systems in a network to interrupt availability to system and network resources.
• T1005 – (Process #1) en.exe tries to read sensitive data of web browser “Internet Explorer / Edge” by file.
• T1006 – (Process #1) en.exe searches for available drives.
• T1036 – (Process #1) en.exe changes the appearance of folder “C:\Users\Public”.
• T1045 – (Process #1) en.exe resolves 28 API functions by name.
• T1081 – (Process #1) en.exe tries to read sensitive data of web browser “Internet Explorer / Edge” by file.
• T1083 – (Process #1) en.exe tries to read sensitive data of web browser “Internet Explorer / Edge” by file.
• T1119 – (Process #1) en.exe tries to read sensitive data of web browser “Internet Explorer / Edge” by file.
• T1486 – Renames 80 files by appending the extension “.nspire”.
• T1059 – Sample might require command line arguments, analyze it with the command line cookbook
• T1059 – Sample may offer command line options, please run it with the command line option cookbook (it’s possible that the command line switches require additional characters like)
• T1574.002 – Tries to load missing DLLs
• T1036 – Creates files inside the user directory
• T1518.001 – May try to detect the virtual machine to hinder analysis (VM artifact strings found in memory)
• T1082 – Queries the volume information (name, serial number etc) of a device
• T1082 – Reads software policies
• T1095 – Performs DNS lookups
• T1071 – Performs DNS lookups
• T1090 – Found Tor onion address
• T1486 – Writes a notice file (html or txt) to demand a ransom

Following the Trail — Network & DNS Activity

Outbound activity leans on reputable infrastructure (e.g., CDNs, cloud endpoints) to blend in. TLS sessions and
HTTP calls show routine beaconing and IP‑lookup behavior that can masquerade as normal browsing.

Hunting tip: alert on unknown binaries initiating TLS to IP‑lookup services or unusual CDN endpoints — especially early in execution.