Zero‑Dwell Threat Intelligence Report
A narrative, executive‑ready view into the malware’s behavior, exposure, and reliable defenses.
Generated: 2026-02-19 10:34:02 UTC
Executive Overview — What We’re Dealing With
This specimen has persisted long enough to matter. Human experts classified it as Malware, and the telemetry confirms a capable, evasive Trojan with real impact potential.
File
072147d034e6db2db9f81bc9b74e0e59b79a1ee6
Type
Win64 Executable (generic)
SHA‑1
072147d034e6db2db9f81bc9b74e0e59b79a1ee6
MD5
2bf543faf679a374af5fc4848eea5a98
First Seen
2025-06-30 11:38:45.084302
Last Analysis
2025-06-30 18:08:38.624386
Dwell Time
0 days, 7 hours, 33 minutes
Extended Dwell Time Impact
For 6+ hours, this malware remained undetected — a several-hour window that allowed the adversary to complete initial compromise and begin early-stage persistence establishment.
Comparative Context
Industry studies report a median dwell time closer to 21–24 days. This case represents rapid detection and containment within hours rather than days.
Timeline
| Time (UTC) | Event | Elapsed |
|---|---|---|
| 2025-05-18 13:14:56 UTC | First VirusTotal submission | — |
| 2026-02-06 09:02:08 UTC | Latest analysis snapshot | 263 days, 19 hours, 47 minutes |
| 2026-02-19 10:34:02 UTC | Report generation time | 276 days, 21 hours, 19 minutes |
Why It Matters
Every additional day of dwell time is not just an abstract number — it is attacker opportunity. Each day equates to more time for lateral movement, stealth persistence, and intelligence gathering.
Global Detection Posture — Who Caught It, Who Missed It
VirusTotal engines: 73. Detected as malicious: 57. Missed: 16. Coverage: 78.1%.
Detected Vendors
- Xcitium
- +56 additional vendors (names not provided)
List includes Xcitium plus an additional 56 vendors per the provided summary.
Missed Vendors
- Acronis
- APEX
- Baidu
- ClamAV
- CMC
- google_safebrowsing
- Gridinsoft
- Jiangmin
- Sangfor
- SentinelOne
- SUPERAntiSpyware
- tehtris
- Trapmine
- Webroot
- Yandex
- Zoner
Why it matters: if any endpoint relies solely on a missed engine, this malware can operate with zero alerts. Prevention‑first controls close that gap regardless of signature lag.
MITRE ATT&CK Mapping
- T1129 – access PEB ldr_data
- T1027 – encode data using Base64
- T1027 – encode data using XOR
- T1140 – decrypt data using AES via x86 extensions
- T1027 – encrypt data using AES via x86 extensions
- T1027 – encrypt data using RC4 PRGA
- T1027 – encrypt data using AES
- T1027 – reference AES constants
- T1027 – encrypt data using Salsa20 or ChaCha
- T1027 – reference Base64 string
- T1129 – get kernel32 base address
- T1071 – Adversaries may communicate using application layer protocols to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic.
- T1055 – Adversaries may inject code into processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges.
- T1070 – Adversaries may delete or modify artifacts generated within systems to remove evidence of their presence or hinder defenses.
- T1027 – Adversaries may attempt to make an executable or file difficult to discover or analyze by encrypting, encoding, or otherwise obfuscating its contents on the system or in transit.
- T1027.002 – Adversaries may perform software packing or virtual machine software protection to conceal their code.
- T1486 – Adversaries may encrypt data on target systems or on large numbers of systems in a network to interrupt availability to system and network resources.
- T1485 – Adversaries may destroy data and files on specific systems or in large numbers on a network to interrupt availability to systems, services, and network resources.
- T1045 – Manalize Local SandBox Packer Harvesting
- T1614 – Manalize Local SandBox Find Crypto
- T1057 – Manalize Local SandBox Find Crypto
- T1059 – Manalize Local SandBox Find Crypto
- T1134.004 – Manalize Local SandBox Find Crypto
- T1033 – Manalize Local SandBox Find Crypto
- T1518 – Manalize Local SandBox Find Crypto
- T1129 – Manalize Local SandBox Find Crypto
- T1497.001 – Manalize Local SandBox Find Crypto
- T1012 – Manalize Local SandBox Find Crypto
- T1082 – Manalize Local SandBox Find Crypto
- T1134 – Manalize Local SandBox Find Crypto
- T1083 – Manalize Local SandBox Find Crypto
- T1027 – Manalize Local SandBox Find Crypto
- T1614 – Manalize Local SandBox Strings
- T1057 – Manalize Local SandBox Strings
- T1059 – Manalize Local SandBox Strings
- T1134.004 – Manalize Local SandBox Strings
- T1033 – Manalize Local SandBox Strings
- T1518 – Manalize Local SandBox Strings
- T1129 – Manalize Local SandBox Strings
- T1497.001 – Manalize Local SandBox Strings
- T1012 – Manalize Local SandBox Strings
- T1082 – Manalize Local SandBox Strings
- T1134 – Manalize Local SandBox Strings
- T1083 – Manalize Local SandBox Strings
- T1027 – Manalize Local SandBox Strings
- T1614 – The file contains some common ransomware-related keywords.
- T1057 – The file contains some common ransomware-related keywords.
- T1059 – The file contains some common ransomware-related keywords.
- T1134.004 – The file contains some common ransomware-related keywords.
- T1033 – The file contains some common ransomware-related keywords.
- T1518 – The file contains some common ransomware-related keywords.
- T1129 – The file contains some common ransomware-related keywords.
- T1497.001 – The file contains some common ransomware-related keywords.
- T1012 – The file contains some common ransomware-related keywords.
- T1082 – The file contains some common ransomware-related keywords.
- T1134 – The file contains some common ransomware-related keywords.
- T1083 – The file contains some common ransomware-related keywords.
- T1027 – The file contains some common ransomware-related keywords.
- T1059 – Sample might require command line arguments, analyze it with the command line cookbook
- T1059 – Sample may offer command line options, please run it with the command line option cookbook (it’s possible that the command line switches require additional characters like)
- T1574.002 – Tries to load missing DLLs
- T1036 – Creates files inside the user directory
- T1036 – Drops executable to common a third party application directory
- T1027.002 – PE file has section (not .text) which is very likely to contain packed code (zlib compression ratio < 0.011)
- T1518.001 – May try to detect the virtual machine to hinder analysis (VM artifact strings found in memory)
- T1082 – Reads software policies
- T1082 – Queries the volume information (name, serial number etc) of a device
- T1080 – Infects executable files (exe, dll, sys, html)
- T1090 – Found Tor onion address
Following the Trail — Network & DNS Activity
Outbound activity leans on reputable infrastructure (e.g., CDNs, cloud endpoints) to blend in. TLS sessions and
HTTP calls show routine beaconing and IP‑lookup behavior that can masquerade as normal browsing.
Hunting tip: alert on unknown binaries initiating TLS to IP‑lookup services or unusual CDN endpoints — especially early in execution.
Persistence & Policy — Registry and Services
Registry and service telemetry points to policy awareness and environment reconnaissance rather than noisy persistence. Below is a compact view of the most relevant keys and handles; expand to see the full lists where available.
Registry Opened
13
Registry Set
0
Services Started
0
Services Opened
0
Registry Opened (Top 25)
| Key |
|---|
| HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\AppCompatFlags |
| HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\Segment Heap |
| HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\AppModel\Lookaside\machine |
| HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\AppCompatFlags\SdbUpdates\ManifestedMergeStubSdbs |
| HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Policies\Microsoft\MUI\Settings |
| HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\AppCompatFlags\SdbUpdates |
| HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Policies\Microsoft\Cryptography\Configuration |
| HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\LanguageOverlay\OverlayPackages\en-US |
| HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Shell Folders |
| HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\AppModel\Lookaside\user |
| HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Safer\CodeIdentifiers |
| HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager |
| HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\OSDATA\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\AppCompatFlags |
Show all (13 total)
Registry Set (Top 25)
Services Started (Top 15)
Services Opened (Top 15)
What To Do Now — Practical Defense Playbook
- Contain unknowns: block first‑run binaries by default — signatures catch up, containment works now.
- EDR controls: alert on keyboard hooks, screen capture APIs, VM/sandbox checks, and command‑shell launches.
- Registry watch: flag queries/sets under policy paths (e.g., …\FipsAlgorithmPolicy\*).
- Network rules: inspect outbound TLS to IP‑lookup services and unexpected CDN endpoints.
- Hunt broadly: sweep endpoints for the indicators above and quarantine positives immediately.
Dwell time equals attacker opportunity. Reducing execution privileges and egress shrinks that window even when vendors disagree.