Executive Overview — What We’re Dealing With

This specimen has persisted long enough to matter. Human experts classified it as Malware, and the telemetry confirms a capable, evasive Trojan with real impact potential.

Extended Dwell Time Impact

For 39+ minutes, this malware was rapidly detected — demonstrating excellent security controls that intercepted the threat during initial execution phases, severely limiting adversary capabilities.

Global Detection Posture — Who Caught It, Who Missed It

VirusTotal engines: 70. Detected as malicious: 48. Missed: 22. Coverage: 68.6%.

Why it matters: if any endpoint relies solely on a missed engine, this malware can operate with zero alerts. Prevention‑first controls close that gap regardless of signature lag.

Behavioral Storyline — How the Malware Operates

Dominant system-level operations (43.37% of behavior) suggest this malware performs deep system reconnaissance, privilege escalation, or core OS manipulation. It’s actively probing system defenses and attempting to gain administrative control.

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

• T1016 – get local IPv4 addresses
• T1057 – enumerate processes
• T1518 – enumerate processes
• T1129 – link function at runtime on Windows
• T1082 – query environment variable
• T1083 – get common file path
• T1497.001 – check for Windows sandbox via dns suffix
• T1082 – get disk size
• T1027 – encode data using XOR
• T1082 – get system information on Windows
• T1497.001 – check for Windows sandbox via device
• T1497.001 – check for Windows sandbox via process name
• T1129 – access PEB ldr_data
• T1083 – enumerate files on Windows
• T1033 – get session user name
• T1087 – get session user name
• T1027 – The binary contains an unknown PE section name indicative of packing
• T1027.002 – The binary contains an unknown PE section name indicative of packing
• T1129 – The process tried to load dynamically one or more functions.
• T1045 – Manalize Local SandBox Packer Harvesting
• T1063 – It Tries to detect injection methods
• T1218.011 – Runs a DLL by calling functions

Following the Trail — Network & DNS Activity

Outbound activity leans on reputable infrastructure (e.g., CDNs, cloud endpoints) to blend in. TLS sessions and
HTTP calls show routine beaconing and IP‑lookup behavior that can masquerade as normal browsing.

Hunting tip: alert on unknown binaries initiating TLS to IP‑lookup services or unusual CDN endpoints — especially early in execution.