Executive Overview — What We’re Dealing With

This specimen has persisted long enough to matter. Human experts classified it as Malware, and the telemetry confirms a capable, evasive Trojan with real impact potential.

Extended Dwell Time Impact

For 883+ days, this malware remained undetected — an extremely prolonged compromise that provided the adversary extensive opportunity for advanced persistent operations, comprehensive data harvesting, lateral movement across network segments, and sophisticated evasion technique deployment.

Global Detection Posture — Who Caught It, Who Missed It

VirusTotal engines: 69. Detected as malicious: 52. Missed: 17. Coverage: 75.4%.

Why it matters: if any endpoint relies solely on a missed engine, this malware can operate with zero alerts. Prevention‑first controls close that gap regardless of signature lag.

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

• T1082 – check OS version
• T1129 – access PEB ldr_data
• T1027 – encode data using Base64
• T1129 – get kernel32 base address
• T1027 – encrypt data using AES
• T1027 – encrypt data using AES via x86 extensions
• T1027 – reference AES constants
• T1027 – encode data using XOR
• T1027 – encode data using ADD XOR SUB operations
• T1140 – decrypt data using AES via x86 extensions
• T1027 – encrypt data using Salsa20 or ChaCha
• T1497.001 – reference anti-VM strings targeting Xen
• T1027 – encrypt data using DES
• T1027 – encrypt data using RC4 PRGA
• T1027 – reference Base64 string
• T1564 – Adversaries may attempt to hide artifacts associated with their behaviors to evade detection.
• T1202 – Adversaries may abuse utilities that allow for command execution to bypass security restrictions that limit the use of command-line interpreters.
• T1564.004 – Adversaries may use NTFS file attributes to hide their malicious data in order to evade detection.
• T1096 – Every New Technology File System (NTFS) formatted partition contains a Master File Table (MFT) that maintains a record for every file/directory on the partition.
• T1071 – Adversaries may communicate using application layer protocols to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic.
• T1071.001 – Adversaries may communicate using application layer protocols associated with web traffic to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic.
• T1074 – Adversaries may stage collected data in a central location or directory prior to Exfiltration.
• T1485 – Adversaries may destroy data and files on specific systems or in large numbers on a network to interrupt availability to systems, services, and network resources.
• T1140 – Detected an attempt to pull out some data from the binary image
• T1129 – The process tried to load dynamically one or more functions.
• T1045 – Manalize Local SandBox Packer Harvesting
• T1059 – Sample may offer command line options, please run it with the command line option cookbook (it’s possible that the command line switches require additional characters like)
• T1059 – Sample might require command line arguments, analyze it with the command line cookbook
• T1569.002 – Uses sc.exe to modify the status of services
• T1543.003 – Uses sc.exe to modify the status of services
• T1547.001 – Creates a start menu entry (Start Menu\\Programs\\Startup)
• T1547.001 – Stores files to the Windows startup directory
• T1547.001 – Drops PE files to the startup folder (C:\\Documents and Settings\\All Users\\Start Menu\\Programs\\Startup)
• T1036 – Creates a directory in C:\Program Files
• T1036 – Creates files inside the user directory
• T1036 – Creates files inside the program directory
• T1564.001 – Creates files in the recycle bin to hide itself
• T1027.002 – PE file has section (not .text) which is very likely to contain packed code (zlib compression ratio < 0.011)
• T1518.001 – May try to detect the virtual machine to hinder analysis (VM artifact strings found in memory)
• T1010 – Sample monitors Window changes (e.g. starting applications), analyze the sample with the simulation cookbook
• T1083 – Reads ini files
• T1083 – Enumerates the file system
• T1082 – Reads software policies
• T1082 – Queries the volume information (name, serial number etc) of a device
• T1095 – Posts data to webserver
• T1071 – Posts data to webserver
• T1090 – Found Tor onion address

Following the Trail — Network & DNS Activity

Outbound activity leans on reputable infrastructure (e.g., CDNs, cloud endpoints) to blend in. TLS sessions and
HTTP calls show routine beaconing and IP‑lookup behavior that can masquerade as normal browsing.

Hunting tip: alert on unknown binaries initiating TLS to IP‑lookup services or unusual CDN endpoints — especially early in execution.