cbdb8ca88593d7c27355c140a43a66b5052c0291


Zero‑Dwell Threat Intelligence Report

A narrative, executive‑ready view into the malware’s behavior, exposure, and reliable defenses.
Generated: 2025-09-09 10:40:39 UTC

Executive Overview — What We’re Dealing With

This specimen has persisted long enough to matter. Human experts classified it as Malware, and the telemetry confirms a capable, evasive Trojan with real impact potential.

File
Request.exe
Type
Win32 EXE
SHA‑1
cbdb8ca88593d7c27355c140a43a66b5052c0291
MD5
3801824965b6c4a5a1d0b0ad57dcec43
First Seen
2025-09-05 07:14:33.222860
Last Analysis
2025-09-05 10:02:35.901357
Dwell Time
0 days, 2 hours, 48 minutes

Extended Dwell Time Impact

For 2+ hours, this malware remained undetected — a limited but sufficient window for the adversary to complete initial execution and establish basic system access.

Comparative Context

Industry studies report a median dwell time closer to 21–24 days. This case represents rapid detection and containment within hours rather than days.

Timeline

Time (UTC) Event Elapsed
2025-09-04 07:07:58 UTC First VirusTotal submission
2025-09-09 07:40:47 UTC Latest analysis snapshot 5 days, 0 hours, 32 minutes
2025-09-09 10:40:39 UTC Report generation time 5 days, 3 hours, 32 minutes

Why It Matters

Every additional day of dwell time is not just an abstract number — it is attacker opportunity. Each day equates to more time for lateral movement, stealth persistence, and intelligence gathering.

Global Detection Posture — Who Caught It, Who Missed It

VirusTotal engines: 73. Detected as malicious: 59. Missed: 14. Coverage: 80.8%.

Detected Vendors

  • Xcitium
  • +58 additional vendors (names not provided)

List includes Xcitium plus an additional 58 vendors per the provided summary.

Missed Vendors

  • Acronis
  • Antiy-AVL
  • Baidu
  • ClamAV
  • CMC
  • Jiangmin
  • SentinelOne
  • SUPERAntiSpyware
  • TACHYON
  • tehtris
  • Trapmine
  • Webroot
  • Zillya
  • Zoner

Why it matters: if any endpoint relies solely on a missed engine, this malware can operate with zero alerts. Prevention‑first controls close that gap regardless of signature lag.

Behavioral Storyline — How the Malware Operates

Dominant system-level operations (52.86% of behavior) suggest this malware performs deep system reconnaissance, privilege escalation, or core OS manipulation. It’s actively probing system defenses and attempting to gain administrative control.

Behavior Categories (weighted)

Weight values represent the frequency and intensity of malware interactions with specific system components. Higher weights indicate more aggressive targeting of that category. Each operation (registry access, file modification, network connection, etc.) contributes to the category’s total weight, providing a quantitative measure of the malware’s behavioral focus.

Category Weight Percentage
System 231 52.86%
File System 151 34.55%
Registry 22 5.03%
Process 17 3.89%
Windows 5 1.14%
Misc 3 0.69%
Synchronization 3 0.69%
Threading 2 0.46%
Device 2 0.46%
Hooking 1 0.23%

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

  • T1082 – get system information on Windows
  • T1082 – get memory capacity
  • T1547.009 – create shortcut via IShellLink
  • T1083 – check if file exists
  • T1129 – link function at runtime on Windows
  • T1033 – get token membership
  • T1082 – query environment variable
  • T1105 – download and write a file
  • T1115 – open clipboard
  • T1083 – get file version info
  • T1083 – get common file path
  • T1083 – enumerate files recursively
  • T1056.001 – log keystrokes
  • T1083 – get file size
  • T1134 – modify access privileges
  • T1134 – acquire debug privileges
  • T1082 – get disk size
  • T1222 – set file attributes
  • T1059 – compiled with AutoIt
  • T1083 – enumerate files on Windows
  • T1012 – query or enumerate registry value
  • T1112 – delete registry key
  • T1012 – query or enumerate registry key
  • T1016 – get socket status
  • T1010 – enumerate gui resources
  • T1134.001 – impersonate user
  • T1529 – shutdown system
  • T1056.001 – log keystrokes via polling
  • T1564.003 – hide graphical window
  • T1497.002 – check for unmoving mouse cursor
  • T1082 – get hostname
  • T1010 – find graphical window
  • T1115 – list drag and drop files
  • T1082 – get COMSPEC environment variable
  • T1033 – get session user name
  • T1087 – get session user name
  • T1129 – parse PE header
  • T1027 – encode data using XOR
  • T1113 – capture screenshot
  • T1614.001 – get keyboard layout
  • T1082 – get disk information
  • T1115 – read clipboard data
  • T1057 – enumerate processes
  • T1518 – enumerate processes
  • T1112 – delete registry value
  • T1027 – encode data using Base64
  • T1071 – Reads from the memory of another process
  • T1071 – Yara detections observed in process dumps, payloads or dropped files
  • T1071 – Binary file triggered YARA rule
  • T1027 – The binary likely contains encrypted or compressed data
  • T1027.002 – The binary likely contains encrypted or compressed data
  • T1129 – The process attempted to dynamically load a malicious function
  • T1129 – The process tried to load dynamically one or more functions.
  • T1564.003 – Detected the creation of a hidden window (common execution hiding technique)
  • T1071 – Detected HTTP requests to some non white-listed domains
  • T1057 – The process attempted to detect a running debugger using common APIs
  • T1063 – It Tries to detect injection methods

Following the Trail — Network & DNS Activity

Outbound activity leans on reputable infrastructure (e.g., CDNs, cloud endpoints) to blend in. TLS sessions and
HTTP calls show routine beaconing and IP‑lookup behavior that can masquerade as normal browsing.

Contacted Domains

Domain IP Country ASN/Org
www.aieov.com 76.223.54.146 United States Amazon.com, Inc.

Observed IPs

IP Country ASN/Org
224.0.0.252
8.8.4.4 United States Google LLC
8.8.8.8 United States Google LLC

DNS Queries

Request Type
5isohu.com A
www.aieov.com A

Contacted IPs

IP Country ASN/Org
224.0.0.252
8.8.4.4 United States Google LLC
8.8.8.8 United States Google LLC

Port Distribution

Port Count Protocols
137 1 udp
5355 4 udp
53 4 udp

UDP Packets

Source IP Dest IP Sport Dport Time Proto
192.168.56.14 192.168.56.255 137 137 3.0781807899475098 udp
192.168.56.14 224.0.0.252 51209 5355 3.018996000289917 udp
192.168.56.14 224.0.0.252 53401 5355 4.755281925201416 udp
192.168.56.14 224.0.0.252 55094 5355 5.578859806060791 udp
192.168.56.14 224.0.0.252 55848 5355 3.0236477851867676 udp
192.168.56.14 8.8.4.4 52815 53 7.325187921524048 udp
192.168.56.14 8.8.4.4 65148 53 22.749995946884155 udp
192.168.56.14 8.8.8.8 52815 53 8.31279993057251 udp
192.168.56.14 8.8.8.8 65148 53 21.750322818756104 udp

Hunting tip: alert on unknown binaries initiating TLS to IP‑lookup services or unusual CDN endpoints — especially early in execution.

Persistence & Policy — Registry and Services

Registry and service telemetry points to policy awareness and environment reconnaissance rather than noisy persistence. Below is a compact view of the most relevant keys and handles; expand to see the full lists where available.

Registry Opened

14

Registry Set

0

Services Started

1

Services Opened

0

Registry Opened (Top 25)

Key
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\Lsa\FipsAlgorithmPolicy
HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Themes\Personalize\AppsUseLightTheme
HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Control Panel\Mouse\SwapMouseButtons
HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\AutoIt v3\AutoIt
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion
HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Themes\Personalize
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\Lsa\FipsAlgorithmPolicy\Enabled
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\GRE_Initialize\DisableMetaFiles
HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Control Panel\Mouse
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\Lsa\FipsAlgorithmPolicy\STE
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\WOW6432Node\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\ProgramFilesDir
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\Lsa\FipsAlgorithmPolicy\MDMEnabled
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\GRE_Initialize\DisableUmpdBufferSizeCheck
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\GRE_Initialize
Show all (14 total)

Registry Set (Top 25)

Services Started (Top 15)

Service
VaultSvc

Services Opened (Top 15)

What To Do Now — Practical Defense Playbook

  • Contain unknowns: block first‑run binaries by default — signatures catch up, containment works now.
  • EDR controls: alert on keyboard hooks, screen capture APIs, VM/sandbox checks, and command‑shell launches.
  • Registry watch: flag queries/sets under policy paths (e.g., …\FipsAlgorithmPolicy\*).
  • Network rules: inspect outbound TLS to IP‑lookup services and unexpected CDN endpoints.
  • Hunt broadly: sweep endpoints for the indicators above and quarantine positives immediately.

Dwell time equals attacker opportunity. Reducing execution privileges and egress shrinks that window even when vendors disagree.

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