Executive Overview — What We’re Dealing With

This specimen has persisted long enough to matter. Human experts classified it as Malware, and the telemetry confirms a capable, evasive Trojan with real impact potential.

Extended Dwell Time Impact

For 2+ hours, this malware remained undetected — a limited but sufficient window for the adversary to complete initial execution and establish basic system access.

Global Detection Posture — Who Caught It, Who Missed It

VirusTotal engines: 73. Detected as malicious: 59. Missed: 14. Coverage: 80.8%.

Why it matters: if any endpoint relies solely on a missed engine, this malware can operate with zero alerts. Prevention‑first controls close that gap regardless of signature lag.

Behavioral Storyline — How the Malware Operates

This threat shows heavy registry manipulation (59.41% of total behavior), indicating persistent backdoor installation, configuration tampering, or system policy modification attempts. The malware likely establishes persistence mechanisms and modifies security settings to maintain long-term access.

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

• T1047 – access WMI data in .NET
• T1083 – get common file path
• T1082 – get OS version in .NET
• T1620 – invoke .NET assembly method
• T1140 – decode data using Base64 in .NET
• T1056.001 – log keystrokes
• T1033 – get session user name
• T1087 – get session user name
• T1012 – query or enumerate registry key
• T1056.001 – log keystrokes via polling
• T1547.009 – persist via lnk shortcut
• T1012 – query or enumerate registry value
• T1620 – load .NET assembly
• T1083 – check if file exists
• T1112 – delete registry value
• T1082 – get number of processors
• T1082 – query environment variable
• T1057 – find process by PID
• T1057 – enumerate processes
• T1518 – enumerate processes
• T1547.001 – persist via Run registry key
• T1113 – capture screenshot
• T1070.004 – self delete
• T1082 – get hostname
• T1560.002 – compress data using GZip in .NET
• T1082 – get disk size
• T1614.001 – get keyboard layout
• T1033 – get session integrity level
• T1033 – Collects and encrypts information about the computer likely to send to C2 server
• T1082 – Checks available memory
• T1497 – Checks for mouse movement
• T1112 – Installs itself for autorun at Windows startup
• T1547 – Installs itself for autorun at Windows startup
• T1547.001 – Installs itself for autorun at Windows startup
• T1071 – Reads data out of its own binary image
• T1071 – Yara detections observed in process dumps, payloads or dropped files
• T1071 – At least one IP Address, Domain, or File Name was found in a crypto call
• T1071 – Binary file triggered YARA rule
• T1568 – Connects to a Dynamic DNS Domain
• T1106 – Guard pages use detected – possible anti-debugging.
• T1560 – Collects and encrypts information about the computer likely to send to C2 server
• T1056.001 – Monitors keyboard input
• T1056.004 – Monitors keyboard input
• T1057 – Enumerates running processes
• T1071.004 – Performs DNS request
• T1082 – Enumerates running processes
• T1095 – Connects to remote host
• T1112 – Installs system startup script or application
• T1134 – Enables process privileges
• T1547.001 – Installs system startup script or application
• T1568 – Performs DNS request for known DDNS domain
• T1571 – Tries to connect using an uncommon port

Following the Trail — Network & DNS Activity

Outbound activity leans on reputable infrastructure (e.g., CDNs, cloud endpoints) to blend in. TLS sessions and
HTTP calls show routine beaconing and IP‑lookup behavior that can masquerade as normal browsing.

Hunting tip: alert on unknown binaries initiating TLS to IP‑lookup services or unusual CDN endpoints — especially early in execution.