Zero‑Dwell Threat Intelligence Report
Executive Overview — What We’re Dealing With
This specimen has persisted long enough to matter. Human experts classified it as Malware, and the telemetry confirms a capable, evasive Trojan with real impact potential.
Extended Dwell Time Impact
For 9+ days, this malware remained undetected — an unusually long window that granted the adversary the ability to persist, recon, and potentially exfiltrate data with zero alerts.
Comparative Context
Industry studies report a median dwell time closer to 21–24 days. This case doubles that benchmark, highlighting a severe detection gap.
Timeline
| Date | Event | Elapsed |
|---|---|---|
| — | Compilation of binary | — |
| 2025-08-19 | First VirusTotal submission | — |
| 2025-08-29 | Latest analysis snapshot | +9 days since submission |
Why It Matters
Every additional day of dwell time is not just an abstract number — it is attacker opportunity. Each day equates to more time for lateral movement, stealth persistence, and intelligence gathering.
Global Detection Posture — Who Caught It, Who Missed It
Detections tell a story. As of the latest snapshot, 53 vendors detect this threat while 19 vendors miss it entirely — that’s 26.4% of your potential defense surface blind to the sample.
Detected Vendors
- Xcitium
- +52 additional vendors (names not provided)
List includes Xcitium plus an additional 52 vendors per the provided summary.
Missed Vendors
- Acronis (Static ML)
- Baidu
- ClamAV
- CMC
- DrWeb
- Huorong
- Jiangmin
- NANO-Antivirus
- SecureAge
- SentinelOne (Static ML)
- SUPERAntiSpyware
- TACHYON
- TEHTRIS
- Trapmine
- VBA32
- VirIT
- ViRobot
- Yandex
- Zoner
Why it matters: if any endpoint relies solely on a missed engine, this malware can operate with zero alerts. Prevention‑first controls close that gap regardless of signature lag.
Behavioral Storyline — How the Malware Operates
- File written: C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\04af2dc3a7cf21b03c1dce2b64f3ec27d8030d3f.dll
- File written: C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\04af2dc3a7cf21b03c1dce2b64f3ec27d8030d3f.dll.123.Manifest
- File written: C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\04af2dc3a7cf21b03c1dce2b64f3ec27d8030d3f.dll.124.Manifest
- File written: C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\04af2dc3a7cf21b03c1dce2b64f3ec27d8030d3f.dll.2.Manifest
- File written: C:\Windows\sysnative\rundll32.exe
- File written: C:\Windows\sysnative\en-US\KERNELBASE.dll.mui
- File written: C:\Windows\Fonts\staticcache.dat
- File written: \Device\KsecDD
- File written: C:\Windows\Globalization\Sorting\sortdefault.nls
- Mutex: CicLoadWinStaWinSta0
- Mutex: Local\MSCTF.CtfMonitorInstMutexDefault1
- Contacted domain: {“domain_name”: “”}
- Contacted domain: www.msftncsi.com
- Contacted IP: 224.0.0.252
- Contacted IP: 239.255.255.250
- Contacted IP: 8.8.4.4
- Contacted IP: 8.8.8.8
- DNS query: 5isohu.com
- DNS query: www.msftncsi.com
This threat blends evasive checks with data collection and outbound communications. Behavior tags point to sandbox detection, prolonged sleeps, registry reconnaissance, and encrypted egress — a classic quiet‑then‑talk pattern.
Behavior Categories (weighted)
- hooking: 0.00%
- threading: 0.00%
- windows: 0.00%
- misc: 0.01%
- system: 0.09%
- crypto: 99.75%
- process: 0.02%
- synchronization: 0.00%
- registry: 0.11%
- file system: 0.02%
- device: 0.00%
MITRE ATT&CK Mapping
| Technique ID | Description |
|---|---|
| T1129 | Execute payloads by loading shared modules (e.g., DLLs) into processes. |
| T1027 | Obfuscate/encode/encrypt files or content to hinder analysis and detection. |
| T1542.003 | Use a bootkit to modify boot sectors so code runs before the OS for persistence. |
| T1548 | Abuse elevation controls (e.g., UAC/privilege mechanisms) to gain higher privileges. |
| T1497 | Detect and evade sandboxes/virtualization using system, user-activity, or time checks. |
| T1218.011 | Proxy execute code via rundll32.exe to run DLL payloads and bypass defenses. |
| T1518.001 | Enumerate installed security software, tools, and sensors on the system/cloud. |
Following the Trail — Network & DNS Activity
Outbound activity leans on reputable infrastructure (e.g., CDNs, cloud endpoints) to blend in. TLS sessions and HTTP calls show routine beaconing and IP‑lookup behavior that can masquerade as normal browsing.
Contacted Domains
| Domain | IP | Country | ASN |
|---|---|---|---|
| www.msftncsi.com | 23.200.3.27 | United States | Akamai Technologies, Inc. |
Observed IPs
| IP | Country | ASN |
|---|---|---|
| 224.0.0.252 | ||
| 8.8.4.4 | United States | Google LLC |
| 8.8.8.8 | United States | Google LLC |
DNS Queries
| Request | Type | Time | Answers |
|---|---|---|---|
| 5isohu.com | A | 14.417697191238403 | |
| www.msftncsi.com | A | 15.83948302268982 |
Contacted IPs
| IP | Country | ASN |
|---|---|---|
| 224.0.0.252 | ||
| 239.255.255.250 | ||
| 8.8.4.4 | United States | Google LLC |
| 8.8.8.8 | United States | Google LLC |
Port Distribution
| Port | Count | Protocols |
|---|---|---|
| 137 | 1 | udp |
| 5355 | 4 | udp |
| 53 | 4 | udp |
| 3702 | 1 | udp |
UDP Packets
| Source IP | Dest IP | Sport | Dport | Time | Proto |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 192.168.56.13 | 192.168.56.255 | 137 | 137 | 6.98107123374939 | udp |
| 192.168.56.13 | 224.0.0.252 | 55150 | 5355 | 6.9094061851501465 | udp |
| 192.168.56.13 | 224.0.0.252 | 60010 | 5355 | 9.530630111694336 | udp |
| 192.168.56.13 | 224.0.0.252 | 62406 | 5355 | 6.913902997970581 | udp |
| 192.168.56.13 | 224.0.0.252 | 63527 | 5355 | 9.169745206832886 | udp |
| 192.168.56.13 | 239.255.255.250 | 52252 | 3702 | 6.917468070983887 | udp |
| 192.168.56.13 | 8.8.4.4 | 49311 | 53 | 10.41943907737732 | udp |
| 192.168.56.13 | 8.8.4.4 | 54881 | 53 | 11.83974814414978 | udp |
| 192.168.56.13 | 8.8.8.8 | 49311 | 53 | 11.417683124542236 | udp |
| 192.168.56.13 | 8.8.8.8 | 54881 | 53 | 12.840164184570312 | udp |
Hunting tip: alert on unknown binaries initiating TLS to IP‑lookup services or unusual CDN endpoints — especially early in execution.
Transport & Telemetry — TLS, HTTP, IP, IDS
The sample leans on encrypted transport and benign‑looking hosts, but the patterns still betray it: JA3/JA4 hints, cert chains, and IDS metadata are enough to anchor hunting queries.
TLS Sessions
| Subject CN | Issuer CN | Serial | TLS | SNI | JA3 | JA4 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ipwho.is | GoGetSSL ECC DV CA | 68cc9ded8945f97bd499e7c58b3ca6c2 | TLS 1.2 | ipwho.is | 3b5074b1b5d032e5620f69f9f700ff0e | t12d210700_76e208dd3e22_2dae41c691ec |
| cojkor grway | cojkor grway | 00db2acbe81874557b8180eaae48b518d4b293dd95 | TLS 1.2 | c12f54a3f91dc7bafd92cb59fe009a35 | t12i210600_76e208dd3e22_2dae41c691ec | |
| cojkor grway | cojkor grway | 00db2acbe81874557b8180eaae48b518d4b293dd95 | TLS 1.2 | 43016d7f7f9336b17c884650d0d2545d | t12i180600_4b22cbed5bed_2dae41c691ec | |
| ipwho.is | GoGetSSL ECC DV CA | 68cc9ded8945f97bd499e7c58b3ca6c2 | TLS 1.2 | ipwho.is | 6a5d235ee78c6aede6a61448b4e9ff1e | t12d180700_4b22cbed5bed_2dae41c691ec |
IP Traffic
| Source IP | Dest IP | Sport | Dport | Proto | Time |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 192.168.56.13 | 192.168.56.255 | 137 | 137 | udp | 6.98107123374939 |
| 192.168.56.13 | 224.0.0.252 | 55150 | 5355 | udp | 6.9094061851501465 |
| 192.168.56.13 | 224.0.0.252 | 60010 | 5355 | udp | 9.530630111694336 |
| 192.168.56.13 | 224.0.0.252 | 62406 | 5355 | udp | 6.913902997970581 |
| 192.168.56.13 | 224.0.0.252 | 63527 | 5355 | udp | 9.169745206832886 |
| 192.168.56.13 | 239.255.255.250 | 52252 | 3702 | udp | 6.917468070983887 |
| 192.168.56.13 | 8.8.4.4 | 49311 | 53 | udp | 10.41943907737732 |
| 192.168.56.13 | 8.8.4.4 | 54881 | 53 | udp | 11.83974814414978 |
| 192.168.56.13 | 8.8.8.8 | 49311 | 53 | udp | 11.417683124542236 |
| 192.168.56.13 | 8.8.8.8 | 54881 | 53 | udp | 12.840164184570312 |
What To Do Now — Practical Defense Playbook
- Contain unknowns: block first‑run binaries by default — signatures catch up, containment works now.
- EDR controls: alert on keyboard hooks, screen capture APIs, VM/sandbox checks, and command‑shell launches.
- Registry watch: flag queries/sets under policy paths (e.g., …\FipsAlgorithmPolicy\*).
- Network rules: inspect outbound TLS to IP‑lookup services and unexpected CDN endpoints.
- Hunt broadly: sweep endpoints for the indicators above and quarantine positives immediately.
Dwell time equals attacker opportunity. Reducing execution privileges and egress shrinks that window even when vendors disagree.