Executive Overview — What We’re Dealing With

This specimen has persisted long enough to matter. Human experts classified it as Malware, and the telemetry confirms a capable, evasive Trojan with real impact potential.

Extended Dwell Time Impact

For 17+ hours, this malware remained undetected — a half-day window that permitted the adversary to complete initial execution, establish basic persistence, and perform initial system enumeration.

Global Detection Posture — Who Caught It, Who Missed It

VirusTotal engines: 73. Detected as malicious: 58. Missed: 15. Coverage: 79.5%.

Why it matters: if any endpoint relies solely on a missed engine, this malware can operate with zero alerts. Prevention‑first controls close that gap regardless of signature lag.

Behavioral Storyline — How the Malware Operates

Dominant system-level operations (48.44% of behavior) suggest this malware performs deep system reconnaissance, privilege escalation, or core OS manipulation. It’s actively probing system defenses and attempting to gain administrative control.

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

• T1129 – access PEB ldr_data
• T1614 – get geographical location
• T1082 – query environment variable
• T1129 – link function at runtime on Windows
• T1083 – get file size
• T1129 – parse PE header
• T1082 – get number of processors
• T1082 – check OS version
• T1083 – enumerate files on Windows
• T1562 – Tries to unhook or modify Windows functions monitored by CAPE
• T1055 – Writes to the memory another process
• T1055 – Writes an executable to the memory of another process
• T1055 – Contains .tls (Thread Local Storage) section
• T1562.001 – Tries to unhook or modify Windows functions monitored by CAPE
• T1027 – The binary likely contains encrypted or compressed data
• T1027.002 – The binary likely contains encrypted or compressed data
• T1082 – Checks available memory
• T1057 – Expresses interest in specific running processes
• T1057 – Enumerates running processes
• T1071 – Reads from the memory of another process
• T1071 – Reads data out of its own binary image
• T1071 – Attempts to connect to a dead IP:Port
• T1573 – Establishes an encrypted HTTPS connection
• T1016 – Queries a host’s domain name
• T1027.002 – Creates a page with write and execute permissions
• T1047 – Collects BIOS properties
• T1047 – Queries OS version via WMI
• T1047 – Collects hardware properties
• T1047 – Tries to detect the presence of antivirus software
• T1055 – Writes into the memory of another process
• T1055.012 – Process Hollowing
• T1057 – Enumerates running processes
• T1082 – Collects BIOS properties
• T1082 – Enumerates running processes
• T1082 – Queries OS version via WMI
• T1082 – Collects hardware properties
• T1115 – Captures clipboard data
• T1518.001 – Tries to detect the presence of antivirus software
• T1564.003 – Creates process with hidden window
• T1129 – The process tried to load dynamically one or more functions.
• T1140 – Detected an attempt to pull out some data from the binary image
• T1045 – Manalize Local SandBox Packer Harvesting
• T1063 – It Tries to detect injection methods
• T1047 – Queries BIOS Information (via WMI, Win32_Bios)
• T1055 – Injects a PE file into a foreign processes
• T1055 – Writes to foreign memory regions
• T1055 – Allocates memory in foreign processes
• T1497 – May sleep (evasive loops) to hinder dynamic analysis
• T1027 – Binary may include packed or crypted data
• T1027.002 – Binary may include packed or crypted data
• T1027.002 – PE file has section (not .text) which is very likely to contain packed code (zlib compression ratio < 0.011)
• T1057 – Queries a list of all running processes
• T1082 – Queries the volume information (name, serial number etc) of a device
• T1082 – Queries the cryptographic machine GUID
• T1082 – Queries BIOS Information (via WMI, Win32_Bios)
• T1005 – Tries to steal Crypto Currency Wallets
• T1005 – Found many strings related to Crypto-Wallets (likely being stolen)
• T1573 – Uses HTTPS
• T1071 – Uses HTTPS
• T1071 – C2 URLs / IPs found in malware configuration

Following the Trail — Network & DNS Activity

Outbound activity leans on reputable infrastructure (e.g., CDNs, cloud endpoints) to blend in. TLS sessions and
HTTP calls show routine beaconing and IP‑lookup behavior that can masquerade as normal browsing.

Hunting tip: alert on unknown binaries initiating TLS to IP‑lookup services or unusual CDN endpoints — especially early in execution.