46f4f179a270f78db855b9f958f0856ad365d5dc


Zero‑Dwell Threat Intelligence Report

A narrative, executive‑ready view into the malware’s behavior, exposure, and reliable defenses.
Generated: 2025-09-05 10:58:52 UTC

Executive Overview — What We’re Dealing With

This specimen has persisted long enough to matter. Human experts classified it as Malware, and the telemetry confirms a capable, evasive Trojan with real impact potential.

File
h0o2jz.exe
Type
MS-DOS executable, MZ for MS-DOS
SHA‑1
46f4f179a270f78db855b9f958f0856ad365d5dc
MD5
88d482f6b42f8d8a5f583b40662882dc
First Seen
2025-08-26 15:44:06.003624
Last Analysis
2025-08-26 17:08:06.535734
Dwell Time
0 days, 1 hours, 24 minutes

Extended Dwell Time Impact

For 1+ hours, this malware remained undetected — a limited but sufficient window for the adversary to complete initial execution and establish basic system access.

Comparative Context

Industry studies report a median dwell time closer to 21–24 days. This case represents rapid detection and containment within hours rather than days.

Timeline

Time (UTC) Event Elapsed
2025-08-19 18:07:59 UTC First VirusTotal submission
2025-08-29 09:07:55 UTC Latest analysis snapshot 9 days, 14 hours, 59 minutes
2025-09-05 10:58:52 UTC Report generation time 16 days, 16 hours, 50 minutes

Why It Matters

Every additional day of dwell time is not just an abstract number — it is attacker opportunity. Each day equates to more time for lateral movement, stealth persistence, and intelligence gathering.

Global Detection Posture — Who Caught It, Who Missed It

VirusTotal engines: 73. Detected as malicious: 69. Missed: 4. Coverage: 94.5%.

Detected Vendors

  • Xcitium
  • +68 additional vendors (names not provided)

List includes Xcitium plus an additional 68 vendors per the provided summary.

Missed Vendors

  • CMC
  • TACHYON
  • Webroot
  • Zoner

Why it matters: if any endpoint relies solely on a missed engine, this malware can operate with zero alerts. Prevention‑first controls close that gap regardless of signature lag.

Behavioral Storyline — How the Malware Operates

Extensive network activity (49.52% of behavior) points to data exfiltration, command-and-control communications, or lateral movement capabilities. This threat is designed for persistent communication with external infrastructure.

Behavior Categories (weighted)

Weight values represent the frequency and intensity of malware interactions with specific system components. Higher weights indicate more aggressive targeting of that category. Each operation (registry access, file modification, network connection, etc.) contributes to the category’s total weight, providing a quantitative measure of the malware’s behavioral focus.

Category Weight Percentage
Network 780 49.52%
System 750 47.62%
File System 18 1.14%
Registry 14 0.89%
Process 12 0.76%
Synchronization 1 0.06%

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

  • T1027.002 – packed with Mpress

Following the Trail — Network & DNS Activity

Outbound activity leans on reputable infrastructure (e.g., CDNs, cloud endpoints) to blend in. TLS sessions and
HTTP calls show routine beaconing and IP‑lookup behavior that can masquerade as normal browsing.

Contacted Domains

Domain IP Country ASN/Org
www.msftncsi.com 23.200.3.31 United States Akamai Technologies, Inc.
www.aieov.com 76.223.54.146 United States Amazon.com, Inc.

Observed IPs

IP Country ASN/Org
224.0.0.252
239.255.255.250
8.8.4.4 United States Google LLC
8.8.8.8 United States Google LLC

DNS Queries

Request Type
5isohu.com A
www.msftncsi.com A
www.aieov.com A

Contacted IPs

IP Country ASN/Org
224.0.0.252
239.255.255.250
8.8.4.4 United States Google LLC
8.8.8.8 United States Google LLC

Port Distribution

Port Count Protocols
137 1 udp
5355 5 udp
53 28 udp
3702 1 udp

UDP Packets

Source IP Dest IP Sport Dport Time Proto
192.168.56.13 192.168.56.255 137 137 3.244051933288574 udp
192.168.56.13 224.0.0.252 49311 5355 5.72878885269165 udp
192.168.56.13 224.0.0.252 55150 5355 3.173029899597168 udp
192.168.56.13 224.0.0.252 60010 5355 5.355119943618774 udp
192.168.56.13 224.0.0.252 62406 5355 3.1755030155181885 udp
192.168.56.13 224.0.0.252 63527 5355 3.9541189670562744 udp
192.168.56.13 239.255.255.250 52252 3702 3.181619882583618 udp
192.168.56.13 8.8.4.4 50554 53 145.60356998443604 udp
192.168.56.13 8.8.4.4 54879 53 7.978886842727661 udp
192.168.56.13 8.8.4.4 54881 53 6.745045900344849 udp
192.168.56.13 8.8.4.4 55551 53 174.5406289100647 udp
192.168.56.13 8.8.4.4 56197 53 159.97824096679688 udp
192.168.56.13 8.8.4.4 57310 53 65.69688391685486 udp
192.168.56.13 8.8.4.4 57415 53 80.16667985916138 udp
192.168.56.13 8.8.4.4 58697 53 22.18467402458191 udp
192.168.56.13 8.8.4.4 58920 53 98.47819304466248 udp
192.168.56.13 8.8.4.4 60910 53 112.86867904663086 udp
192.168.56.13 8.8.4.4 61004 53 192.88464784622192 udp
192.168.56.13 8.8.4.4 62493 53 51.291008949279785 udp
192.168.56.13 8.8.4.4 62849 53 36.58760690689087 udp
192.168.56.13 8.8.4.4 64801 53 127.30647587776184 udp
192.168.56.13 8.8.8.8 50554 53 144.60339283943176 udp
192.168.56.13 8.8.8.8 54879 53 8.978646993637085 udp
192.168.56.13 8.8.8.8 54881 53 7.743751049041748 udp
192.168.56.13 8.8.8.8 55551 53 173.54089999198914 udp
192.168.56.13 8.8.8.8 56197 53 158.97861289978027 udp
192.168.56.13 8.8.8.8 57310 53 64.69742488861084 udp
192.168.56.13 8.8.8.8 57415 53 79.16583800315857 udp
192.168.56.13 8.8.8.8 58697 53 21.181889057159424 udp
192.168.56.13 8.8.8.8 58920 53 97.47887301445007 udp
192.168.56.13 8.8.8.8 60910 53 111.87656283378601 udp
192.168.56.13 8.8.8.8 61004 53 191.88488602638245 udp
192.168.56.13 8.8.8.8 62493 53 50.290727853775024 udp
192.168.56.13 8.8.8.8 62849 53 35.58846092224121 udp
192.168.56.13 8.8.8.8 64801 53 126.30700993537903 udp

Hunting tip: alert on unknown binaries initiating TLS to IP‑lookup services or unusual CDN endpoints — especially early in execution.

What To Do Now — Practical Defense Playbook

  • Contain unknowns: block first‑run binaries by default — signatures catch up, containment works now.
  • EDR controls: alert on keyboard hooks, screen capture APIs, VM/sandbox checks, and command‑shell launches.
  • Registry watch: flag queries/sets under policy paths (e.g., …\FipsAlgorithmPolicy\*).
  • Network rules: inspect outbound TLS to IP‑lookup services and unexpected CDN endpoints.
  • Hunt broadly: sweep endpoints for the indicators above and quarantine positives immediately.

Dwell time equals attacker opportunity. Reducing execution privileges and egress shrinks that window even when vendors disagree.

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