Executive Overview — What We’re Dealing With

This specimen has persisted long enough to matter. Human experts classified it as Malware, and the telemetry confirms a capable, evasive Trojan with real impact potential.

Extended Dwell Time Impact

For 2+ hours, this malware remained undetected — a limited but sufficient window for the adversary to complete initial execution and establish basic system access.

Global Detection Posture — Who Caught It, Who Missed It

VirusTotal engines: 73. Detected as malicious: 53. Missed: 20. Coverage: 72.6%.

Why it matters: if any endpoint relies solely on a missed engine, this malware can operate with zero alerts. Prevention‑first controls close that gap regardless of signature lag.

Behavioral Storyline — How the Malware Operates

Dominant system-level operations (40.62% of behavior) suggest this malware performs deep system reconnaissance, privilege escalation, or core OS manipulation. It’s actively probing system defenses and attempting to gain administrative control.

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

• T1620 – invoke .NET assembly method
• T1027 – encode data using Base64
• T1560.002 – compress data using GZip in .NET
• T1620 – load .NET assembly
• T1057 – find process by PID
• T1112 – delete registry key
• T1056.001 – log keystrokes
• T1083 – check if file exists
• T1083 – get common file path
• T1047 – access WMI data in .NET
• T1614.001 – get keyboard layout
• T1140 – decode data using Base64 in .NET
• T1113 – capture screenshot
• T1056.001 – log keystrokes via application hook
• T1057 – enumerate processes
• T1518 – enumerate processes
• T1082 – get disk size
• T1082 – get OS version in .NET
• T1082 – get hostname
• T1082 – get number of processors
• T1056.001 – log keystrokes via polling
• T1012 – query or enumerate registry value
• T1033 – get session user name
• T1087 – get session user name
• T1033 – Collects and encrypts information about the computer likely to send to C2 server
• T1082 – Checks available memory
• T1071 – Reads from the memory of another process
• T1071 – DNS query to a paste site or service detected
• T1071 – At least one IP Address, Domain, or File Name was found in a crypto call
• T1573 – Establishes an encrypted HTTPS connection to a paste site
• T1573 – Establishes an encrypted HTTPS connection
• T1106 – Guard pages use detected – possible anti-debugging.
• T1560 – Collects and encrypts information about the computer likely to send to C2 server
• T1129 – The process attempted to dynamically load a malicious function
• T1057 – The process has tried to detect the debugger probing the use of page guards.
• T1129 – The process tried to load dynamically one or more functions.
• T1071 – Some process has originated direct HTTPS traffic with one or more hosts.
• T1057 – The process attempted to detect a running debugger using common APIs
• T1056 – The process behaves as a keylogger (keyboard capturing detected)
• T1179 – The process behaves as a keylogger (keyboard capturing detected)
• T1082 – Queries for the computername
• T1012 – The process tried to collect informations about the system reading some known registry keys
• T1082 – The process tried to collect informations about the system reading some known registry keys
• T1047 – Checks if Antivirus program is installed (via WMI)
• T1047 – Queries sensitive video device information (via WMI, Win32_VideoController, often done to detect virtual machines)
• T1055 – May try to detect the Windows Explorer process (often used for injection)
• T1562.001 – Creates guard pages, often used to prevent reverse engineering and debugging
• T1497 – Allocates memory with a write watch (potentially for evading sandboxes)
• T1497 – May sleep (evasive loops) to hinder dynamic analysis
• T1497 – Queries sensitive video device information (via WMI, Win32_VideoController, often done to detect virtual machines)
• T1140 – .NET source code contains calls to encryption/decryption functions
• T1518.001 – Checks if Antivirus program is installed (via WMI)
• T1518.001 – Queries sensitive video device information (via WMI, Win32_VideoController, often done to detect virtual machines)
• T1057 – Queries a list of all running processes
• T1057 – May try to detect the Windows Explorer process (often used for injection)
• T1082 – Queries the cryptographic machine GUID
• T1082 – Queries the volume information (name, serial number etc) of a device
• T1082 – Checks the free space of harddrives
• T1560 – .NET source code contains calls to encryption/decryption functions
• T1102 – Connects to a pastebin service (like for C&C)
• T1573 – Uses HTTPS
• T1571 – Detected TCP or UDP traffic on non-standard ports
• T1071 – C2 URLs / IPs found in malware configuration
• T1071 – Uses HTTPS

Following the Trail — Network & DNS Activity

Outbound activity leans on reputable infrastructure (e.g., CDNs, cloud endpoints) to blend in. TLS sessions and
HTTP calls show routine beaconing and IP‑lookup behavior that can masquerade as normal browsing.

Hunting tip: alert on unknown binaries initiating TLS to IP‑lookup services or unusual CDN endpoints — especially early in execution.