528cc729a82dcd022d552e0d28c2c2ef8d582fff


Zero‑Dwell Threat Intelligence Report

A narrative, executive‑ready view into the malware’s behavior, exposure, and reliable defenses.
Generated: 2025-09-18 06:50:38 UTC

Executive Overview — What We’re Dealing With

This specimen has persisted long enough to matter. Human experts classified it as Malware, and the telemetry confirms a capable, evasive Trojan with real impact potential.

File
528cc729a82dcd022d552e0d28c2c2ef8d582fff
Type
Win64 Executable (generic)
SHA‑1
528cc729a82dcd022d552e0d28c2c2ef8d582fff
MD5
5e7940ac5f3eb078753b33bb0d11f48e
First Seen
2025-09-05 07:17:29.994457
Last Analysis
2025-09-05 10:02:32.678854
Dwell Time
0 days, 7 hours, 33 minutes

Extended Dwell Time Impact

For 2+ hours, this malware remained undetected — a limited but sufficient window for the adversary to complete initial execution and establish basic system access.

Comparative Context

Industry studies report a median dwell time closer to 21–24 days. This case represents rapid detection and containment within hours rather than days.

Timeline

Time (UTC) Event Elapsed
2025-09-03 16:33:36 UTC First VirusTotal submission
2025-09-09 07:37:18 UTC Latest analysis snapshot 5 days, 15 hours, 3 minutes
2025-09-18 06:50:38 UTC Report generation time 14 days, 14 hours, 17 minutes

Why It Matters

Every additional day of dwell time is not just an abstract number — it is attacker opportunity. Each day equates to more time for lateral movement, stealth persistence, and intelligence gathering.

Global Detection Posture — Who Caught It, Who Missed It

VirusTotal engines: 73. Detected as malicious: 47. Missed: 26. Coverage: 64.4%.

Detected Vendors

  • Xcitium
  • +46 additional vendors (names not provided)

List includes Xcitium plus an additional 46 vendors per the provided summary.

Missed Vendors

  • Acronis
  • Antiy-AVL
  • APEX
  • Baidu
  • CAT-QuickHeal
  • ClamAV
  • CMC
  • CrowdStrike
  • Cylance
  • Gridinsoft
  • huorong
  • Jiangmin
  • MaxSecure
  • NANO-Antivirus
  • SentinelOne
  • SUPERAntiSpyware
  • TACHYON
  • tehtris
  • Tencent
  • Trapmine
  • VirIT
  • ViRobot
  • Yandex
  • Zillya
  • ZoneAlarm
  • Zoner

Why it matters: if any endpoint relies solely on a missed engine, this malware can operate with zero alerts. Prevention‑first controls close that gap regardless of signature lag.

Behavioral Storyline — How the Malware Operates

Dominant system-level operations (68.42% of behavior) suggest this malware performs deep system reconnaissance, privilege escalation, or core OS manipulation. It’s actively probing system defenses and attempting to gain administrative control.

Behavior Categories (weighted)

Weight values represent the frequency and intensity of malware interactions with specific system components. Higher weights indicate more aggressive targeting of that category. Each operation (registry access, file modification, network connection, etc.) contributes to the category’s total weight, providing a quantitative measure of the malware’s behavioral focus.

Category Weight Percentage
System 13 68.42%
Process 2 10.53%
File System 2 10.53%
Registry 2 10.53%

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

  • T1027 – encrypt data using RC4 PRGA
  • T1027 – encode data using XOR
  • T1027 – encrypt data using AES via x86 extensions
  • T1129 – get kernel32 base address
  • T1129 – parse PE header
  • T1027 – encrypt data using Salsa20 or ChaCha
  • T1129 – access PEB ldr_data
  • T1027 – encode data using Base64
  • T1071 – The PE file contains an overlay
  • T1027 – The binary contains an unknown PE section name indicative of packing
  • T1027.002 – The binary contains an unknown PE section name indicative of packing

Following the Trail — Network & DNS Activity

Outbound activity leans on reputable infrastructure (e.g., CDNs, cloud endpoints) to blend in. TLS sessions and
HTTP calls show routine beaconing and IP‑lookup behavior that can masquerade as normal browsing.

Contacted Domains

Domain IP Country ASN/Org
www.msftncsi.com 23.200.3.20 United States Akamai Technologies, Inc.

Observed IPs

IP Country ASN/Org
224.0.0.252
239.255.255.250
8.8.4.4 United States Google LLC
8.8.8.8 United States Google LLC

DNS Queries

Request Type
www.msftncsi.com A
5isohu.com A

Contacted IPs

IP Country ASN/Org
224.0.0.252
239.255.255.250
8.8.4.4 United States Google LLC
8.8.8.8 United States Google LLC

Port Distribution

Port Count Protocols
137 1 udp
138 1 udp
5355 5 udp
53 4 udp
3702 1 udp

UDP Packets

Source IP Dest IP Sport Dport Time Proto
192.168.56.11 192.168.56.255 137 137 3.2733330726623535 udp
192.168.56.11 192.168.56.255 138 138 9.260455131530762 udp
192.168.56.11 224.0.0.252 49563 5355 3.228827953338623 udp
192.168.56.11 224.0.0.252 54650 5355 3.2730560302734375 udp
192.168.56.11 224.0.0.252 55601 5355 5.138597011566162 udp
192.168.56.11 224.0.0.252 60205 5355 3.276216983795166 udp
192.168.56.11 224.0.0.252 62798 5355 5.832782030105591 udp
192.168.56.11 239.255.255.250 62184 3702 3.272390127182007 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.4.4 51690 53 7.963478088378906 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.4.4 51899 53 5.832895040512085 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.8.8 51690 53 8.963125944137573 udp
192.168.56.11 8.8.8.8 51899 53 6.822757005691528 udp

Hunting tip: alert on unknown binaries initiating TLS to IP‑lookup services or unusual CDN endpoints — especially early in execution.

Persistence & Policy — Registry and Services

Registry and service telemetry points to policy awareness and environment reconnaissance rather than noisy persistence. Below is a compact view of the most relevant keys and handles; expand to see the full lists where available.

Registry Opened

15

Registry Set

0

Services Started

0

Services Opened

0

Registry Opened (Top 25)

Key
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Policies\Microsoft\Cryptography\Configuration
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Ole
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Display
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\AppModel\Lookaside\machine
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\OLE
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\DMTW.exe
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\Segment Heap
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Policies\Microsoft\MUI\Settings
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\GRE_Initialize
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Safer\CodeIdentifiers
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\AppModel\Lookaside\user
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Ole\FeatureDevelopmentProperties
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\OLE\Tracing
Show all (15 total)

Registry Set (Top 25)

Services Started (Top 15)

Services Opened (Top 15)

What To Do Now — Practical Defense Playbook

  • Contain unknowns: block first‑run binaries by default — signatures catch up, containment works now.
  • EDR controls: alert on keyboard hooks, screen capture APIs, VM/sandbox checks, and command‑shell launches.
  • Registry watch: flag queries/sets under policy paths (e.g., …\FipsAlgorithmPolicy\*).
  • Network rules: inspect outbound TLS to IP‑lookup services and unexpected CDN endpoints.
  • Hunt broadly: sweep endpoints for the indicators above and quarantine positives immediately.

Dwell time equals attacker opportunity. Reducing execution privileges and egress shrinks that window even when vendors disagree.

Scroll to Top