Executive Overview — What We’re Dealing With

This specimen has persisted long enough to matter. Human experts classified it as Malware, and the telemetry confirms a capable, evasive Trojan with real impact potential.

Extended Dwell Time Impact

For 2+ hours, this malware remained undetected — a limited but sufficient window for the adversary to complete initial execution and establish basic system access.

Global Detection Posture — Who Caught It, Who Missed It

VirusTotal engines: 73. Detected as malicious: 45. Missed: 28. Coverage: 61.6%.

Why it matters: if any endpoint relies solely on a missed engine, this malware can operate with zero alerts. Prevention‑first controls close that gap regardless of signature lag.

Behavioral Storyline — How the Malware Operates

This threat shows heavy registry manipulation (36.97% of total behavior), indicating persistent backdoor installation, configuration tampering, or system policy modification attempts. The malware likely establishes persistence mechanisms and modifies security settings to maintain long-term access.

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

• T1620 – invoke .NET assembly method
• T1105 – download and write a file
• T1202 – Uses suspicious command line tools or Windows utilities
• T1202 – Uses Windows utilities for basic functionality
• T1070.006 – Binary compilation timestomping detected
• T1070 – Deletes executed files from disk
• T1070 – Binary compilation timestomping detected
• T1027 – Uses csc.exe C# compiler to build and execute code
• T1027.004 – Uses csc.exe C# compiler to build and execute code
• T1082 – Checks available memory
• T1057 – Enumerates the modules from a process (may be used to locate base addresses in process injection)
• T1071 – At least one IP Address, Domain, or File Name was found in a crypto call
• T1071 – Reads from the memory of another process
• T1071 – Yara detections observed in process dumps, payloads or dropped files
• T1071 – A process attempted to delay the analysis task.
• T1573 – Establishes an encrypted HTTPS connection
• T1106 – Guard pages use detected – possible anti-debugging.
• T1012 – Query OS Information
• T1016 – Reads network adapter information
• T1027.002 – Creates a page with write and execute permissions
• T1027.002 – Resolves API functions dynamically
• T1047 – Executes WMI query
• T1071.001 – Downloads file
• T1071.004 – Performs DNS request
• T1082 – Query OS Information
• T1095 – Connects to remote host
• T1105 – Downloads file
• T1134 – Enables process privileges
• T1564.003 – Creates process with hidden window
• T1047 – Queries memory information (via WMI often done to detect virtual machines)
• T1562.001 – Creates guard pages, often used to prevent reverse engineering and debugging
• T1497 – May sleep (evasive loops) to hinder dynamic analysis
• T1497 – Allocates memory with a write watch (potentially for evading sandboxes)
• T1070.006 – Binary contains a suspicious time stamp
• T1518.001 – Queries memory information (via WMI often done to detect virtual machines)
• T1082 – Queries the volume information (name, serial number etc) of a device
• T1082 – Queries the cryptographic machine GUID
• T1573 – Uses HTTPS
• T1071 – Uses HTTPS

Following the Trail — Network & DNS Activity

Outbound activity leans on reputable infrastructure (e.g., CDNs, cloud endpoints) to blend in. TLS sessions and
HTTP calls show routine beaconing and IP‑lookup behavior that can masquerade as normal browsing.

Hunting tip: alert on unknown binaries initiating TLS to IP‑lookup services or unusual CDN endpoints — especially early in execution.