62bed6d5666ac884271aebf89c863e7cc801a29e


Zero‑Dwell Threat Intelligence Report

A narrative, executive‑ready view into the malware’s behavior, exposure, and reliable defenses.
Generated: 2025-09-18 06:50:24 UTC

Executive Overview — What We’re Dealing With

This specimen has persisted long enough to matter. Human experts classified it as Malware, and the telemetry confirms a capable, evasive Trojan with real impact potential.

File
cnmpaui.dll
Type
Win64 Executable (generic)
SHA‑1
62bed6d5666ac884271aebf89c863e7cc801a29e
MD5
9f1de211941d63b57942661c4d30833d
First Seen
2025-09-05 07:16:53.395496
Last Analysis
2025-09-05 10:02:33.221382
Dwell Time
0 days, 7 hours, 33 minutes

Extended Dwell Time Impact

For 2+ hours, this malware remained undetected — a limited but sufficient window for the adversary to complete initial execution and establish basic system access.

Comparative Context

Industry studies report a median dwell time closer to 21–24 days. This case represents rapid detection and containment within hours rather than days.

Timeline

Time (UTC) Event Elapsed
2025-03-26 10:46:22 UTC First VirusTotal submission
2025-09-09 07:37:39 UTC Latest analysis snapshot 166 days, 20 hours, 51 minutes
2025-09-18 06:50:24 UTC Report generation time 175 days, 20 hours, 4 minutes

Why It Matters

Every additional day of dwell time is not just an abstract number — it is attacker opportunity. Each day equates to more time for lateral movement, stealth persistence, and intelligence gathering.

Global Detection Posture — Who Caught It, Who Missed It

VirusTotal engines: 73. Detected as malicious: 48. Missed: 25. Coverage: 65.8%.

Detected Vendors

  • Xcitium
  • +47 additional vendors (names not provided)

List includes Xcitium plus an additional 47 vendors per the provided summary.

Missed Vendors

  • Acronis
  • Alibaba
  • Avira
  • Baidu
  • ClamAV
  • CMC
  • DrWeb
  • F-Secure
  • google_safebrowsing
  • Gridinsoft
  • huorong
  • Jiangmin
  • Kingsoft
  • SentinelOne
  • SUPERAntiSpyware
  • TACHYON
  • tehtris
  • Trapmine
  • TrendMicro
  • VBA32
  • VirIT
  • Webroot
  • Yandex
  • ZoneAlarm
  • Zoner

Why it matters: if any endpoint relies solely on a missed engine, this malware can operate with zero alerts. Prevention‑first controls close that gap regardless of signature lag.

Behavioral Storyline — How the Malware Operates

Dominant system-level operations (45.16% of behavior) suggest this malware performs deep system reconnaissance, privilege escalation, or core OS manipulation. It’s actively probing system defenses and attempting to gain administrative control.

Behavior Categories (weighted)

Weight values represent the frequency and intensity of malware interactions with specific system components. Higher weights indicate more aggressive targeting of that category. Each operation (registry access, file modification, network connection, etc.) contributes to the category’s total weight, providing a quantitative measure of the malware’s behavioral focus.

Category Weight Percentage
System 28 45.16%
Process 14 22.58%
File System 10 16.13%
Registry 8 12.90%
Misc 2 3.23%

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

  • T1027 – encrypt data using RC4 PRGA
  • T1129 – link function at runtime on Windows
  • T1082 – query environment variable
  • T1129 – link many functions at runtime
  • T1082 – get memory capacity
  • T1129 – parse PE header
  • T1082 – get system information on Windows
  • T1129 – access PEB ldr_data
  • T1027 – encode data using XOR
  • T1083 – enumerate files on Windows
  • T1082 – get number of processors
  • T1071 – Adversaries may communicate using application layer protocols to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic.
  • T1027 – Adversaries may attempt to make an executable or file difficult to discover or analyze by encrypting, encoding, or otherwise obfuscating its contents on the system or in transit.
  • T1027.002 – Adversaries may perform software packing or virtual machine software protection to conceal their code.
  • T1045 – Software Packing
  • T1574.002 – Tries to load missing DLLs
  • T1218.011 – Runs a DLL by calling functions
  • T1497 – Contains medium sleeps (>= 30s)
  • T1056 – Creates a DirectInput object (often for capturing keystrokes)
  • T1082 – Reads software policies
  • T1095 – Performs DNS lookups
  • T1071 – Performs DNS lookups

Following the Trail — Network & DNS Activity

Outbound activity leans on reputable infrastructure (e.g., CDNs, cloud endpoints) to blend in. TLS sessions and
HTTP calls show routine beaconing and IP‑lookup behavior that can masquerade as normal browsing.

Contacted Domains

Domain IP Country ASN/Org
www.aieov.com 76.223.54.146 United States Amazon.com, Inc.

Observed IPs

IP Country ASN/Org
224.0.0.252
8.8.4.4 United States Google LLC
8.8.8.8 United States Google LLC

DNS Queries

Request Type
5isohu.com A
www.aieov.com A

Contacted IPs

IP Country ASN/Org
224.0.0.252
8.8.4.4 United States Google LLC
8.8.8.8 United States Google LLC

Port Distribution

Port Count Protocols
137 1 udp
5355 4 udp
53 28 udp

UDP Packets

Source IP Dest IP Sport Dport Time Proto
192.168.56.14 192.168.56.255 137 137 3.0812318325042725 udp
192.168.56.14 224.0.0.252 51209 5355 3.018558979034424 udp
192.168.56.14 224.0.0.252 53401 5355 4.410560846328735 udp
192.168.56.14 224.0.0.252 55094 5355 5.5795018672943115 udp
192.168.56.14 224.0.0.252 55848 5355 3.018948793411255 udp
192.168.56.14 8.8.4.4 49916 53 98.26566886901855 udp
192.168.56.14 8.8.4.4 50180 53 145.23465991020203 udp
192.168.56.14 8.8.4.4 50710 53 65.65699887275696 udp
192.168.56.14 8.8.4.4 52815 53 7.009670972824097 udp
192.168.56.14 8.8.4.4 54579 53 51.29741287231445 udp
192.168.56.14 8.8.4.4 54683 53 192.20344281196594 udp
192.168.56.14 8.8.4.4 55914 53 126.98449277877808 udp
192.168.56.14 8.8.4.4 56399 53 173.95599699020386 udp
192.168.56.14 8.8.4.4 60117 53 80.0164589881897 udp
192.168.56.14 8.8.4.4 62022 53 159.59435892105103 udp
192.168.56.14 8.8.4.4 62112 53 36.71914982795715 udp
192.168.56.14 8.8.4.4 63205 53 206.56276082992554 udp
192.168.56.14 8.8.4.4 64753 53 112.62533378601074 udp
192.168.56.14 8.8.4.4 65148 53 22.359785795211792 udp
192.168.56.14 8.8.8.8 49916 53 97.26862096786499 udp
192.168.56.14 8.8.8.8 50180 53 144.23539781570435 udp
192.168.56.14 8.8.8.8 50710 53 64.66831183433533 udp
192.168.56.14 8.8.8.8 52815 53 8.003232955932617 udp
192.168.56.14 8.8.8.8 54579 53 50.29745292663574 udp
192.168.56.14 8.8.8.8 54683 53 191.20515894889832 udp
192.168.56.14 8.8.8.8 55914 53 125.98494696617126 udp
192.168.56.14 8.8.8.8 56399 53 172.95368885993958 udp
192.168.56.14 8.8.8.8 60117 53 79.01781177520752 udp
192.168.56.14 8.8.8.8 62022 53 158.5947949886322 udp
192.168.56.14 8.8.8.8 62112 53 35.719374895095825 udp
192.168.56.14 8.8.8.8 63205 53 205.56298279762268 udp
192.168.56.14 8.8.8.8 64753 53 111.62602281570435 udp
192.168.56.14 8.8.8.8 65148 53 21.36153483390808 udp

Hunting tip: alert on unknown binaries initiating TLS to IP‑lookup services or unusual CDN endpoints — especially early in execution.

Persistence & Policy — Registry and Services

Registry and service telemetry points to policy awareness and environment reconnaissance rather than noisy persistence. Below is a compact view of the most relevant keys and handles; expand to see the full lists where available.

Registry Opened

42

Registry Set

0

Services Started

0

Services Opened

0

Registry Opened (Top 25)

Key
HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Themes\Personalize\AppsUseLightTheme
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\GRE_Initialize\DisableMetaFiles
HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Themes\Personalize
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\GRE_Initialize
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\GRE_Initialize\DisableUmpdBufferSizeCheck
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\CTF\TIP\{0000897b-83df-4b96-be07-0fb58b01c4a4}\LanguageProfile\0x00000000\{0001bea3-ed56-483d-a2e2-aeae25577436}
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\CTF\Compatibility\rundll32.exe
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\CTF\
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\rundll32.exe
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\WOW6432Node\Policies\Microsoft\WindowsStore
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\Segment Heap
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\cmd.exe
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\WOW6432Node\Policies\Microsoft\MUI\Settings
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\WOW6432Node\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\ProfileList
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\WOW6432Node\Microsoft\CTF\Compatibility\rundll32.exe
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\WOW6432Node\Microsoft\OLE
HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\WOW6432Node\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\AppCompatFlags
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\WOW6432Node\Microsoft\LanguageOverlay\OverlayPackages\en-US
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\WOW6432Node\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\SideBySide
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\WOW6432Node\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Safer\CodeIdentifiers
HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\AppCompatFlags\Layers
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Wow64\x86
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\DllNXOptions
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\WOW6432Node\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Policies\Microsoft\Cryptography\Configuration
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\WOW6432Node\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\system\CurrentControlSet\control\NetworkProvider\HwOrder
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Wow64\x86\xtajit
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\AppCompatFlags\Disable8And16BitMitigation
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\WOW6432Node\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Display
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\WOW6432Node\Microsoft\OLEAUT
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\MUI\UILanguages\en-US
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Ole
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Ole\FeatureDevelopmentProperties
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\WOW6432Node\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\GRE_Initialize
HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Shell Folders
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Nls\CustomLocale
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\WOW6432Node\Microsoft\OLE\Tracing
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\system\CurrentControlSet\control\NetworkProvider\ProviderOrder
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\AppModel\Lookaside\Packages
Show all (42 total)

Registry Set (Top 25)

Services Started (Top 15)

Services Opened (Top 15)

What To Do Now — Practical Defense Playbook

  • Contain unknowns: block first‑run binaries by default — signatures catch up, containment works now.
  • EDR controls: alert on keyboard hooks, screen capture APIs, VM/sandbox checks, and command‑shell launches.
  • Registry watch: flag queries/sets under policy paths (e.g., …\FipsAlgorithmPolicy\*).
  • Network rules: inspect outbound TLS to IP‑lookup services and unexpected CDN endpoints.
  • Hunt broadly: sweep endpoints for the indicators above and quarantine positives immediately.

Dwell time equals attacker opportunity. Reducing execution privileges and egress shrinks that window even when vendors disagree.

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