Zero‑Dwell Threat Intelligence Report
Executive Overview — What We’re Dealing With
This specimen has persisted long enough to matter. Human experts classified it as Malware, and the telemetry confirms a capable, evasive Trojan with real impact potential.
Extended Dwell Time Impact
For 2+ hours, this malware remained undetected — a limited but sufficient window for the adversary to complete initial execution and establish basic system access.
Comparative Context
Industry studies report a median dwell time closer to 21–24 days. This case represents rapid detection and containment within hours rather than days.
Timeline
Time (UTC) | Event | Elapsed |
---|---|---|
2025-03-26 10:46:22 UTC | First VirusTotal submission | — |
2025-09-09 07:37:39 UTC | Latest analysis snapshot | 166 days, 20 hours, 51 minutes |
2025-09-18 06:50:24 UTC | Report generation time | 175 days, 20 hours, 4 minutes |
Why It Matters
Every additional day of dwell time is not just an abstract number — it is attacker opportunity. Each day equates to more time for lateral movement, stealth persistence, and intelligence gathering.
Global Detection Posture — Who Caught It, Who Missed It
VirusTotal engines: 73. Detected as malicious: 48. Missed: 25. Coverage: 65.8%.
Detected Vendors
- Xcitium
- +47 additional vendors (names not provided)
List includes Xcitium plus an additional 47 vendors per the provided summary.
Missed Vendors
- Acronis
- Alibaba
- Avira
- Baidu
- ClamAV
- CMC
- DrWeb
- F-Secure
- google_safebrowsing
- Gridinsoft
- huorong
- Jiangmin
- Kingsoft
- SentinelOne
- SUPERAntiSpyware
- TACHYON
- tehtris
- Trapmine
- TrendMicro
- VBA32
- VirIT
- Webroot
- Yandex
- ZoneAlarm
- Zoner
Why it matters: if any endpoint relies solely on a missed engine, this malware can operate with zero alerts. Prevention‑first controls close that gap regardless of signature lag.
Behavioral Storyline — How the Malware Operates
Dominant system-level operations (45.16% of behavior) suggest this malware performs deep system reconnaissance, privilege escalation, or core OS manipulation. It’s actively probing system defenses and attempting to gain administrative control.
Behavior Categories (weighted)
Weight values represent the frequency and intensity of malware interactions with specific system components. Higher weights indicate more aggressive targeting of that category. Each operation (registry access, file modification, network connection, etc.) contributes to the category’s total weight, providing a quantitative measure of the malware’s behavioral focus.
Category | Weight | Percentage |
---|---|---|
System | 28 | 45.16% |
Process | 14 | 22.58% |
File System | 10 | 16.13% |
Registry | 8 | 12.90% |
Misc | 2 | 3.23% |
MITRE ATT&CK Mapping
- T1027 – encrypt data using RC4 PRGA
- T1129 – link function at runtime on Windows
- T1082 – query environment variable
- T1129 – link many functions at runtime
- T1082 – get memory capacity
- T1129 – parse PE header
- T1082 – get system information on Windows
- T1129 – access PEB ldr_data
- T1027 – encode data using XOR
- T1083 – enumerate files on Windows
- T1082 – get number of processors
- T1071 – Adversaries may communicate using application layer protocols to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic.
- T1027 – Adversaries may attempt to make an executable or file difficult to discover or analyze by encrypting, encoding, or otherwise obfuscating its contents on the system or in transit.
- T1027.002 – Adversaries may perform software packing or virtual machine software protection to conceal their code.
- T1045 – Software Packing
- T1574.002 – Tries to load missing DLLs
- T1218.011 – Runs a DLL by calling functions
- T1497 – Contains medium sleeps (>= 30s)
- T1056 – Creates a DirectInput object (often for capturing keystrokes)
- T1082 – Reads software policies
- T1095 – Performs DNS lookups
- T1071 – Performs DNS lookups
Following the Trail — Network & DNS Activity
Outbound activity leans on reputable infrastructure (e.g., CDNs, cloud endpoints) to blend in. TLS sessions and
HTTP calls show routine beaconing and IP‑lookup behavior that can masquerade as normal browsing.
Contacted Domains
Domain | IP | Country | ASN/Org |
---|---|---|---|
www.aieov.com | 76.223.54.146 | United States | Amazon.com, Inc. |
Observed IPs
IP | Country | ASN/Org |
---|---|---|
224.0.0.252 | — | — |
8.8.4.4 | United States | Google LLC |
8.8.8.8 | United States | Google LLC |
DNS Queries
Request | Type |
---|---|
5isohu.com | A |
www.aieov.com | A |
Contacted IPs
IP | Country | ASN/Org |
---|---|---|
224.0.0.252 | — | — |
8.8.4.4 | United States | Google LLC |
8.8.8.8 | United States | Google LLC |
Port Distribution
Port | Count | Protocols |
---|---|---|
137 | 1 | udp |
5355 | 4 | udp |
53 | 28 | udp |
UDP Packets
Source IP | Dest IP | Sport | Dport | Time | Proto |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
192.168.56.14 | 192.168.56.255 | 137 | 137 | 3.0812318325042725 | udp |
192.168.56.14 | 224.0.0.252 | 51209 | 5355 | 3.018558979034424 | udp |
192.168.56.14 | 224.0.0.252 | 53401 | 5355 | 4.410560846328735 | udp |
192.168.56.14 | 224.0.0.252 | 55094 | 5355 | 5.5795018672943115 | udp |
192.168.56.14 | 224.0.0.252 | 55848 | 5355 | 3.018948793411255 | udp |
192.168.56.14 | 8.8.4.4 | 49916 | 53 | 98.26566886901855 | udp |
192.168.56.14 | 8.8.4.4 | 50180 | 53 | 145.23465991020203 | udp |
192.168.56.14 | 8.8.4.4 | 50710 | 53 | 65.65699887275696 | udp |
192.168.56.14 | 8.8.4.4 | 52815 | 53 | 7.009670972824097 | udp |
192.168.56.14 | 8.8.4.4 | 54579 | 53 | 51.29741287231445 | udp |
192.168.56.14 | 8.8.4.4 | 54683 | 53 | 192.20344281196594 | udp |
192.168.56.14 | 8.8.4.4 | 55914 | 53 | 126.98449277877808 | udp |
192.168.56.14 | 8.8.4.4 | 56399 | 53 | 173.95599699020386 | udp |
192.168.56.14 | 8.8.4.4 | 60117 | 53 | 80.0164589881897 | udp |
192.168.56.14 | 8.8.4.4 | 62022 | 53 | 159.59435892105103 | udp |
192.168.56.14 | 8.8.4.4 | 62112 | 53 | 36.71914982795715 | udp |
192.168.56.14 | 8.8.4.4 | 63205 | 53 | 206.56276082992554 | udp |
192.168.56.14 | 8.8.4.4 | 64753 | 53 | 112.62533378601074 | udp |
192.168.56.14 | 8.8.4.4 | 65148 | 53 | 22.359785795211792 | udp |
192.168.56.14 | 8.8.8.8 | 49916 | 53 | 97.26862096786499 | udp |
192.168.56.14 | 8.8.8.8 | 50180 | 53 | 144.23539781570435 | udp |
192.168.56.14 | 8.8.8.8 | 50710 | 53 | 64.66831183433533 | udp |
192.168.56.14 | 8.8.8.8 | 52815 | 53 | 8.003232955932617 | udp |
192.168.56.14 | 8.8.8.8 | 54579 | 53 | 50.29745292663574 | udp |
192.168.56.14 | 8.8.8.8 | 54683 | 53 | 191.20515894889832 | udp |
192.168.56.14 | 8.8.8.8 | 55914 | 53 | 125.98494696617126 | udp |
192.168.56.14 | 8.8.8.8 | 56399 | 53 | 172.95368885993958 | udp |
192.168.56.14 | 8.8.8.8 | 60117 | 53 | 79.01781177520752 | udp |
192.168.56.14 | 8.8.8.8 | 62022 | 53 | 158.5947949886322 | udp |
192.168.56.14 | 8.8.8.8 | 62112 | 53 | 35.719374895095825 | udp |
192.168.56.14 | 8.8.8.8 | 63205 | 53 | 205.56298279762268 | udp |
192.168.56.14 | 8.8.8.8 | 64753 | 53 | 111.62602281570435 | udp |
192.168.56.14 | 8.8.8.8 | 65148 | 53 | 21.36153483390808 | udp |
Hunting tip: alert on unknown binaries initiating TLS to IP‑lookup services or unusual CDN endpoints — especially early in execution.
Persistence & Policy — Registry and Services
Registry and service telemetry points to policy awareness and environment reconnaissance rather than noisy persistence. Below is a compact view of the most relevant keys and handles; expand to see the full lists where available.
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Registry Opened (Top 25)
Key |
---|
HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Themes\Personalize\AppsUseLightTheme |
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\GRE_Initialize\DisableMetaFiles |
HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Themes\Personalize |
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\GRE_Initialize |
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\GRE_Initialize\DisableUmpdBufferSizeCheck |
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\CTF\TIP\{0000897b-83df-4b96-be07-0fb58b01c4a4}\LanguageProfile\0x00000000\{0001bea3-ed56-483d-a2e2-aeae25577436} |
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\CTF\Compatibility\rundll32.exe |
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\CTF\ |
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\rundll32.exe |
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\WOW6432Node\Policies\Microsoft\WindowsStore |
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\Segment Heap |
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\cmd.exe |
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager |
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\WOW6432Node\Policies\Microsoft\MUI\Settings |
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\WOW6432Node\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\ProfileList |
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\WOW6432Node\Microsoft\CTF\Compatibility\rundll32.exe |
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\WOW6432Node\Microsoft\OLE |
HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion |
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\WOW6432Node\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\AppCompatFlags |
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\WOW6432Node\Microsoft\LanguageOverlay\OverlayPackages\en-US |
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\WOW6432Node\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\SideBySide |
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\WOW6432Node\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Safer\CodeIdentifiers |
HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\AppCompatFlags\Layers |
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Wow64\x86 |
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\DllNXOptions |
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\WOW6432Node\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options |
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Policies\Microsoft\Cryptography\Configuration |
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\WOW6432Node\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion |
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\system\CurrentControlSet\control\NetworkProvider\HwOrder |
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Wow64\x86\xtajit |
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\AppCompatFlags\Disable8And16BitMitigation |
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\WOW6432Node\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Display |
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\WOW6432Node\Microsoft\OLEAUT |
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\MUI\UILanguages\en-US |
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Ole |
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Ole\FeatureDevelopmentProperties |
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\WOW6432Node\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\GRE_Initialize |
HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Shell Folders |
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Nls\CustomLocale |
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\WOW6432Node\Microsoft\OLE\Tracing |
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\system\CurrentControlSet\control\NetworkProvider\ProviderOrder |
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\AppModel\Lookaside\Packages |
Show all (42 total)
Registry Set (Top 25)
Services Started (Top 15)
Services Opened (Top 15)
What To Do Now — Practical Defense Playbook
- Contain unknowns: block first‑run binaries by default — signatures catch up, containment works now.
- EDR controls: alert on keyboard hooks, screen capture APIs, VM/sandbox checks, and command‑shell launches.
- Registry watch: flag queries/sets under policy paths (e.g., …\FipsAlgorithmPolicy\*).
- Network rules: inspect outbound TLS to IP‑lookup services and unexpected CDN endpoints.
- Hunt broadly: sweep endpoints for the indicators above and quarantine positives immediately.
Dwell time equals attacker opportunity. Reducing execution privileges and egress shrinks that window even when vendors disagree.